A Longer Farewell

Last Friday I let everyone know of my intent to shut up shop and close Think Defence. I also said I would pen a more considered farewell by way of an explanation and look forward.

Beginnings

The reason I started Think Defence was simply to provide a forum for (hopefully) sensible conversations about UK defence and security.

I actually received the inspiration to ‘do something’ from Dr Richard North at EU Referendum who at the time was campaigning on the Snatch Land Rover issue against a great deal of negativity. Richard was thoroughly vindicated and eventually spun Defence of the Realm out from the main blog and so one might consider DOTR as the ‘granddaddy’ of UK Defence Blogs although I think Tony McNally has been blogging at Rogue Gunner since 2006. Richard Beedall’s site, Navy Matters, was also an early inspiration, I owe them all a debt of gratitude for showing the way.

With a broader subject spread, Think Defence was born in February 2009 with a post about the A400M.

Back Office

The format and publishing platform has changed a number of times, first Joomla (painful) and then on to WordPress. I wanted total control so decided against Blogger or Typepad. With increasing traffic, the demands of a high volume site dictated the need for much more robust hosting arrangements.

WordPress is a great platform for content creators but don’t underestimate the learning curve.

On hosting, after going through several, the adage that you get what you pay for is apt, if you want security and reliability that is. Advertising through Google and several contributions from the TD   community has enabled this high quality hosting and a number of additional enhancements to the basic platform.

The Road to Today

A few nerdy stats…

• 2009; 105 posts, 1 page and 93,091 words
• 2010; 400 posts, 0 pages and 326,059 words
• 2011; 336 posts, 0 pages and 487,964 words
• 2012; 401 posts, 3 pages and 584,272 words
• 2013; 724 posts, 5 pages and 603,584 words
• 2014; 712 posts, 4 pages and 507,100 words
• 2015; 665 posts, 50 pages and 571,040 words
• 2016; 463 posts, 47 pages and 285,271 words

Totting up, that is approximately 3.5 million words across over just under four thousand posts or pages.

When I live blogged the 2015 SDSR, traffic went through the roof, about 45,000 page views that day. Otherwise, traffic has grown steadily with an average of about 10,000 page views per day until fairly recently when I slowed things down. Current traffic is about 6,000 page views per day.

In total, Think Defence has garnered approximately 13 million page views.

There has been a few a few shenanigans; others stealing content and passing it off as their own, legal threats from a certain mythical think tank, a constant battle against spammers and the odd intemperate bitchfest in comments, but despite these, it’s been a hoot!

A collection of great guest writers have also added enormous value.

The real strength of Think Defence however, is not the content, it is the comments, all 164 odd thousand of them.

On Twitter, as you may know, I also kept an active presence, over 8,000 followers now, although not quite in Justin Bieber territory!

The reason for my decision, which has been coming for some time, is simply one of time. To keep things going at a level of quality that I set myself means a lot of time. Whilst it has been possible to slow the post rate down, time spent researching and collating information from different sources still means a large commitment.

It is also much harder than one might imagine to ‘slow down’, the temptation is always there. Better to remove the temptation altogether.

The three things I have taken most pride from are;

Keeping a loyal and hugely knowledgeable gang of commenters who continually invest their own time to join the conversation and make Think Defence a friendly and interesting place.

Being able to attract guest authors and provide them with a platform to say what they want, Think Defence would be much the poorer without its guest authors or contributors.

Finally, inspiring a few guest authors to go on and start their own blogs, Thin Pinstriped Line and Defence with a C for example.

A Few Thoughts on Military Blogging

What started out fairly low key has turned into a bit of a monster because I think there was a ‘market need’ for it.

Let’s be clear, typing words into a computer is in no way comparable to the problems that defence professionals face in the real world, or indeed, former server service personnel.

I have also tried, not always successfully, to avoid being too judgemental from a position of comfort, people in the MoD and industry don’t get up in morning and decide to make poor decisions. They are working within the bounds of a larger system with financial, political and operational constraints we cannot know. FRES or Type 26 problems are not the result of one pivotal decision made by a single malignant person.

That said, problems can sometimes be seen from outside with a clarity not possible when dealing with the day to day, so defence blogging (and defence journalism of course) is a valuable means by which decisions can be examined and those in power held to some form of account.

Hopefully, other and future defence bloggers looking outside in will try and keep that in mind.

Where I think defence blogging can have significant value is to link current decisions to past decisions. We know the MoD has a predilection to change project names in order to compartmentalise previous problems, the FLAV >> FFLAV >> MRAV/TRACER >> FRES >> SV/UV >> Ajax/MIV journey being a case in point.

