The first open thread here, looking for volunteers to manage it
So, about that shipbuilding strategy
Last Friday I let everyone know of my intent to shut up shop and close Think Defence. I also said I would pen a more considered farewell by way of an explanation and look forward.
The reason I started Think Defence was simply to provide a forum for (hopefully) sensible conversations about UK defence and security.
I actually received the inspiration to ‘do something’ from Dr Richard North at EU Referendum who at the time was campaigning on the Snatch Land Rover issue against a great deal of negativity. Richard was thoroughly vindicated and eventually spun Defence of the Realm out from the main blog and so one might consider DOTR as the ‘granddaddy’ of UK Defence Blogs although I think Tony McNally has been blogging at Rogue Gunner since 2006. Richard Beedall’s site, Navy Matters, was also an early inspiration, I owe them all a debt of gratitude for showing the way.
With a broader subject spread, Think Defence was born in February 2009 with a post about the A400M.
The format and publishing platform has changed a number of times, first Joomla (painful) and then on to WordPress. I wanted total control so decided against Blogger or Typepad. With increasing traffic, the demands of a high volume site dictated the need for much more robust hosting arrangements.
WordPress is a great platform for content creators but don’t underestimate the learning curve.
On hosting, after going through several, the adage that you get what you pay for is apt, if you want security and reliability that is. Advertising through Google and several contributions from the TD community has enabled this high quality hosting and a number of additional enhancements to the basic platform.
The Road to Today
A few nerdy stats…
- 2009; 105 posts, 1 page and 93,091 words
- 2010; 400 posts, 0 pages and 326,059 words
- 2011; 336 posts, 0 pages and 487,964 words
- 2012; 401 posts, 3 pages and 584,272 words
- 2013; 724 posts, 5 pages and 603,584 words
- 2014; 712 posts, 4 pages and 507,100 words
- 2015; 665 posts, 50 pages and 571,040 words
- 2016; 463 posts, 47 pages and 285,271 words
Totting up, that is approximately 3.5 million words across over just under four thousand posts or pages.
When I live blogged the 2015 SDSR, traffic went through the roof, about 45,000 page views that day. Otherwise, traffic has grown steadily with an average of about 10,000 page views per day until fairly recently when I slowed things down. Current traffic is about 6,000 page views per day.
In total, Think Defence has garnered approximately 13 million page views.
There has been a few a few shenanigans; others stealing content and passing it off as their own, legal threats from a certain mythical think tank, a constant battle against spammers and the odd intemperate bitchfest in comments, but despite these, it’s been a hoot!
A collection of great guest writers have also added enormous value.
The real strength of Think Defence however, is not the content, it is the comments, all 164 odd thousand of them.
On Twitter, as you may know, I also kept an active presence, over 8,000 followers now, although not quite in Justin Bieber territory!
The reason for my decision, which has been coming for some time, is simply one of time. To keep things going at a level of quality that I set myself means a lot of time. Whilst it has been possible to slow the post rate down, time spent researching and collating information from different sources still means a large commitment.
It is also much harder than one might imagine to ‘slow down’, the temptation is always there. Better to remove the temptation altogether.
The three things I have taken most pride from are;
Keeping a loyal and hugely knowledgeable gang of commenters who continually invest their own time to join the conversation and make Think Defence a friendly and interesting place.
Being able to attract guest authors and provide them with a platform to say what they want, Think Defence would be much the poorer without its guest authors or contributors.
Finally, inspiring a few guest authors to go on and start their own blogs, Thin Pinstriped Line and Defence with a C for example.
A Few Thoughts on Military Blogging
What started out fairly low key has turned into a bit of a monster because I think there was a ‘market need’ for it.
Let’s be clear, typing words into a computer is in no way comparable to the problems that defence professionals face in the real world, or indeed, former server service personnel.
I have also tried, not always successfully, to avoid being too judgemental from a position of comfort, people in the MoD and industry don’t get up in morning and decide to make poor decisions. They are working within the bounds of a larger system with financial, political and operational constraints we cannot know. FRES or Type 26 problems are not the result of one pivotal decision made by a single malignant person.
