Op HERRICK (Afghanistan) Aircraft Statistics

Defence Statistics and the Air Warfare Centre released a statistics bulletin covering Aircraft sorties, hours and weapons released for Operation HERRICK, Afghanistan.

 

It makes for some fascinating reading but it is worth repeating pointing to Page 16 before starting, the section on making like for like comparisons or drawing conclusions from bare data.

So, click here to read, but skip to Page 16 first.

The key points and trends, quoting from the report, are;

Flying Hours

  • Harriers were used in Afghanistan from 2004 to 2009, when they were withdrawn from service and replaced by Tornados, which were used up to the end of Op HERRICK. Harrier and Tornado flew more than 56,000 hours in total, averaging about 500 hours per month between 2007 and 2013.
  • Reaper was introduced in Afghanistan in 2007. Unlike Harrier and Tornado, Reaper is remotely piloted and is primarily tasked in an Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance role, but also has an armed capability. Reaper’s annual flying hours steadily increased between its introduction in 2007 and 2011, due to a staged increase in Reaper platforms arriving in Theatre and the subsequent increase in missions flown. Reaper flew more than 71,000 hours in total, averaging just over 1,000 hours per month in 2011 and 2012. This increased in 2013 and 2014.
  • All the Unmanned Aircraft Systems operated by the British Army are unarmed. Hermes aircraft flew over 85,000 hours in Afghanistan in total, and the Desert Hawks more than 18,000 hours.

Weapons Expended

  • To obtain a fair measure of weapon usage frequency, which accounts for the different types of weapon available to each aircraft, each mission report received from Theatre is retrospectively examined to determine the number of Weapon Release Events (WREs) during that mission. The number and frequency of WREs peaked in 2006. After 2006, there were downward trends in the numbers and frequencies, which were not significantly altered by the switch from Harrier to Tornado, or the introduction of Reaper. The overall WRE rate was highest for Harrier, followed by Reaper, then Tornado.
  • Comparing only precision-guided munitions (PGM), and ignoring all the use of unguided weapons by Harrier and Tornado, the total number PGM used by RAF fixed-wing aircraft each year did not substantially change with the introduction of Reaper: Harrier was the only RAF fixed-wing aircraft which expended PGM until 2007, and in 2007 it expended 119. From 2008, PGM were also expended by Tornado and Reaper, and the average from 2008 to 2013 was 121 per year.
  • The overall rate of PGM expended was highest for Harrier, followed by Reaper, then Tornado.

To which I would also add;

  • The data does not include 27mm on Tornado, or 30mm on Apache,
  • No CRV-7 for Apache or Harrier,
  • No show of presence/show of force data,
  • Sorties would not all be for British forces given the large area of operations and multinational nature of the air campaign,
  • Different missions would be needed for different areas,
  • The ‘surge’ and initial operations that heavily relied on close air support are not specifically mentioned,
  • No differentiation between Close Air Support and deliberate strikes or interdiction missions,
  • No mention of changing rules of engagement,
  • No indication of when USMC support assets were available.

So with all the caveats and warnings it is difficult to draw any conclusions but it is clear that the hours flown between Harrier and Tornado remained relatively stable throughout the entire campaign, from a much smaller Harrier fleet, this is impressive. Hours flown by Hermes 450 and Reaper were vastly more than Harrier or Tornado, entirely as one might expect.

Where the graphs and data tables in the report don’t do, is present the Army and RAF data together. The report makes it clear that it has been unable to obtain reliable data for Apache Hellfire expenditure and hours/sorties. There has, however, been some data released through Parliamentary Answers, it is fragmentary and incomplete but assuming it is relatively accurate, does allow a handful of point comparisons to be made.

Merging the data shows the hours flown between Harrier (until it was withdrawn), Tornado, Reaper and the leased Hermes 450’s.

op-herrick-air-stats-1-740x456

 

Watchkeeper managed 60 hours in 2014 but not included in the graph.

The Hermes 450 is air vehicle base design as Watchkeeper but the amount of hours flown by it compared to even Reaper is dramatic. As combat operations started reducing in 2012 its hours reduced whilst Reaper increased slightly, the changing nature of operations I guess. This chimes with a number of comments that Hermes provided the majority of tactical ISTAR for operations.

The second series of graphs below shows precision guided weapons released by each aircraft type.

op-herrick-air-stats-2-740x393

 

The data and report do not show Hellfire missiles fired by Apache attack helicopters. Add in the 4 years of data from PQ’s and it shows for those years where data is available, Hellfire from Apache was much more common than fast jet or RPAS released weapons.

 

op-herrick-air-stats-3-740x402

With GMLRS being increasingly used I thought I would add in usage for that as well. Unfortunately, only 1 year of data is available from PQ’s the first full year it was used, 2009.

op-herrick-air-stats-4-740x410

 

No additional GMLRS data is available in Hansard but if anyone has anything to add to these, I will update the table and graph.

It would seem that for operations in Afghanistan, once Apache and GMLRS were in theatre, the Army expended the vast majority of precision guided weapons and RPAS flying hours in support of the ISTAR requirement.