I feel privileged to know the authors of blogs such as Jedibeeftrix, Chuck Hills Coast Guard Blog, Mental Crumble, PsyWar, Quill or Capture, Bring the Heat, Defense and Freedom, Military History Now, Defence in Depth, Weapons Man, Save the Royal Navy, Eagle Speak, Steeljaw Scribe, Angry Staff Officer, Snafu, Thin Pinstriped Line, Defence with a C, Fall When Hit, CDR Salamander, Defence of the Realm, Kings of War, War on the Rocks and many more, even if only virtually.

There is a fantastic community of defence writers outside of Think Defence.

When it comes to UK defence blogging specifically, MoD policy, whether written or unwritten, puts many constraints on serving personnel or civil servants putting their thoughts online. In 2016, the British Army Review is still closed from the public and those serving personnel that have contributed to Think Defence and other blogs have generally done so under a nom de plume. This is stark contrast to US forces where writing and public debate seems (at least from this perspective) to be positively encouraged.

The MoD’s social media policy will change as times change, slower than many want, but it will change. Hopefully, the forces culture will follow.

Over the years a few things have remained constant at Think Defence;

• People, training and thinking must always come before shiny new toys
• High-end equipment spending will be wasted without adequate support, spares and consumable stocks
• Civilian industry can offer many solutions to defence problems
• Technology risk taking is to be encouraged
• UK defence industry must be nurtured and protected
• Bridges are rather cool and metals boxes, likewise

My hope is that these themes remain as defence writing evolves, especially the last one, obvs!

From this point…

Think Defence will not disappear overnight, this is the current plan…

First, I will start to thin out the database and remove content that has not aged well, was topical to a specific time point, or frankly, a bit rubbish.

Second, the Parliamentary Questions and Answers will be deleted, these are held in Hansard and easily accessed with keyword searches etc.

Third, I have a Flickr Pro account that I will maintain, all the media from the site will be migrated. If anyone is looking for an opportunity to help, tagging and grouping would benefit from ‘many hands makes light work’. Please let me know if you are interested.

Finally, I intend to migrate the long form content into downloadable PDF’s. This will mean losing the YouTube videos but I will link to those as appropriate from within the document. The PDF’s will be fully indexed, with a tables of content and all the media. Whether these remain hosted at www.thinkdefence.co.uk or somewhere else remains to be decided, am having a number of conversations about this. Other options include migrating to a WordPress.com site as a means of archiving older content.

As this processes progresses, I will keep you all posted, it might take a while.

 

A Final Word

Thanks

 

 

So long, fish and all that

After nearly eight years , time to call it a day.

Has been a hoot, made some great friends and had the honour to interact with current and ex service personnel, academics, people from industry and members of the great British public who care about the defence of this nation, plus of course, the same from other nations.

A special mention to the big bunch of commenters and guest authors, without which this place would be much the poorer, and not forgetting those that have thrown a few quid into the jar over the years to cover hosting costs.

Nothing is happening overnight and the long form content will live on in another form, not yet decided how though.

Will post more details in the near future, with perhaps a look back over the years.

Thanks all, it has been an honour.

 

PS

I know many of you don’t appreciate all the Sapper and Logistics stuff I write about, but hey, not everyone can be perfect 🙂

The Strike Brigade – what, why, how?

A GUEST POST FROM JED

It appears to this humble arm chair general, that the British Army has a fundamental problem, or three.

After over a decade of constant deployment and action in a counter-insurgency role, there appears to be a resurgent interest in “high intensity” operations against so called peer level adversaries, perhaps fueled by Mr Putin’s Russia making it’s forays into Georgia, and Crimea and the eastern part of Ukraine. I don’t want to argue geopolitics, but the world wide threat assessment is what drives our governmental security policy, which in turn shapes the missions of our armed forces, which of course drives their size and shape, and their equipment procurement.

I would also suggest that Government after Government, of whatever political stripe eschews any grand strategy in favour of short termism and that in causes great problems for the armed forces. This shows itself in strategy and concepts of operations which although dressed up in flowery political language often appear to be budget driven. Hence, review after review we have man power cuts and capability cuts (oh, sorry “capability holidays” !). Yet even the army senior leadership seems to think we retain a broad and well rounded army capable of as many missions as the politicians can dream up. While I am sure it is very, very difficult as a serving head of the Army to tell the PM of the day that they are insane, that does not at the same time absolve the senior generals from coming up with their own not well thought out concepts !

Which brings us to the matter in question – the Strike Brigade. This beast seems to be vexing many an arm chair general, so I thought I would give TD my thoughts on the subject and let you all way lyrical in the comments section.