That said, problems can sometimes be seen from outside with a clarity not possible when dealing with the day to day, so defence blogging (and defence journalism of course) is a valuable means by which decisions can be examined and those in power held to some form of account.
Hopefully, other and future defence bloggers looking outside in will try and keep that in mind.
Where I think defence blogging can have significant value is to link current decisions to past decisions. We know the MoD has a predilection to change project names in order to compartmentalise previous problems, the FLAV >> FFLAV >> MRAV/TRACER >> FRES >> SV/UV >> Ajax/MIV journey being a case in point.
I feel privileged to know the authors of blogs such as Jedibeeftrix, Chuck Hills Coast Guard Blog, Mental Crumble, PsyWar, Quill or Capture, Bring the Heat, Defense and Freedom, Military History Now, Defence in Depth, Weapons Man, Save the Royal Navy, Eagle Speak, Steeljaw Scribe, Angry Staff Officer, Snafu, Thin Pinstriped Line, Defence with a C, Fall When Hit, CDR Salamander, Defence of the Realm, Kings of War, War on the Rocks and many more, even if only virtually.
There is a fantastic community of defence writers outside of Think Defence.
When it comes to UK defence blogging specifically, MoD policy, whether written or unwritten, puts many constraints on serving personnel or civil servants putting their thoughts online. In 2016, the British Army Review is still closed from the public and those serving personnel that have contributed to Think Defence and other blogs have generally done so under a nom de plume. This is stark contrast to US forces where writing and public debate seems (at least from this perspective) to be positively encouraged.
The MoD’s social media policy will change as times change, slower than many want, but it will change. Hopefully, the forces culture will follow.
Over the years a few things have remained constant at Think Defence;
- People, training and thinking must always come before shiny new toys
- High-end equipment spending will be wasted without adequate support, spares and consumable stocks
- Civilian industry can offer many solutions to defence problems
- Technology risk taking is to be encouraged
- UK defence industry must be nurtured and protected
- Bridges are rather cool and metals boxes, likewise
My hope is that these themes remain as defence writing evolves, especially the last one, obvs!
From this point…
Think Defence will not disappear overnight, this is the current plan…
First, I will start to thin out the database and remove content that has not aged well, was topical to a specific time point, or frankly, a bit rubbish.
Second, the Parliamentary Questions and Answers will be deleted, these are held in Hansard and easily accessed with keyword searches etc.
Third, I have a Flickr Pro account that I will maintain, all the media from the site will be migrated. If anyone is looking for an opportunity to help, tagging and grouping would benefit from ‘many hands makes light work’. Please let me know if you are interested.
Finally, I intend to migrate the long form content into downloadable PDF’s. This will mean losing the YouTube videos but I will link to those as appropriate from within the document. The PDF’s will be fully indexed, with a tables of content and all the media. Whether these remain hosted at www.thinkdefence.co.uk or somewhere else remains to be decided, am having a number of conversations about this. Other options include migrating to a WordPress.com site as a means of archiving older content.
As this processes progresses, I will keep you all posted, it might take a while.
A Final Word
After nearly eight years , time to call it a day.
Has been a hoot, made some great friends and had the honour to interact with current and ex service personnel, academics, people from industry and members of the great British public who care about the defence of this nation, plus of course, the same from other nations.
A special mention to the big bunch of commenters and guest authors, without which this place would be much the poorer, and not forgetting those that have thrown a few quid into the jar over the years to cover hosting costs.
Nothing is happening overnight and the long form content will live on in another form, not yet decided how though.
Will post more details in the near future, with perhaps a look back over the years.
Thanks all, it has been an honour.
I know many of you don’t appreciate all the Sapper and Logistics stuff I write about, but hey, not everyone can be perfect 🙂
A GUEST POST FROM JED
It appears to this humble arm chair general, that the British Army has a fundamental problem, or three.