Interesting.

There is also a curious statement about the sharp decrease in PGM release by Tornado in 2011, explained by ‘a focus on operations in Libya’

Does this mean we didn’t have enough stock of Dual Mode Brimstone and Paveway IV for simultaneous operations in two theatres and had to prioritise one over the other?

The hours flown remained fairly steady in this period and given that air support was an ISAF, not national, responsibility others would have picked up the gap..

Clearly, munition availability was an issue.

H/T HMAF

The CTruk Thor

In the recent Type 26 GCS project I wrote that the new adaptable mission bay could accommodate a 12m vessel weighing up to 15 tonnes, somewhat larger than the normal 8 or 9 metre RHIB.

So what is the potential of this additional capacity, bigger is not always better (stop sniggering), but for some operations it may well provide a greater uplift in capability than we might think.

CTruk has featured on Think Defence several times over the years, they are an innovative British manufacturer of composite small craft, mostly for the offshore energy industry. One of their recent developments has been to look at the defence and security applications of their composite technology and design experience.

The CTruk Thor is an 11m composite twin hull vessel that can be configured as a troop carrier, riverine or force protection craft. With a compact radar, electro-optical sensor system, remote weapon system and enclosed accommodation, it offers a longer endurance and better weather protected version of the Royal Marine’s Offshore Raiding Craft for maritime security operations, counter-piracy, force protection and extended operations away from the ‘mothership’, two or three days perhaps.

The extensive use of composites reduces weight, useful considering the 15-tonne crane limit on the Type 26 GCS.

 

Read more…

http://www.ctruk.com/products-and-systems/THOR11

Am also thinking that composite construction might lend itself to the MCM mission.

However good it is though, it cannot possibly approach the coolness of the Avenger.



 

Typhoon Flying and Simulator Hours

From a recent published FOI request, the number of flying and simulator hours in support of flying training.

During the financial year 2014/15 the RAF provided 3,890 hours of Typhoon simulator flying training

and

During the financial year 2014/15 the RAF undertook 16,445 live flying hours in the Typhoon aircraft

The questions are not identical in scope and the second answer does not seem to make clear the difference between flying hours and training flying hours, but still interesting.

 

 

3D Printing Buildings

Back in the deepest archives at TD Towers is a 2011 post on 3D printing for buildings and field fortifications using a technique called contour crafting. One of the disadvantages of these early systems was the need to build parallel rails for the printing head to move along. This new system from APIS COR in Rusia does away with parallel rails and instead, uses a robotic arm.

The main attraction of these systems is the dramatic reduction in waste materials, ease of transport and low power consumption, less than 8kW.

 

A single device can cover an area of up to 192 m2

 

Read more at APIS COR

ENISA Cyber Security Exercise

The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) is a centre of network and information security expertise for the EU, its member states, the private sector and Europe’s citizens. ENISA works with these groups to develop advice and recommendations on good practice in information security.

Every two years, they hold a large-scale exercise called Cyber Europe.

The executive summary of the Exercise Report is reproduced below;

Cyber Europe offers to 32 different countries, Member States of the European Union (EU) and the European Free Trade Association, hereafter collectively referred to as the Member States (MS), the possibility to engage in cooperation activities at various levels with the shared objective to mitigate jointly large-scale cybersecurity incidents. The EU Standard Operational Procedures (EU-SOPs), used to support these cooperation activities, provide Member States with guidelines which they can use in the face of large-scale cybersecurity incidents.

The main goal of Cyber Europe 2014 was to train Member States to cooperate during a cyber crisis .

The exercise also aimed at providing an opportunity to Member States to test national capabilities, including the level of cybersecurity expertise and national contingency plans, involving both public and private sector organisations. In order to address the different layers of cyber crisis management, Cyber Europe 2014 was divided in three escalating phases, spread over 2014 and early 2015.

The exercise was a success, for it allowed ENISA to draw numerous lessons, recommendations and concrete actions, which will help to enhance cyber crisis preparedness in Europe. The common ability to mitigate large scale cybersecurity incidents in Europe has progressed significantly since 2010 when the first Cyber Europe exercise was organised. In particular, Cyber Europe 2014 has shown how valuable it is to share information from many different countries in real-time in order to facilitate high-level situation awareness and swift decision-making.

Nevertheless, such processes are unprecedented in real-life and hence requires primarily capability development and possibly also policy guidance from both the Member States as well as the EU Institutions and Agencies. It is crucial that Member States continue to rely upon and improve multilateral cooperation mechanisms,which complement the bilateral and regional relations they have with trusted partners. The EU-SOPs, which are meant to support the former, will be further improved to better take into account the evolving cybersecurity policy context in Europe.

In addition, experience gathered throughout this exercise and the previous ones will strongly guide the development of future EU cyber cooperation instruments and exercises.

Click the image to read the full report;

https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/cyber-crisis-cooperation/cce/cyber-europe/ce2014/ce2014-after-action-report

 

Swarming

A few years ago ‘swarming’ was all the rage as efforts to combat saturation attacks against shipping stepped up a gear. More recently, attention has turned to small unmanned aircraft with many solutions introduced by manufacturers that use electronic or more physical means of countering them.