Future Force 2020

The last great plan, which actually seemed quite sensible and workable to me, from the outside looking in basically split the forces available by role, “weight” and availability criteria:

• Immediate Reaction forces – the very high readiness elements of the Royal Marines and the Para’s / 16 Air Assault Brigade.
• The Reaction Force – 3 Armoured Infantry Brigades with 5 maneuver units (Armoured Recce, Armoured (MBT), 2 x Armoured Infantry (Warrior), 1 x Mechanised Infantry (Mastiff)
• The Adaptable Force – Infantry and light recce units that could be pulled together to form not less than 2 deployable brigades of 4 maneuver units (1 recce, 3 infantry)
• Force Troops – Artillery, Engineer, Signals and logistics units brought together / deployed as required to support the deployable brigades.

Basically instead of the previous plan for 5 identical deployable brigades, this plan cut the cloth to meet the budget and yet still produced 5 brigades for rotation through an enduring deployment. While maybe not perfect, personally I thought this was a “good enough” and in many ways quite sensible structure. With UOR procured vehicles taken into the core fleet, the final appearance of the Ajax family of vehicles, Warrior upgrade progamme etc. it actually seemed a balanced plan that could provide a force not just for long term peace keeping / peace enforcement / COIN tasking, but also a heavier force for NATO or coalition ops against a peer / near peer enemy.

Not that there were not problems, Challenger 2 upgrade needed funding, the cuts in the Royal Corps of Signals (my beloved Corps) seemed to be impacting on the number of HQ’s that could be supported in the field, and similarly the Royal Artillery seemed to be in a somewhat parlous state with cuts to the AS90 fleet and reliance on towed light guns etc.

Fast forward to the latest and greatest of the so called strategic reviews, and we get a new force structure before we are anywhere near achieving the last one. This time we aspire to provide a division for a high intensity fight, and as part of the force structure we are bringing back the idea of an 8 x 8 wheeled armoured vehicle last seen as FRES UV and now known as the Mechanised Infantry Vehicle (MIV). It would appear from comments made that we would aim to pull together a division based on:

• An Armoured Infantry Brigade (one of two)
• A Strike Brigade (one of two)
• A (Protected Mobility) Infantry Brigade (one of two ?)

The Strike Brigade – what is it, what is it for ?

As part of the newly minted force structure it appears that the Armoured Infantry brigades would be cut to 2, while 2 new formations based on the MIV would be created. These would be known as Strike Brigades, a somewhat obvious homage to the U.S. Army’s “medium” Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) aka the Stryker Brigades, named after their ride the GD Stryker 8 x 8 evolution of the LAV .

The Chief of the General Staff, Sir Nick Carter did not provide a great deal of detail as to the size and shape of the Strike Brigade, nor the impact of it’s creation on other formations. Discussion ensued and details started to appear, for example although the number of tracked FRES Scout (Ajax family) would not be increased, they would now be spread across four brigades instead of three. Also the role of the MIV became somewhat more clear as the MOD / Army stated they would be looking at an off the shelf 8 x 8 APC.

So what do we think is the concept of operations behind a Strike Brigade?

Well in many respects we are just jumping on a band wagon that many (if not all ?) of our allies jumped on some years ago. After the Russians zoomed into Kosovo in a long and fast road march in wheeled BTR type vehicles, the theatre-strategic mobility of wheeled armour seemed to grab western army imaginations. The French and Italians did not need to be sold on the concept, they had been using wheeled light armoured vehicles alongside their tanks for decade. The French particularly have a long history of the use wheeled armoured cars and APC’s in 40 years of colonial and anti-terrorist operations, largely in Africa. Stryker brigades made some long range and high speed movements across Iraq’s road network that also impressed U.S. Army leadership.

There is absolutely nothing wrong with this concept of a wheeled armoured force, who’s main advantage is theatre-strategic mobility, the so called ability to self deploy. In the self defence of continental European NATO, the ability to use an extensive road network offering many different routes from A to B, mostly (?) under a secure air defence umbrella to enable speed of movement seems like a worthwhile objective. For our larger European allies, this may even mean rapid deployment within their own borders. For light to medium weight armoured vehicles, the advantage over heavy armour which needs to be deployed via wheeled heavy transport vehicles (tank transporters) or by rail, is one of getting into action at the point where it is needed more rapidly.

In a rather more British expeditionary scenario, theatre-strategic mobility could still be of great utility even if the purely strategic transport function for both heavy tracked or wheeled medium weight armoured vehicles as both would likely be deployed by sea; however the ability to move swiftly from the point of debarkation to the area of need, remains and advantage.

So if the concept of wheeled medium armoured formations is sound, why do so many of us seem to think the British Strike Brigades appear to be an unmitigated dollop of fudge dressed up with some out of date whipped cream ?

Where exactly is the Strike in the Strike Brigade ?