After over a decade of constant deployment and action in a counter-insurgency role, there appears to be a resurgent interest in “high intensity” operations against so called peer level adversaries, perhaps fueled by Mr Putin’s Russia making it’s forays into Georgia, and Crimea and the eastern part of Ukraine. I don’t want to argue geopolitics, but the world wide threat assessment is what drives our governmental security policy, which in turn shapes the missions of our armed forces, which of course drives their size and shape, and their equipment procurement.
I would also suggest that Government after Government, of whatever political stripe eschews any grand strategy in favour of short termism and that in causes great problems for the armed forces. This shows itself in strategy and concepts of operations which although dressed up in flowery political language often appear to be budget driven. Hence, review after review we have man power cuts and capability cuts (oh, sorry “capability holidays” !). Yet even the army senior leadership seems to think we retain a broad and well rounded army capable of as many missions as the politicians can dream up. While I am sure it is very, very difficult as a serving head of the Army to tell the PM of the day that they are insane, that does not at the same time absolve the senior generals from coming up with their own not well thought out concepts !
Which brings us to the matter in question – the Strike Brigade. This beast seems to be vexing many an arm chair general, so I thought I would give TD my thoughts on the subject and let you all way lyrical in the comments section.
Future Force 2020
The last great plan, which actually seemed quite sensible and workable to me, from the outside looking in basically split the forces available by role, “weight” and availability criteria:
- Immediate Reaction forces – the very high readiness elements of the Royal Marines and the Para’s / 16 Air Assault Brigade.
- The Reaction Force – 3 Armoured Infantry Brigades with 5 maneuver units (Armoured Recce, Armoured (MBT), 2 x Armoured Infantry (Warrior), 1 x Mechanised Infantry (Mastiff)
- The Adaptable Force – Infantry and light recce units that could be pulled together to form not less than 2 deployable brigades of 4 maneuver units (1 recce, 3 infantry)
- Force Troops – Artillery, Engineer, Signals and logistics units brought together / deployed as required to support the deployable brigades.
Basically instead of the previous plan for 5 identical deployable brigades, this plan cut the cloth to meet the budget and yet still produced 5 brigades for rotation through an enduring deployment. While maybe not perfect, personally I thought this was a “good enough” and in many ways quite sensible structure. With UOR procured vehicles taken into the core fleet, the final appearance of the Ajax family of vehicles, Warrior upgrade progamme etc. it actually seemed a balanced plan that could provide a force not just for long term peace keeping / peace enforcement / COIN tasking, but also a heavier force for NATO or coalition ops against a peer / near peer enemy.
Not that there were not problems, Challenger 2 upgrade needed funding, the cuts in the Royal Corps of Signals (my beloved Corps) seemed to be impacting on the number of HQ’s that could be supported in the field, and similarly the Royal Artillery seemed to be in a somewhat parlous state with cuts to the AS90 fleet and reliance on towed light guns etc.
Fast forward to the latest and greatest of the so called strategic reviews, and we get a new force structure before we are anywhere near achieving the last one. This time we aspire to provide a division for a high intensity fight, and as part of the force structure we are bringing back the idea of an 8 x 8 wheeled armoured vehicle last seen as FRES UV and now known as the Mechanised Infantry Vehicle (MIV). It would appear from comments made that we would aim to pull together a division based on:
- An Armoured Infantry Brigade (one of two)
- A Strike Brigade (one of two)
- A (Protected Mobility) Infantry Brigade (one of two ?)
The Strike Brigade – what is it, what is it for ?
As part of the newly minted force structure it appears that the Armoured Infantry brigades would be cut to 2, while 2 new formations based on the MIV would be created. These would be known as Strike Brigades, a somewhat obvious homage to the U.S. Army’s “medium” Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) aka the Stryker Brigades, named after their ride the GD Stryker 8 x 8 evolution of the LAV .
The Chief of the General Staff, Sir Nick Carter did not provide a great deal of detail as to the size and shape of the Strike Brigade, nor the impact of it’s creation on other formations. Discussion ensued and details started to appear, for example although the number of tracked FRES Scout (Ajax family) would not be increased, they would now be spread across four brigades instead of three. Also the role of the MIV became somewhat more clear as the MOD / Army stated they would be looking at an off the shelf 8 x 8 APC.