The video below shows a recent trial of 50 small unmanned aircraft controlled by a single operator.

Each one cost approximately $2,000 and the software and launch system developed by the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.

 

Each one communicated with each other using WiFi

Once in the air, the drones communicated with each other via a system that uses high-powered Wi-Fi rather than conventional drone-communication systems, which would be swamped by the overlapping signals. The launch also gave an opportunity to test swarming algorithms with real drones rather than simulations.

“Most of the swarming operations are things like ‘follow-me’ mode, where one or more UAVs follow a leader around the sky,” says Jones. This allows the whole swarm to be moved without directing the aircraft individually. There are also algorithms for search-and-rescue operations, in which the flight pattern resembles that of foraging bees.

“The swarm behaviour looks quite random as the aircraft move around the sky trying to optimally search an area in the shortest amount of time,” says Jones.

Read more at New Scientist

Remote Control Boats

From BAE, in conjunction with ASV;

Unmanned technology with the potential to change the face of naval operations within a decade has successfully been demonstrated for the first time by BAE Systems in partnership with ASV at a site near Portsmouth Naval Base. The new system will allow crews to carry out vital tasks such as high speed reconnaissance and remote surveillance while keeping sailors out of harm’s way.

The modified boat is capable of operating autonomously for up to 12 hours at a time on either a pre-planned route or via remote control. It can reach speeds in excess of 38 knots (44 miles per hour), providing unique ship-launched manoeuvrability and enhanced situational awareness to support the decision-making of its operators. The technology is designed to be fitted to the Rigid Inflatable Boats (RIBs) like those already used extensively by the Royal Navy.

Underpinning the system’s ability to operate autonomously is its complex array of sensors, including a navigation radar, 360 degree panoramic infrared camera array and laser range finder which offer operators a detailed picture within a significant range of the vessel.

“This technology delivers an extremely robust and fast-moving unmanned boat that is able to perform a number of surveillance and reconnaissance roles, even when operating at high speed or in choppy water,” said Les Gregory, Product and Training Services Director at BAE Systems.

“BAE Systems has a wealth of experience in the development and integration of unmanned systems. The successful demonstration highlights the enhanced capability this technology offers. While other programmes are primarily designed for larger, slower boats to tackle mine counter-measure scenarios, this system provides an extremely manoeuvrable multi-role vessel.”

The unmanned system and software algorithms controlling the boat were provided by Portchester-based unmanned and autonomous specialist, ASV. BAE Systems has been working closely with ASV to integrate the technology and prove the concept through the demonstrator.  The next stage in its development is to create the sensor suite before ensuring a seamless integration with the combat management system on the parent ship.

Dan Hook, Managing Director for ASV said: “The algorithms we’re developing with BAE Systems allow the boat to perform complex missions and navigate through waters avoiding collisions.

“This gives it the flexibility and sophistication to operate in a number of different tactical roles, whether it’s patrolling areas of interest, providing surveillance and reconnaissance ahead of manned missions, or protecting larger ships in the fleet.”

The boats will be able to operate up to 40km away from their parent ship.  As well as being completely autonomous they can also be remote-controlled by crew on land, from the ship via a hand-held controller or piloted as usual.

The technology is designed as a retrofit to the manned Pacific 24 RIB already deployed across Type 23 Frigates and Type 45 Destroyers. These boats will also go on to the Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers once they enter service.

 

 

Priorities and Options for SDSR 2015 – Conclusion

A GUEST POST FROM ANDY C

The UK’s armed forces have shrunk considerably since the end of the Cold War and this sometimes leads to criticism.  However, the nature and strength of the threat to the UK has also declined – by an even greater degree.

This paper argues for a sequential strategy for our defence posture.  First, we must prioritise the defence of the UK itself.  Second, is the security of our remaining sovereign territories.  Third, are our regional international obligations to NATO, which also makes the UK itself more secure.  Fourth, is our desire to participate in global intervention in partnership with our allies and global intervention by the UK acting alone.

 

Generally the current defence strategy meets the UK’s aspirations with the exception of a notable gap in anti-shipping and anti-submarine air power needed to protect our shipping lanes.  As this is a necessary part of the defence of the UK itself it should therefore warrant the highest priority.

When suggesting Options the starting point is the minimum necessary force level to achieve the UK’s defence objectives and this has been used to inform Option 1.  Both Land and Naval Commands are capable of meeting these minimum requirements with the budget and personnel numbers set out for them in Future Force 2020.  The same cannot be said for Air Command.  There is now a requirement to fly aircraft from both QE carriers, to re-establish a maritime patrol capability and expand the role of UCAVs.  At the same time there is pressure on the QRA role from a resurgent Russia and on-going demands in the Middle East.  This all means that Air Command will need additional financial resources and personnel even to meet its minimum necessary force levels.  This degree of support needs to be a major commitment in SDSR 2015.