As far as we know it would appear that a Strike Brigade will consist of:

• Medium Armoured Regiment – Ajax
• 2 Mechanised Infantry Battalions – MIV 8 x 8 APC
• 1 Protected Mobility Infantry Battalion – Mastiff

If we thin out the Ajax numbers on order, including the 245 Ajax Scout with the 40mm CTA to equip 4 regiments (one each for the 2 remaining armoured infantry brigades and the new Strike brigades) that could give us a “type 56” Ajax regiment, echoing the format of a Challenger 2 regiment, but this would appear to be sole fire power of a Strike Brigade. Let’s be clear, the army has said it might be looking for 300 to 350 MIV, and that they will be APC’s so expect an armament of at most a dual weapon RWS. There has been no mention of an Anti-Armour Ajax variant as yet, although we have seen one displayed with an un-armoured Javelin clipped on to the Protector RWS. So it would appear, that to provide some hitting power we would need to deploy AS90 155mm howitzers, which are “heavy” and tracked. For long range hitting power with GMLRS rockets, we would need the M270 launcher vehicles, which are heavy and tracked….. So we can see where the standard British fudgery is coming into play here, right ?

Basically it appears that after decades of throwing good money after bad on FRES, if we are going to buy a certain number, which really is not that large, and obviously is no where near as large as originally envisioned, we would look stupid if we cut them to buy something else. So lets eek out the ones we have got to include these weird Strike Brigades, just to give them something with a turret and a gun. Do we even have enough tank transport type vehicles to deploy the Ajax equipped regiment, a couple of batteries of AS90 and a battery of M270 plus some engineering vehicles and plant on a fast road march across Europe to rapidly reinforce a threatened ally ?

Do we think the rail links, offering less alternative routes, could be secured against action by saboteurs / terrorists?

Personally I find it hard to believe our current army senior leadership does not see the issues with the wheeled medium / tacked medium to heavy mix. There was talk recently at DVD 2016 reported by various military media outlets that the Royal Artillery would like to find money for various firepower projects, included wheeled 155mm guns, specifically to match the theatre-strategic mobility requirements of the Strike Brigade. However, money is going to be a problem, as ever. So the cynic in me wonders if the Strike Brigade is just PR smoke and mirrors to disguise cuts to the armoured force, and the budgets allocated to upgrades. If we have only 2 armoured infantry brigades we need less Challenger 2’s and less Warriors upgraded, in fact we might need to cut the money from these programs just afford the MIV APC’s !!

Doom and gloom

So the current prognosis seems to be a poor one:  Less tanks, less AIFV, and mixed tracked / wheeled brigade that negates the advantages of a wheeled only formation, and with very little combat power. There are alternatives though, many of which might not actually need additional investment.  So let us investigate some alternative options, what we could do with a little extra money, or even better perhaps with none at all ?

Option 1 – Full on wheeled

If we are going to reduce the number of Challenger 2 and Warrior to be upgraded, could we afford to make the Strike Brigade all wheeled? How might this work? Well if we keep all the 32 – 40 tonne Ajax family vehicles in the Armoured Infantry brigades, and spread them, say 16 each into the Armoured Infantry battalions (8 in a Recce Platoon, 8 in a direct fire support platoon) then go with an upgraded Warrior which is a turretless “heavy” APC with a 40mm GMG / 7.62mm MG only, we reduce the firepower of the heaviest formations, but we use the investment to upgrade the Striker Brigades.

How ?

Well at DVD 2016 Lockheed displayed the export version of their Warrior turret on a Patria AMV. The Export version even packs an armoured box launcher for a Javelin. So take the Warrior turrets contracted for, and apply them to a suitable 8 x 8. If we can find a MIV cheap enough, perhaps we can buy enough for 2 wheeled medium armour recce regiments (so upping the total requirement to 6 battalions worth).

 

It would appear that VBCI2, Piranha 5 etc can carry 6 dismounts with a turret basket protruding into the main compartment. So putting your guns into the recce regiment MIV’s, the infantry battalion recce and AT platoons, and running the “standard” MIV as an APC with the RWS, at least gives a fully wheeled formation with a fair number of medium calibre auto-cannon and if we could afford the export version of the turret, a Javelin “up and ready”.

 

An 81mm mortar carrier, firing through open roof hatches would be better than nothing, and for harder hitting artillery the French CEASAR 6 x 6 155mm gun on a MAN armoured cab chassis is probably the cheapest option, although the Donar 155mm turret on the Boxer chassis remains an interesting option.

 

A long term affordability plus that might help fund the extra MIV would be enough Warrior ABSV conversions to finally get rid of all the remaining FV432 variants, that must a considerable drain on maintenance budgets. Finally if money were no object then I would see if our preferred MIV could take a CMI turret and deploy a 120mm gun as the anti-tank over-watch vehicle, rather than a missile system. Call them anti-tank guns, put them in the AT platoon of infantry battalions and hope against hope that this means politicians wont deploy them as “tanks” !!

In the end, could we afford to go fully wheeled by shuffling the existing budgets around ?