So what do we think is the concept of operations behind a Strike Brigade?
Well in many respects we are just jumping on a band wagon that many (if not all ?) of our allies jumped on some years ago. After the Russians zoomed into Kosovo in a long and fast road march in wheeled BTR type vehicles, the theatre-strategic mobility of wheeled armour seemed to grab western army imaginations. The French and Italians did not need to be sold on the concept, they had been using wheeled light armoured vehicles alongside their tanks for decade. The French particularly have a long history of the use wheeled armoured cars and APC’s in 40 years of colonial and anti-terrorist operations, largely in Africa. Stryker brigades made some long range and high speed movements across Iraq’s road network that also impressed U.S. Army leadership.
There is absolutely nothing wrong with this concept of a wheeled armoured force, who’s main advantage is theatre-strategic mobility, the so called ability to self deploy. In the self defence of continental European NATO, the ability to use an extensive road network offering many different routes from A to B, mostly (?) under a secure air defence umbrella to enable speed of movement seems like a worthwhile objective. For our larger European allies, this may even mean rapid deployment within their own borders. For light to medium weight armoured vehicles, the advantage over heavy armour which needs to be deployed via wheeled heavy transport vehicles (tank transporters) or by rail, is one of getting into action at the point where it is needed more rapidly.
In a rather more British expeditionary scenario, theatre-strategic mobility could still be of great utility even if the purely strategic transport function for both heavy tracked or wheeled medium weight armoured vehicles as both would likely be deployed by sea; however the ability to move swiftly from the point of debarkation to the area of need, remains and advantage.
So if the concept of wheeled medium armoured formations is sound, why do so many of us seem to think the British Strike Brigades appear to be an unmitigated dollop of fudge dressed up with some out of date whipped cream ?
Where exactly is the Strike in the Strike Brigade ?
As far as we know it would appear that a Strike Brigade will consist of:
- Medium Armoured Regiment – Ajax
- 2 Mechanised Infantry Battalions – MIV 8 x 8 APC
- 1 Protected Mobility Infantry Battalion – Mastiff
If we thin out the Ajax numbers on order, including the 245 Ajax Scout with the 40mm CTA to equip 4 regiments (one each for the 2 remaining armoured infantry brigades and the new Strike brigades) that could give us a “type 56” Ajax regiment, echoing the format of a Challenger 2 regiment, but this would appear to be sole fire power of a Strike Brigade. Let’s be clear, the army has said it might be looking for 300 to 350 MIV, and that they will be APC’s so expect an armament of at most a dual weapon RWS. There has been no mention of an Anti-Armour Ajax variant as yet, although we have seen one displayed with an un-armoured Javelin clipped on to the Protector RWS. So it would appear, that to provide some hitting power we would need to deploy AS90 155mm howitzers, which are “heavy” and tracked. For long range hitting power with GMLRS rockets, we would need the M270 launcher vehicles, which are heavy and tracked….. So we can see where the standard British fudgery is coming into play here, right ?
Basically it appears that after decades of throwing good money after bad on FRES, if we are going to buy a certain number, which really is not that large, and obviously is no where near as large as originally envisioned, we would look stupid if we cut them to buy something else. So lets eek out the ones we have got to include these weird Strike Brigades, just to give them something with a turret and a gun. Do we even have enough tank transport type vehicles to deploy the Ajax equipped regiment, a couple of batteries of AS90 and a battery of M270 plus some engineering vehicles and plant on a fast road march across Europe to rapidly reinforce a threatened ally ?
Do we think the rail links, offering less alternative routes, could be secured against action by saboteurs / terrorists?
Personally I find it hard to believe our current army senior leadership does not see the issues with the wheeled medium / tacked medium to heavy mix. There was talk recently at DVD 2016 reported by various military media outlets that the Royal Artillery would like to find money for various firepower projects, included wheeled 155mm guns, specifically to match the theatre-strategic mobility requirements of the Strike Brigade. However, money is going to be a problem, as ever. So the cynic in me wonders if the Strike Brigade is just PR smoke and mirrors to disguise cuts to the armoured force, and the budgets allocated to upgrades. If we have only 2 armoured infantry brigades we need less Challenger 2’s and less Warriors upgraded, in fact we might need to cut the money from these programs just afford the MIV APC’s !!