Recommendation 1:  Air Command should be given additional resources out of the 1% real growth in the defence budget during this Parliament to operate 9 frontline Squadrons, 1 Maritime Patrol Squadron and double the number of UCAVs.

While Land Command does not require additional personnel to meet its minimum necessary force levels it does need to make changes to its overall structure.  The Army needs to be re-balanced by withdrawing 4 regular Adaptable Force Infantry Battalions and 1 reserve Infantry Battalion and re-allocating personnel to cavalry, artillery, signals, engineering and logistic support.  This will enable Land Command to commit a Brigade to long-term operations, field three full Divisions in a major crisis (including the capability to deploy the Challenger 2 main battle tanks held in storage) and bring back into frontline service the artillery and SAMs currently held in storage.

Recommendation 2:  the British Army should be restructured through the re-deployment of 2,280 regular and 360 reserve troops from infantry units to cavalry, artillery, signals, engineering and logistic support.

In addition to these major recommendations this report makes a whole series of recommendations to improve the use of existing forces and to buy new equipment.

Recommendation 3:  enhancements to existing defence capability should include:

  • Land Command developing plans to maintain 144 currently surplus Challenger 2 main battle tanks in storage for use by three Light Cavalry Regiments in the Adaptable Force
  • undertaking a Life Extension Programme for the 224 main battle tanks committed to the Reaction Force including replacing the gun and turret and so create a new Challenger 3 standard
  • completing the Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme
  • beginning the conversion of 272 Armoured Battlefield Support Vehicles (of which 180 would be anti-armour guided missile variants)
  • upgrading 50 Apache WAH-64Ds to AH-64E standard
  • integrating Brimstone 2 anti-armour missiles on to Apache, Wildcat and Lynx helicopters and
  • Martlet lightweight air-to-surface missiles on its Wildcat helicopters.
  • Naval Command refitting HMS Ocean to take over from RFA Argus
  • upgrading 8 remaining Merlin HM1s to HMA2 standard
  • integrating Sea Venom anti-shipping missiles on to all 38 Merlin HMA2s
  • introducing ten AEW Crowsnest radars
  • upgrading the Aster 30 long-range SAM for an ABM role
  • integrating the Sea Ceptor short-range SAM on to all carriers, major amphibious ships, destroyers and frigates and
  • equipping all Type 45 destroyers with Harpoon anti-shipping missiles.
  • Air Command upgrading all tranche 2 and 3 Typhoons with Captor E-Scan AESA radar and 76 of them with conformal fuel tanks
  • integrating the Meteor Beyond Visual Range AAM on to all Typhoons, any F-16s and all Hawks
  • integrating Brimstone 2 anti-armour missiles on the Typhoon, F-35 and Protector UCAV
  • modernising tranche 1 Typhoons with a more basic AESA radar
  • enabling Typhoons assigned to air defence to carry six Meteor BVRAAMs plus four ASRAAMs
  • developing a more manoeuvrable version of ASRAAM able to intercept air-to-air missiles
  • introducing an Extended Range anti-shipping capable version of Storm Shadow
  • equipping existing Hawk T2s with a basic AESA radar.

Recommendation 4:  procurement orders required to maintain an effective minimum necessary defence (Option 1) should include:

  • Land Command ordering 649 Ajax specialist reconnaissance vehicles to equip six Armoured Cavalry Regiments and nearly all Reconnaissance Troops and Platoons
  • 1,014 Mechanised Infantry Vehicles to replace the aged Bulldog and the limited Mastiff plus 46 armoured ambulance variants
  • introducing the remaining Watchkeeper Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
  • 24 Land Ceptor short-range SAM launchers
  • developing a Brimstone 3 ground launched medium-range anti-armour missile
  • ordering 328 wheeled Common Support Vehicle to replace Land Ceptor SAM launch vehicles, Stormer Starstreak SAM vehicles, Warthog UAV support vehicles and Wolfhound vehicles for towed artillery
  • replacing Land Rovers and Pinzgauers with up to 4,000 MRV(P)s and
  • preparing for the replacement of the remaining Lynx, Bell 212 and Puma helicopters with either a medium sized helicopters such as the NH90, AW149 or EC725 or a combination of additional Wildcats and 14 Chinooks.
  • Naval Command introducing the two QE class aircraft carriers
  • receiving the remaining Astute class attack submarines
  • introducing the Type 26 frigate into service
  • equipping all Type 26 frigates with TLAM cruise missiles and Harpoon anti-shipping missiles
  • adding the VL-ASROC anti-submarine missile to the ASW variant of the Type 26 frigate
  • the Aster 30 long-range SAM to the general purpose variant of the Type 26 frigate
  • ordering 3 MARS solid replenishment ships to support the carrier groups and
  • receiving 3 offshore patrol vessels.
  • Air Command receiving the remaining tranche 3 Typhoons
  • 64 F-35B Lightning IIs
  • ordering 12 long-range Maritime Patrol Aircraft, probably the P-8 Poseidon or Kawasaki P-1
  • evaluating the effectiveness of the Triton UAV and a Sea Protector UCAV
  • introducing 20 long-range Protector UCAVs
  • developing a Meteor B to fit in the internal weapons bay of an F-35
  • developing SPEAR 3 medium-range cruise missile for the F-35 and Typhoon and
  • replacing remaining Hawk T1s with a mixture of 30 secondhand F-16s and 14 new Hawk 200s or 44 Hawk 200s all equipped with a basic AESA radar.