Option 2  – Go French (or “low end of medium weight”)

After a decade of tests, experiments and deliberations (sounds familiar eh?) the French have finally ramped up their Scorpion project to revamp their entire Army. There structure is somewhat like that for which we are aiming – light rapid intervention brigades (Marines and Paras), heavy brigades based on Leclerc MBT and VBCI 8 x 8 AIFV, and medium “mechanised” brigades which will benefit most from the new vehicles. The scale of the French programme leads me to believe that if we jumped in now, there could be considerable advantage in price to getting involved as a joint program.

The French are to replace their venerable 4 x4 VAB with the 6 x 6 VBMR “Griffon” 20 tonne APC with a crew of 2 and carrying an 8 man squad. With over a 1,700 required, with all the variants the British Army could ever require already designed / developed including mortar carrier, Command vehicle, ambulance, engineer and recovery vehicle, could we work with this solution? A boxy 6 x 6 APC might not seem as sexy as an 8 x 8, but as we only intend to run the said 8 x 8 as a lightly armed APC, are the French on to something we have missed ? Don’t forget the French run their VBCI with a 25mm gun equipped turret as their main AIFV alongside their MBT’s.

The other requirement is for 600 plus 6 x 6 EBRC “Jaguar” armoured recce vehicle.

 

A 25 tonne specialist recce vehicle with the Anglo-French 40mm CTA cannon and the new MMP missile, it seems to me that equipping 2 x armoured recce regiments, and the recce and AT platoons of the Griffon equipped battalions would give a “French Style” Strike brigades some teeth. Of course the artillery would remain French too, with either the original manually loaded CEASAR 6 x 6 or perhaps the new CESAR 8 x 8 with it’s auto-loader and higher capacity magazine, on a MAN armoured cab chassis.

Option 3 – Go American (or “light weight”)

Ahhh I bet you thought I was going to say go with the new Stryker Double V-Hull as the MIV. Wrong.

Apparently we are very interested in the Oshkosh L-ATV (JLTV) as the light end of our Multi-Role Vehicle (Protected) requirement, again largely due to the price being driven by the massive scale at which the U.S. will purchase these vehicles. What does this have to do with the Strike Brigades ? Well perhaps they could “go light” in that the heavy end of MRV-P could also be a MIV ? The L-ATV as a 7 tonne, 4 to 5 crew vehicle, capable of carrying RWS or weapons stations with M230 30mm medium velocity cannon (used on our Apaches) or a Moog reconfigurable weapons platform that can take 2 Javelin in protected launchers for example could equip the recce regiment.

 

It’s bigger brother the M-ATV which is available in long wheelbase 4 x 4 APC (up to 11 seats) at a 16 tonne curb weight,  or 6 x 6 APC (up to15 seats) with a 19 tonne curb weight; and in many existing available variants such as command and ambulance vehicles might provide a vehicle which maybe at the low end of a MIV specification sheet, but eminently affordable. If you take the TAK4i suspension and the improved engine of the L-ATV and add it to the M-ATV, the mobility might not be all that much less than an8 x 8, which would really seem to be the real concern. The M-ATV was churned out by Oshkosh at  1,000 vehicles a month at its peak !

In massive use with the U.S Army and Marines, this could turn out to be the cheapest option, even if it seems a bit “lower spec” than an 8 x 8 like a Patria AMV, Boxer or a GD Piranha 5, it can for example still be fitted with an active protection system, as well as providing basic protection from small arms / medium MG fire and artillery frag.

Option 4 – Just don’t do it !

Keep the existing 3 armoured infantry brigades as they are! If there is a need to politically save face, then rename them as strike brigades and replace the Mastiff ride for the Mechanised infantry battalion with a lower number of the cheapest 8 x 8 you can find. With this option we keep one third more Chally 2 in the front line inventory, and we make up a little for reducing the upgraded Warrior to 6 dismounts (or Panzer Grenadier’s as I like to call them) by providing an 8 x 8 APC which can carry 8.

We can still build a division around one of these brigades, plus an Adaptable Force “Protected Mobility” infantry brigade, and we can add an allied brigade, say Danish or Dutch or Norwegian to provide more AIFV. Sure it still might be better to replace at least some AS90 with 52 calibre 155mm guns with say a CEASAR 8 x 8, and even the remaining 105mm LG with the manually crew served CESAR 6 x 6 for support less than divisional level deployments based around the Adaptable Force Protected Mobility battalions.  Yes we would deny ourselves of the wheeled armoured high theatre-strategic mobility option for future operations, but plenty of our allies can provide this capability, while we can concentrate on backing them up with heavier tracked forces. Perhaps we would actually need to keep one of the Armoured Infantry brigades in Germany, or even Poland, to demonstrate our commitment and reducing the potential distance to deploy to continental European hot spots – ok lets face it, the Baltics……

Go big or go……..