Doom and gloom
So the current prognosis seems to be a poor one: Less tanks, less AIFV, and mixed tracked / wheeled brigade that negates the advantages of a wheeled only formation, and with very little combat power. There are alternatives though, many of which might not actually need additional investment. So let us investigate some alternative options, what we could do with a little extra money, or even better perhaps with none at all ?
Option 1 – Full on wheeled
If we are going to reduce the number of Challenger 2 and Warrior to be upgraded, could we afford to make the Strike Brigade all wheeled? How might this work? Well if we keep all the 32 – 40 tonne Ajax family vehicles in the Armoured Infantry brigades, and spread them, say 16 each into the Armoured Infantry battalions (8 in a Recce Platoon, 8 in a direct fire support platoon) then go with an upgraded Warrior which is a turretless “heavy” APC with a 40mm GMG / 7.62mm MG only, we reduce the firepower of the heaviest formations, but we use the investment to upgrade the Striker Brigades.
Well at DVD 2016 Lockheed displayed the export version of their Warrior turret on a Patria AMV. The Export version even packs an armoured box launcher for a Javelin. So take the Warrior turrets contracted for, and apply them to a suitable 8 x 8. If we can find a MIV cheap enough, perhaps we can buy enough for 2 wheeled medium armour recce regiments (so upping the total requirement to 6 battalions worth).
It would appear that VBCI2, Piranha 5 etc can carry 6 dismounts with a turret basket protruding into the main compartment. So putting your guns into the recce regiment MIV’s, the infantry battalion recce and AT platoons, and running the “standard” MIV as an APC with the RWS, at least gives a fully wheeled formation with a fair number of medium calibre auto-cannon and if we could afford the export version of the turret, a Javelin “up and ready”.
An 81mm mortar carrier, firing through open roof hatches would be better than nothing, and for harder hitting artillery the French CEASAR 6 x 6 155mm gun on a MAN armoured cab chassis is probably the cheapest option, although the Donar 155mm turret on the Boxer chassis remains an interesting option.
A long term affordability plus that might help fund the extra MIV would be enough Warrior ABSV conversions to finally get rid of all the remaining FV432 variants, that must a considerable drain on maintenance budgets. Finally if money were no object then I would see if our preferred MIV could take a CMI turret and deploy a 120mm gun as the anti-tank over-watch vehicle, rather than a missile system. Call them anti-tank guns, put them in the AT platoon of infantry battalions and hope against hope that this means politicians wont deploy them as “tanks” !!
In the end, could we afford to go fully wheeled by shuffling the existing budgets around ?
Option 2 – Go French (or “low end of medium weight”)
After a decade of tests, experiments and deliberations (sounds familiar eh?) the French have finally ramped up their Scorpion project to revamp their entire Army. There structure is somewhat like that for which we are aiming – light rapid intervention brigades (Marines and Paras), heavy brigades based on Leclerc MBT and VBCI 8 x 8 AIFV, and medium “mechanised” brigades which will benefit most from the new vehicles. The scale of the French programme leads me to believe that if we jumped in now, there could be considerable advantage in price to getting involved as a joint program.
The French are to replace their venerable 4 x4 VAB with the 6 x 6 VBMR “Griffon” 20 tonne APC with a crew of 2 and carrying an 8 man squad. With over a 1,700 required, with all the variants the British Army could ever require already designed / developed including mortar carrier, Command vehicle, ambulance, engineer and recovery vehicle, could we work with this solution? A boxy 6 x 6 APC might not seem as sexy as an 8 x 8, but as we only intend to run the said 8 x 8 as a lightly armed APC, are the French on to something we have missed ? Don’t forget the French run their VBCI with a 25mm gun equipped turret as their main AIFV alongside their MBT’s.
The other requirement is for 600 plus 6 x 6 EBRC “Jaguar” armoured recce vehicle.