The list of enhancements, upgrades and orders for new equipment is very long.  However, the procurement budget has been increased dramatically.  There was £42.8 billion allocated to services but uncommitted to projects at the start of 2015, a further £10 billion unallocated to services and a £4.6 billion contingency.

In An Abundance of Riches: MoD Procurement 2015-25’ below it is clear that there is enough funding to support production orders for all four Options outlined in this report.  If the projects outlined can be kept to budget there is a potential underspend of £1.6 billion.  If £700 million of this were re-allocated from procurement to current spending at the rate of £100 million per year from 2018/19 it would go a long way to funding an enhanced defence capability.

Recommendation 5:  re-allocate £100 million per year from the equipment budget to current spending in each year starting from 2018/19 to fund as many as possible of the enhanced capabilities listed in Options 2-4.

SDSR Option 2
Land Command Equip all Adaptable Force Infantry Battalions with Mechanised Infantry Vehicles
Naval Command As Option 1 but with a new LHD helicopter carrier
Air Command Operate 9.33 frontline and 12.66 fast jet combat Squadrons with 6 F-35B Squadrons

Additional procurement totals 540 Mechanised Infantry Vehicles, 38 F-35Bs, 1 LHD helicopter carrier and 24 Ajax vehicles.  Refurbish an additional 48 Guided ABSVs.

 

SDSR Option 3
Land Command As Option 2 but retain all Lynx AH9As
Naval Command As Option 2 but retain 3 River class 1 offshore patrol vessels
Air Command Operate 10.33 frontline and 13.66 fast jet combat Squadrons with 6 F-35B Squadrons

Additional procurement totals 540 Mechanised Infantry Vehicles, 38 F-35Bs, 1 LHD helicopter carrier and 24 Ajax vehicles.  Refurbish an additional 48 Guided ABSVs and 2 Merlin HMA2s.

 

SDSR Option 4
Land Command As Option 3 but refurbish an additional 16 Apache AH2s
Naval Command As Option 2 but retain three Type 23 frigates
Air Command Operate 11.33 frontline and 14.66 fast jet combat Squadrons with 6 F-35B and eventually 2 F-35A Squadrons

Additional procurement totals 540 Mechanised Infantry Vehicles, 38 F-35Bs, 36 F-35As, 1 LHD helicopter carrier, 8 Merlin HMA2s and 24 Ajax vehicles.  Refurbish an additional 48 Guided ABSVs, 16 Apache AH2s and 2 Merlin HMA2s.

 

Appendix 4: An Abundance of Riches, MoD Procurement 2015-25

“An Abundance of Riches” is an accurate description of the growing size of the equipment procurement budget.  This analysis illustrates that the existing procurement budget should be sufficient to afford all four of the Options outlined above.

This assessment is based on the MoD’s defence equipment plan 2014 which can be found here https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-defence-equipment-plan-2014.

The MoD report provides plenty of detail that can be used to assess the state of the procurement budget by service.  To get an accurate picture of the procurement position in SDSR 2015 there remains one important caveat.  The figures in this report are already twelve months old so to get the true picture we have to remove the numbers for 2014/15 and add in estimates for 2024/25 based on repeating the figures for 2023/24.

For each budget heading this analysis examines the ‘Equipment Procurement (Uncommitted)’ figure.  As the report is a year old we need to include the contracts that have been signed in the last twelve months.  The budget headings below are those used on pages 18-31 but have been re-ordered for the largest to go first:

Submarines – £19.1 billion in Uncommitted Equipment Procurement

Included in this are boats 5-7 of the Astute class but the vast majority of this huge total is the Trident Successor Programme and the maintenance of the nuclear deterrent.  Under the last government this remained ‘uncommitted’ due to the politics of the Coalition.  As this is the MoD’s largest procurement project it provides the greatest risk to the overall budget and will require the closest management.  However, any cost overruns can be controlled by delaying in-service entry and should not present a threat to the project as a whole.  The Submarines budget is therefore fully committed.

Land Equipment – £8.9 billion in Uncommitted Equipment Procurement

Included in this are contracts of £3.5 billion for Ajax specialist reconnaissance vehicles and £1.3 billion for the Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme.  There’s now a separate budget heading for the Armoured Battlefield Support Vehicle adaptation of the Warrior set initially at £100 million for 65 APCs and ambulances.  Coming up is the Challenger 2 Life Extension Programme to cost £700 million for a basic upgrade and a new amphibious all-terrain vehicle for the Royal Marines at a cost of £230 million.  Then there’s the Mechanised Infantry Vehicle.  An order for 1,014 could replace the Bulldog and Mastiff and so equip the majority of Infantry Battalions.  For an 8×8 wheeled vehicle such as VBCI or Piranha V that would cost about £3 billion.  The Land Equipment budget is therefore fully committed.