Before I complete my rant thinly disguised as an essay; I would like to note there is a further variant of Option 1 – lets call it “1 Heavy”;

If we were to reduce Armoured Infantry brigades to 2, why not make them Armoured Brigades ? Get rid of the Mastiff based mechanised infantry battalion and convert an armoured recce regiment to Challenger 2. So the Armoured Brigades would be 2 Chally regiments, and 2 Warrior Regiments with the Ajax recce regiment. With 2 regiments of tanks, and lots of Ajax spread around the Warrior’s would definitely just be in the APC role with no turreted medium calibre cannon. We have enough Challengers to upgrade, and as the rest of our formations are very definitely infantry heavy, and not all 4 regiments would be online and at high readiness, does it not make sense to increase tank numbers, not reduce them ?

Summary

We have not heard much officially about the Strike Brigades, how they will be equipped or setup, or doctrinally how they might be used. In my opinion they are a typical massive fudge and pretty much good for nothing as the plans now stand. I will happily be proved to be an idiot arm chair general by the Army’s senior leadership, but I am fairly confident that won’t happen. My preferred option from those I outlined above is to stay with the last plan, retain the FF2020 orbat, and if someone feels they need to save face then buy 200 8 x 8 APC’s to replace the Mastiff and just rename the existing brigades as strike brigades, then the government could even say they have created 3 of them instead of the originally mentioned 2 !

So, what do you think ?

Warfighting Warrior Experimentation

Excellent news, I have been a long time proponent of experimentation without specific fully worked up statement of user requirements.

The Royal Navy has been publicising the upcoming Unmanned Warrior, and even has a Fleet Robotics Officer. And now, the British Army, as revealed in the latest DESIDER magazine, is joining the party.

The Army Warfighting Experiment 2017 will build on the success of previous similar initiatives that were more tightly focused on dismounted close combat. The concept is to encourage corporate organisations, SME’s and even individual innovators to bring forth their products and concepts against a series of broad requirements. The RAF Regiment and Royal Marines will also be there, as will a team from the US Army.

[box type=”custom” bg=”#F5F5F5″ color=”#” border=”#” radius=”0″ fontsize=”14″]Industry first have to progress through a ‘Dragon’s Den’ style phase, where they have 10 minutes to pitch the benefits and capabilities of their product to a Military Judgement Panel (MJP). Those successful will then have their equipment or system tested by experts from the Army’s Trials and Development Units (TDUs), the Royal Air Force Regiment, the Royal Marines and also a squad from the US Army. This operationally representative exercise will take place on Salisbury Plain over a six week period early next year. Finally, at the end of March, a VIP day will be held to give industry  and their products/systems visibility to senior members of the British Army.[/box]

Read the full article, at the link above, but whilst this may seem small beer, it is hugely encouraging and hats must be doffed to those in DE&S and the RN and British Army.

 

Come on RAF, where is your similar event!

PS

Can we just bloody stop with this Warfighter nonsense, it is an Americanism that makes us sound like fawning fools, desperately following US military fashion in a pathetic attempt to be trendy.

Like Dad dancing and middle aged men with ponytails, it is cringeworthy.

The Return of the Anti-Tank Mine?

With most of the UK’s stock of anti-tank Barmines either expired or used for Explosive Means of Entry (EMOE) in Afghanistan there is somewhat of a dilemma when it comes to the ‘return to contingency’, or conventional combined arms combat.

The cupboard is bare.

The Barmine Layers are currently being disposed of.

Described by the disposal agents as;

[box type=”custom” bg=”#F5F5F5″ color=”#” border=”#” radius=”0″ fontsize=”14″]These were designed to be towed behind FV 432`s, Stalwarts, Saracens, CVRT Spartan, AEC Trucks, Bedfords and even Landrovers !! Obviously now obsolete but will make a fantastic display piece for a show or museum. Or even a possibility for conversion I.E. potato planter! Trencher for cables etc.[/box]

So although it may seem surprising, the MoD might be back in the market for them.

[box type=”custom” bg=”#F5F5F5″ color=”#” border=”#” radius=”0″ fontsize=”14″]Defence Equipment and Support is responsible for procuring and supporting the equipment and services for the UK’s Armed Forces. The DE&S Technology Office seeks to understand Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) and near COTS counter-mobility technologies in the land domain. Both mines other than anti-personnel mines (MOTAPM) and other novel / innovative technologies are within the scope of this call. MOTAPM refers to anti-vehicle mines. Unlike anti-personnel mines, this type of mine is activated by a vehicle driving over it, rather than a person stepping on it. MOTAPM includes anti-tank mines. Expression of Interest (EoI) will be used for MOD informative purposes to gain market understanding and are not in competition or subject to any formal assessment.[/box]

Mines remain an emotive and sensitive subject with the MoD, as in most Western nations, anti-personnel mines are long gone and the whole subject fraught with legal scrutiny.