A 25 tonne specialist recce vehicle with the Anglo-French 40mm CTA cannon and the new MMP missile, it seems to me that equipping 2 x armoured recce regiments, and the recce and AT platoons of the Griffon equipped battalions would give a “French Style” Strike brigades some teeth. Of course the artillery would remain French too, with either the original manually loaded CEASAR 6 x 6 or perhaps the new CESAR 8 x 8 with it’s auto-loader and higher capacity magazine, on a MAN armoured cab chassis.
Option 3 – Go American (or “light weight”)
Ahhh I bet you thought I was going to say go with the new Stryker Double V-Hull as the MIV. Wrong.
Apparently we are very interested in the Oshkosh L-ATV (JLTV) as the light end of our Multi-Role Vehicle (Protected) requirement, again largely due to the price being driven by the massive scale at which the U.S. will purchase these vehicles. What does this have to do with the Strike Brigades ? Well perhaps they could “go light” in that the heavy end of MRV-P could also be a MIV ? The L-ATV as a 7 tonne, 4 to 5 crew vehicle, capable of carrying RWS or weapons stations with M230 30mm medium velocity cannon (used on our Apaches) or a Moog reconfigurable weapons platform that can take 2 Javelin in protected launchers for example could equip the recce regiment.
It’s bigger brother the M-ATV which is available in long wheelbase 4 x 4 APC (up to 11 seats) at a 16 tonne curb weight, or 6 x 6 APC (up to15 seats) with a 19 tonne curb weight; and in many existing available variants such as command and ambulance vehicles might provide a vehicle which maybe at the low end of a MIV specification sheet, but eminently affordable. If you take the TAK4i suspension and the improved engine of the L-ATV and add it to the M-ATV, the mobility might not be all that much less than an8 x 8, which would really seem to be the real concern. The M-ATV was churned out by Oshkosh at 1,000 vehicles a month at its peak !
In massive use with the U.S Army and Marines, this could turn out to be the cheapest option, even if it seems a bit “lower spec” than an 8 x 8 like a Patria AMV, Boxer or a GD Piranha 5, it can for example still be fitted with an active protection system, as well as providing basic protection from small arms / medium MG fire and artillery frag.
Option 4 – Just don’t do it !
Keep the existing 3 armoured infantry brigades as they are! If there is a need to politically save face, then rename them as strike brigades and replace the Mastiff ride for the Mechanised infantry battalion with a lower number of the cheapest 8 x 8 you can find. With this option we keep one third more Chally 2 in the front line inventory, and we make up a little for reducing the upgraded Warrior to 6 dismounts (or Panzer Grenadier’s as I like to call them) by providing an 8 x 8 APC which can carry 8.
We can still build a division around one of these brigades, plus an Adaptable Force “Protected Mobility” infantry brigade, and we can add an allied brigade, say Danish or Dutch or Norwegian to provide more AIFV. Sure it still might be better to replace at least some AS90 with 52 calibre 155mm guns with say a CEASAR 8 x 8, and even the remaining 105mm LG with the manually crew served CESAR 6 x 6 for support less than divisional level deployments based around the Adaptable Force Protected Mobility battalions. Yes we would deny ourselves of the wheeled armoured high theatre-strategic mobility option for future operations, but plenty of our allies can provide this capability, while we can concentrate on backing them up with heavier tracked forces. Perhaps we would actually need to keep one of the Armoured Infantry brigades in Germany, or even Poland, to demonstrate our commitment and reducing the potential distance to deploy to continental European hot spots – ok lets face it, the Baltics……
Go big or go……..
Before I complete my rant thinly disguised as an essay; I would like to note there is a further variant of Option 1 – lets call it “1 Heavy”;
If we were to reduce Armoured Infantry brigades to 2, why not make them Armoured Brigades ? Get rid of the Mastiff based mechanised infantry battalion and convert an armoured recce regiment to Challenger 2. So the Armoured Brigades would be 2 Chally regiments, and 2 Warrior Regiments with the Ajax recce regiment. With 2 regiments of tanks, and lots of Ajax spread around the Warrior’s would definitely just be in the APC role with no turreted medium calibre cannon. We have enough Challengers to upgrade, and as the rest of our formations are very definitely infantry heavy, and not all 4 regiments would be online and at high readiness, does it not make sense to increase tank numbers, not reduce them ?