Ships – £6.5 billion in Uncommitted Equipment Procurement

Included in this is the contract of £350 million for Offshore Patrol Vessels.  Coming up is the start of the Type 26 programme.  Even with budget growth it’s unlikely that the cost of this will rise above £2.5 billion before 2025.  There is also a requirement for three MARS solid replenishment ships, if they are tendered for commercially that should keep the cost under £500 million.  Finally, there’s a requirement to replace RFA Argus.  If this can’t be done by refitting HMS Ocean then a new ship will be required – if the Royal Navy bought one of the French Mistral’s or a similar ship it should cost no more than £500 million.

Even after taking into account all of these items there’s still £2.6 billion uncommitted.  In the long-term there will be a need for new amphibious ships and the replacement of a whole range of smaller ships but neither of these is necessary prior to 2025.  A total of £2.6 billion could therefore be returned to Central Provision to be allocated for the F-35B and Maritime Patrol Aircraft.

Combat Air and Air Support – £6.3 billion in Uncommitted Equipment Procurement

Included in this are the contracts of £2.6 billion for 14 F-35Bs including support requirements, £500 million for new basic and elementary training aircraft, £300 million for the development and integration of Captor E-scan radar and £200 million for Brimstone 2 integration and the development of a common weapons launcher for the Typhoon.  Coming up is the order to bring the number of F-35Bs up to 48 as committed to in SDSR 2010 (this could be as much as £2.4 billion), a further £300 million on manufacture of the Captor E-scan radar and £300 million for 20 new long-range Protector UCAVs.  With the initial work on the new Typhoon radar being paid from underspending in 2013 this means that the Air budgets are fully committed.

Helicopters – £2 billion in Uncommitted Equipment Procurement

Included in this are the £500 million contract for Crowsnest radar for Merlin helicopters and coming up soon is a requirement for new helicopter trainers which could cost £200 million.  There is up to £1 billion available to purchase 50 new Apache AH-64E attack helicopters or upgrade all 66 existing Apache WAH-64D attack helicopters, £200 million to upgrade eight more Merlin HM1s to HM2 standard and a further £100 million to integrate Brimstone 2 on to the Apache and the Army’s Wildcats and Lynx’s.  In addition there could be a further £100 million for integrating Sea Venom on to Merlin’s and Martlet on to the Army’s Wildcats.  That leaves £400 million to replace the Bell 212 and Special Forces’ Lynx AH9As with either 16 additional Wildcats or a new medium sized helicopter.  As the Crowsnest radar is also being paid from the 2013 underspend this means the Helicopters budget is fully committed.

Unallocated Headroom and Central Provision – £10 billion

Effectively, the budgeting here has covered all of the outstanding commitments from SDSR 2010 plus there’s a surplus from the Ships budget of £2.6 billion that can be re-allocated.

Altogether that gives a total of £12.6 billion in uncommitted equipment procurement that can be allocated in SDSR 2015.  If required funding up to Option 4 is achievable by 2024/25 with:

  • £2.4 billion out of a total order of £4.3 billion for an additional 54 F-35s.  Ordered at a rate of 12 per year from 2020 the total numbers would reach 102 in 2026.  This assumes a unit cost of £80 million which could be less as the production rate accelerates;
  • £3.6 billion for 12 Maritime Patrol Aircraft (including a replacement for Sentinel R1) as well as up to 12 maritime UAVs;
  • £350 million out of a total order of up to £1.1 billion for the replacement of remaining Lynx and Puma helicopters with either 38 medium sized helicopters such as the NH90, AW149 or EC725 or a combination of an extra 14 Wildcats and 14 Chinooks;
  • £300 million out of a total order of £1.7 billion for a further 540 MIVs and 46 armoured ambulances to replace all other remaining infantry vehicles in the Adaptable Force by 2029;
  • £650 million to develop and order a total of 328 wheeled Common Support Vehicles to replace Land Ceptor SAM launch vehicles, Stormer Starstreak SAM vehicles, Warthog UAV support vehicles and Wolfhound vehicles for towed artillery.  This could be a turretless variant of the Utility Vehicle;
  • £650 million to replace the remaining 44 Hawk T1s with a variant of the Hawk 200 and/or secondhand F-16s;
  • £600 million for the conversion of an additional 255 ABSVs, with 228 of the total equipped to carry medium-range guided anti-armour missiles;
  • £600 million for 121 basic AESA radars for tranche 1 Typhoons, any F-16s and all Hawks plus Meteor integration on tranche 1 Typhoons, any F-16s and all Hawks;
  • £500 million for a new gun and turret to increase the effectiveness of 224 main battle tanks and upgrade them to Challenger 3 standard;
  • £450 million for an additional 84 Ajax specialist reconnaissance vehicles;
  • £400 million for up to 4,000 MRV(P)s;
  • £350 million for 8 new Merlin HMA2s;
  • £100 million to fit 76 tranche 3 and 2 Typhoons with conformal fuel tanks and;
  • £50 million for the refurbishment of two additional Merlin HMA2s.