And yet they remain an effective capability.

SA80 Equipped to Fight

There was a flurry of news this week about the MoD considering extending the service of the SA80, with a handful of images reportedly showing prototypes of the A3 model.

The images were released by the MoD as part of DVD2016 coverage, specifically on the Virtus contract for soldier equipment.

What this flurry of news seemed to have missed is the MoD letting a £2.7 million contract to Heckler and Koch GMBH & Co  for work on the SA80A2.

The Dismounted Close Combat Programme team, part of the UK Ministry of Defence, intends to place a contract for the Equipped to Fight Improvement (EFI) programme for the modification of 5 000 SA80 weapons with Heckler & Koch GMBH & Co for work to be completed by March 2017. The estimated contract value is 2 700 000 GBP. The contract will require the supplier to modify the existing SA80 A2 weapon by fitting a combination of new and modified components. Specific tolerances of materials are needed along with exact dimensions and surface finishes on the components to allow for interoperability with the existing system, particularly when managing the variable interface caused by differing rates of wear of existing components which are recycled as part of the programme. There are very high risks involved in managing the variable tolerances and manufacturing processes when combining new and existing weapon components.

A replacement for the much, and probably unfairly, maligned SA80 is usually the subject of much debate but despite France only recently selecting the HK416 to replace the FAMAS, I get the impression the SA80 is not going anywhere fast.

GUEST POST – Fixing UK Land Power

A guest post from ‘Monty’

This article is intended to be a high-level discussion of the issues and potential fixes that would address the manifold problems faced by the British Army. It isn’t a deep-dive supported by detailed budgeting, planning and implementation considerations. So I trust readers will judge it for what it is rather than what it should be. I hope that the concepts presented below will inspire other ideas that could transform UK land power capabilities and its deterrent effect.

A slow decline towards ‘block obsolescence’

In 1984, when I was a young platoon commander, there was a feeling of constantly being asked to do more with less. If a lack of resources was a problem then, the constraints placed on the Army today are in an entirely different league. In its heydey the British Army of the Rhine numbered more than 160,000 soldiers, it had four armoured divisions, including 12 MBT regiments and a full complement of supporting assets. It was a time when we had not forgotten the war-winning potential of artillery, so we had an extensive array of Royal Artillery regiments that were all properly resourced, including one equipped with the Lance tactical nuclear missile. Today, we can barely muster a single division and have only three regular MBT regiments. A reduction in headcount to 82,000 has seen a huge loss in combat ability as accumulated knowledge and experience have exited the service.

Since the Cold War ended in 1989, there has been a very little impetus to re-equip the British Army. I remember Think Defence in another article noting that when the FV430 series of AFVs came into service in the mid-1960s, the English Electric Lightning was the primary air defence asset. This was superseded by the Phantom, then the Tornado and, most recently, by the Typhoon. Despite four generations of combat aircraft passing through Royal Air Force hands, the FV430 has resolutely remained the only tracked APC in service with British land forces. Warrior was a half-hearted attempt to replace it, but the money to equip all armoured infantry formations with it was never made available. The so-called peace dividend resulting from the end of the Cold War halted any significant AFV platform investment after the last Warriors were delivered in the 1990s.

Since then, the combat capability of the British Army’s AFVs has slowly atrophied.

Challenger 2 and Warrior were brief flashes of promise. When they first arrived, they offered an excellent capability against peer enemies, but, unlike the Bundeswehr’s Leopard 2, were not constantly upgraded to ensure they remained relevant and potent. With the UK only deploying a full armoured division on two occasions since the end of WW2 (during each of the two Gulf Wars), the global financial crisis in 2008 provided a perfect catalyst to bring an obsolete Army back to the UK from Germany. Our few remaining armoured units were content to rust in peace. Indeed, if Liam Fox had had his way when he was UK defence Secretary, we would have retired all of our Challenger 2s.

Since 2002, deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan have required us to practice counter-insurgency techniques supposedly honed over many post-war decades, particularly in Northern Ireland. Our failure to achieve significant or lasting resolution in Iraq or Afghanistan, and possibly in Ireland itself, are further reflections of the broken nature of British Land Power. The failure to build an Army capable of fulfilling multiple roles may have more to do with foreign policy and doctrine than equipment or manpower levels. That said, our failures to replace Snatch Land-Rovers quickly or to provide adequate body armour led to needless casualties. We also spent billions acquiring a multitude of different MRAP vehicles which proved to have little utility beyond our most recent operational deployments.