We have not heard much officially about the Strike Brigades, how they will be equipped or setup, or doctrinally how they might be used. In my opinion they are a typical massive fudge and pretty much good for nothing as the plans now stand. I will happily be proved to be an idiot arm chair general by the Army’s senior leadership, but I am fairly confident that won’t happen. My preferred option from those I outlined above is to stay with the last plan, retain the FF2020 orbat, and if someone feels they need to save face then buy 200 8 x 8 APC’s to replace the Mastiff and just rename the existing brigades as strike brigades, then the government could even say they have created 3 of them instead of the originally mentioned 2 !
So, what do you think ?
Excellent news, I have been a long time proponent of experimentation without specific fully worked up statement of user requirements.
The Army Warfighting Experiment 2017 will build on the success of previous similar initiatives that were more tightly focused on dismounted close combat. The concept is to encourage corporate organisations, SME’s and even individual innovators to bring forth their products and concepts against a series of broad requirements. The RAF Regiment and Royal Marines will also be there, as will a team from the US Army.
[box type=”custom” bg=”#F5F5F5″ color=”#” border=”#” radius=”0″ fontsize=”14″]Industry first have to progress through a ‘Dragon’s Den’ style phase, where they have 10 minutes to pitch the benefits and capabilities of their product to a Military Judgement Panel (MJP). Those successful will then have their equipment or system tested by experts from the Army’s Trials and Development Units (TDUs), the Royal Air Force Regiment, the Royal Marines and also a squad from the US Army. This operationally representative exercise will take place on Salisbury Plain over a six week period early next year. Finally, at the end of March, a VIP day will be held to give industry and their products/systems visibility to senior members of the British Army.[/box]
Read the full article, at the link above, but whilst this may seem small beer, it is hugely encouraging and hats must be doffed to those in DE&S and the RN and British Army.
Come on RAF, where is your similar event!
Can we just bloody stop with this Warfighter nonsense, it is an Americanism that makes us sound like fawning fools, desperately following US military fashion in a pathetic attempt to be trendy.
Like Dad dancing and middle aged men with ponytails, it is cringeworthy.
With most of the UK’s stock of anti-tank Barmines either expired or used for Explosive Means of Entry (EMOE) in Afghanistan there is somewhat of a dilemma when it comes to the ‘return to contingency’, or conventional combined arms combat.
The cupboard is bare.
The Barmine Layers are currently being disposed of.
Described by the disposal agents as;
[box type=”custom” bg=”#F5F5F5″ color=”#” border=”#” radius=”0″ fontsize=”14″]These were designed to be towed behind FV 432`s, Stalwarts, Saracens, CVRT Spartan, AEC Trucks, Bedfords and even Landrovers !! Obviously now obsolete but will make a fantastic display piece for a show or museum. Or even a possibility for conversion I.E. potato planter! Trencher for cables etc.[/box]
So although it may seem surprising, the MoD might be back in the market for them.
[box type=”custom” bg=”#F5F5F5″ color=”#” border=”#” radius=”0″ fontsize=”14″]Defence Equipment and Support is responsible for procuring and supporting the equipment and services for the UK’s Armed Forces. The DE&S Technology Office seeks to understand Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) and near COTS counter-mobility technologies in the land domain. Both mines other than anti-personnel mines (MOTAPM) and other novel / innovative technologies are within the scope of this call. MOTAPM refers to anti-vehicle mines. Unlike anti-personnel mines, this type of mine is activated by a vehicle driving over it, rather than a person stepping on it. MOTAPM includes anti-tank mines. Expression of Interest (EoI) will be used for MOD informative purposes to gain market understanding and are not in competition or subject to any formal assessment.[/box]
Mines remain an emotive and sensitive subject with the MoD, as in most Western nations, anti-personnel mines are long gone and the whole subject fraught with legal scrutiny.
And yet they remain an effective capability.