This still leaves £1.6 billion left uncommitted in Central Provision.

Also, if the whole MIV purchase was spread evenly across the decade from 2020 to 2030 it would reduce the cost of this programme by £950 million up to 2024/25.

And then there’s £4.6 billion in the contingency reserve as well!

The Major Projects in 2015-25 spending over £1 billion each are:

  1. £14.4 billion Trident Successor Programme
  2. £7.4 billion F-35B Lightning II
  3. £4.7 billion Astute attack submarine
  4. £3.95 billion Ajax specialist reconnaissance vehicle
  5. £3.6 billion Maritime Multi-Mission Project
  6. £3.3 billion Mechanised Infantry Vehicle
  7. £2.5 billion Type 26 frigate
  8. £2 billion Warrior Capability Sustainment and Armoured Battlefield Support Vehicle
  9. £1.2 billion Challenger 3 Life Extension Programme
  10. £1.15 billion additional Typhoon enhancement
  11. £1 billion Attack Helicopter Capability Sustainment Programme.

 

 

Priorities and Options for SDSR 2015 – Appendix 3 – RAF 2025

A GUEST POST FROM ANDY C

More than either of the other services the strength and disposition of the RAF is determined by its support role.

The number of transport aircraft and helicopters is determined by the need to provide mobility for the British Army.  In addition, the number of A330 Voyager multi role tanker transports is partly determined by the needs of the transport fleet and only partly by the needs of the RAF’s combat aircraft.

The minimum number of Squadrons needed to provide QRA in peacetime and a minimum effective air defence of the UK is four and we should not go below this.  The Eurofighter Typhoon’s capabilities to operate at long-range, with high speed, agility and at up to ten of the most effective air-to-air missiles make it the logical choice for this role.  Much the same applies to the Falklands Flight.

Conversely the F-35B Lightning II has been designed to operate from aircraft carriers.  Each QE class aircraft carrier is capable of operating three Squadrons.  While all F-35Bs can operate in a swing-role, one Naval Air Squadron would concentrate on fleet air defence/anti-shipping and be mostly carrier based.  In times of conflict it could be joined by RAF Squadrons that would primarily focus on close air support/suppression of enemy air defence with a secondary anti-shipping role.

The F-35B Lightning II is one of the most advanced fighter aircraft in the world.

If budgets permitted a larger F-35 force than six Squadrons the additional aircraft should be F-35As as they can operate over a longer range with a greater and more varied payload.  However, it is unlikely that this would be affordable before 2025.

The Typhoon will inevitably be the mainstay of the RAF well into the mid-2020s and possibly longer, see http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2015/01/raf-2019-mind-gap for more.  In these circumstances it makes sense to upgrade the whole fleet with AESA radars although the ones operated by tranche 1 aircraft will need to be more basic due to the high cost of fixing power, cooling and computing issues.

Existing tranche 1 (T3/FGR4 standard) Typhoons would equip the OCU and concentrate on air defence.  Some tranche 2 aircraft (T5/FGR6) would also be primarily assigned to the air defence role but retain a secondary swing-role capability.  Both of these variants would be upgraded with the ability to carry six Meteor BVRAAMs and four ASRAAMs.

In contrast, tranche 3 Typhoons and a significant number of tranche 2 aircraft (FGR7) would be fully swing-role.  At least at the start of any conflict they would specialise in long-range strike with Storm Shadow.  They should also be equipped with conformal fuel tanks to maximise their effective combat range.

If any Typhoons are withdrawn from frontline service in the Options below the most serviceable twenty should be maintained in the Sustainment Fleet so that they can be brought back into service should there be a major crisis.  The personnel for this Shadow Squadron should be found from recently retired Typhoon pilots and groundcrew.

In the scenarios examined there is a clear need for a long-range anti-submarine patrol aircraft to cover the large areas of sea around the UK that the surface fleet cannot cover.  The most effective way to achieve this capability would be to buy a long range dedicated Maritime Patrol Aircraft such as either the Boeing P-8 Poseidon or Kawasaki P-1.  In due course modified versions of these aircraft could take over the land ISTAR role of the Sentinel R1.  In addition, the UK should evaluate the Triton UAV and a Sea Protector UCAV to see whether either can add to the capabilities and reach of whichever aircraft is selected in the MPA role.

A small number of fighter aircraft operating with aerial tankers are also needed to provide an anti-shipping capability in the areas that carrier based F-35Bs cannot reach and to provide fighter escort for the MPA.  With its longer range the Typhoon would be the most suitable aircraft for this role.

To improve land ISTAR and assist with future conflicts against insurgents the RAF will receive a long-range UCAV, to be known as Protector, armed with Brimstone 2 and Paveway IV laser guided bombs.

A number of new missiles are already on order and will enter service in the next five years including the Meteor Beyond Visual Range air-to-air missile (with a later B version designed to operate with the F-35), the upgraded Brimstone 2 anti-armour missile and Land Ceptor surface-to-air missile to replace the Rapier for short-range air defence.  The ASRAAM Within Visual Range air-to-air missile will also be upgraded to improve its manoeuvrability and enable it to shoot down incoming air-to-air missiles.

In addition, the SPEAR 3 missile is being developed to enable the destruction of enemy air defences and the targeting of mobile ground targets at distances of up to 60 miles.

There is no doubt that ground based air defences are becoming more effective.  One answer is the stealth of the F-35 but another is to extend the range of stealthy stand-off cruise missiles.  Improvements in engine technology and the use of lighter materials are enabling these missiles to be effective at much longer ranges.  The US has embarked on what it calls the ‘-Extended Range’ programme.  For example, the 200+ mile range JASSM is being upgraded to the 600+ mile JASSM-ER.  It should be a priority to improve the Storm Shadow missile to a similar extent.  In addition, its targeting software should be enhanced to give the missile a long-range anti-shipping capability.

UK air defence could be supplemented in emergencies by upgraded and armed training, aggressor and exercise support aircraft.  The Hawk T1 is due to be out of service by 2020.  In its aggressor and support roles with 100 Squadron and 736 NAS it could be replaced by secondhand F-16s or new Hawk 200s.

The Red Arrows would receive a variant of the Hawk 200 so that they can continue to promote British industry.  Together with the Hawk T2s currently being used for advanced jet training these aircraft and any F-16s would be upgraded with a basic AESA radar and armed with Meteor and ASRAAM air-to-air missiles to provide an important secondary air defence.

 

From western Poland the white represents the range of a Typhoon + Storm Shadow-ER, the orange is Typhoon + current Storm Shadow.  From RAF Coningsby the yellow is Typhoon + Storm Shadow-ER and the green is Typhoon + current Storm Shadow.

The RAF’s priority for training should be to work with the Polish Air Force together with German and French aircraft that could all potentially be deployed to Eastern Europe in a crisis and with the Norwegian Air Force and French naval air arm in the north and the French and Italian naval air arms in the Mediterranean.  Two permanent air bases should be developed in Poland to be used for forward operations and as a transport hub.

While both the F-35B Lightning II and the Eurofighter Typhoon are swing-role aircraft that can perform all combat missions the scenario analyses illustrate that there is a minimum number of aircraft required to fulfil each task and this has informed Option 1 below.

Unlike the other services even Option 1 will require additional funding and personnel compared to Future Force 2020.

This is a result of the requirements to fly aircraft from both QE carriers, the re-establishment of a maritime patrol capability and the expanded role of UCAVs.  Each additional Option offers enhanced capabilities but at extra cost and increased numbers of personnel.  These Air Force Options are designed to be consistent with the respective Naval and (where relevant) Army Options.

Air Force Option 1 – operate a minimum of 9.33 frontline and 12.66 fast jet combat Squadrons.

In peacetime this is the minimum number of frontline and fast jet combat Squadrons needed by Air Command.  Four Squadrons are required for QRA, three need to be available for swing-role operations (so that one can be deployed globally at any time) and two for carrier operations (so that one is always at sea) plus there’s the Flight in the Falklands.  Three reserve Squadrons are also required – one Operational Conversion Unit for the F-35B and Typhoon respectively and one Test & Evaluation Squadron.

The scenario analyses suggest that in a European potential conflict Air Command needs a minimum of four Squadrons to provide air defence of the UK, four swing-role Squadrons to deploy to Eastern Europe, two to support ground forces in Norway (they could be carrier based) and two to defend the aircraft carriers plus an independent Flight for anti-shipping.

In this Option Air Command would operate 156 Typhoons in 8.66 Squadrons and 64 F-35Bs in 4 Squadrons.  It is consistent with the second QE aircraft carrier operating in a principally ASW or amphibious role.

This Option would require ordering an additional 16 F-35Bs.

Air Force Option 2 – also operate 9.33 frontline and 12.66 fast jet combat Squadrons.

As Option 1, but with the ability to operate six Squadrons between both QE class aircraft carriers.  Air Command would then operate 114 Typhoons in 6.66 Squadrons and 102 F-35Bs in 6 Squadrons.

This Option would require ordering an additional 54 F-35Bs.

Air Force Option 3 – operate 10.33 frontline and 13.66 fast jet combat Squadrons.

In addition to Option 2 there would be an additional swing-role Typhoon Squadron.  Air Command would then operate 136 Typhoons in 7.66 Squadrons and 102 F-35Bs in 6 Squadrons.

This Option would require ordering an additional 54 F-35Bs.

Air Force Option 4 – operate 11.33 frontline and 14.66 fast jet combat Squadrons.

Air Command could increase its effectiveness further by providing five or six swing-role Squadrons to Eastern Europe and three to Norway.  In addition, two of these Squadrons could in the long term be equipped with F-35As.

In the medium-term this would mean operating 156 Typhoons in 8.66 Squadrons and 102 F-35Bs in 6 Squadrons but in the long-term this would change to 114 Typhoons in 6.66 Squadrons, 102 F-35Bs in 6 Squadrons and 36 F-35As in 2 Squadrons.

This Option would require ordering an additional 54 F-35Bs and eventually a further 36 F-35As.