In a post-Afghanistan world, the Army now eagerly anticipates the arrival of Ajax, not because it somehow anticipated the new threat posed by Russia, but because at last, after many decades, it finally has a new AFV. For all its benefits, I can’t help feeling that the acquisition of Ajax is an act of pure nostalgia, akin to building a brand new steam locomotive in an age of electric trains. The last time the UK had a 40-tonne tank with a 40 mm gun was in 1942 when we had the Churchill. Perhaps a better analogy is that Ajax is similar to the type of tanks we bought just before World War 2. The Vickers medium and light tanks were hopelessly out-of-date when the BEF deployed to France in 1939. Despite valiant efforts, the BEF’s inability to manoeuvre in a way that delivered a concentrated effect forced it to conduct a haphazard rearguard action that ended in defeat at Dunkirk. I wonder whether the state of the Army today reflects a similar unpreparedness should we again face a serious and unexpected threat? Senior army officers who’ve finally seen Ajax in the metal after a 16-year gestation period are asking whether it is still the right platform. It seems too small to be a medium tank but too large to be a reconnaissance vehicle.

In Ajax’s defence, it is part of a larger modernisation effort and may yet have a valid place in a revitalised Army. When it comes to MBTs, the Challenger 2 Life Extension Programme is disappointing, because it seems to be no more than an obsolescence management exercise. There are no plans to upgrade its lethality, survivability or mobility. The UK’s rifled 120 mm gun is no longer as potent as Rheinmetall’s 120 mm L/55 smoothbore gun. Meanwhile, the Germans are developing a new 130 mm smoothbore, which will comprehensively overmatch all existing tank guns. Meanwhile, the Warrior CSP programme is another cut-price upgrade that seems to be an uneasy marriage of old hulls with new turrets. De-lamination issues with Warrior’s aluminium armour mean that we may not have enough hulls to upgrade the whole fleet to the new build standard. I believe there’s a strong case for a new MBT and tracked IFV.

As Think Defence’s extensive white paper on FRES shows, the UK still has no wheeled medium capability to complement its tracked heavy armour formations despite spending some £300 million over almost 20 years. Our artillery systems are also approaching the end of their useful lives. In short, the Army is faced with block obsolescence where a lack of investment over many years has completely degraded its capabilities.

The extraordinary lack of resources extends beyond equipment to training. Soldiers simply do not spend enough time shooting on ranges compared to 30 years ago. Military housing is another problem area and needs wholesale refurbishment. A major problem related to bringing the Army back to the UK from Germany, and which was also a factor in the decision to reduce troop numbers, was not having sufficient accommodation to house them. Who else decides the size of their army based on the number of available barracks?

Perhaps we were right to prioritise the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force above the Army. The benefits they bring to UK defence are immediately apparent. Both services have played an essential role over the last decade, whether it is Tornados bombing terrorist bases abroad, or Frigates conducting anti-piracy patrols on the high seas. Our aircraft and ships have proved to highly flexible and capable of performing a variety of mission types. In contrast tanks and tracked AFVs are less adaptable. It needs to be said that we are paying a high price for the F-35B and CVF. Both are first-class assets, but their massive price tags undoubtedly beg the question whether we could have acquired comparable capabilities by purchasing less expensive substitutes? Paying £7 billion for two ships and £120 million per aircraft for 148 F-35s could be described as profligate. It looks like we will need to purchase a less capable fleet of frigates to compensate for the extra billions we’ve spent on CVF. But, this is crying over spilt milk. If CVF and F-35 cannot be scrapped now, it doesn’t make sense to question them further – so long as they deliver everything promised of them.

It is easy to criticise the Army’s ability to procure new vehicles as being the reason why it is less capable than it should be, but the truth is the piecemeal allocation of the equipment budget and long development and manufacturing lead-times have totally hamstrung its ability to think big. For all of the above reasons, it is entirely appropriate and desirable to question what the Army does next.

We need to answer four essential questions:

• What are the key threats we are likely to face?
• What combat roles do these imply?
• What resources, including troop numbers, are needed to fulfil them?
• How do we achieve a balanced allocation of resources between the three services?

What are the key threats we are likely to face?

The Army’s primary role is to protect the UK against a direct land attack. While an invasion scenario is highly unlikely, the prospect of home-grown terrorism conducted by extremists with their own political or military agenda could require a response beyond any that our national Police forces could provide. We certainly cannot discount the need for home defence or the unexpected need to deploy British soldiers on British streets.

What seems more likely is the need to deploy UK forces within Europe or further afield in support of our treaty obligations. What Brexit means in terms of supporting our European neighbours is not yet clear, but should any EU member state that is not a member of NATO be invaded, e.g. Finland, it seems more than probable that the UK would step-in to support military action to defend our combined interests.

We face three primary peer or near-peer threats. It hardly needs to be reiterated that Russia is the most obvious hostile player. Putin appears to want to recreate the Former Soviet Union and remains a real and present danger. China is happily building its armed forces beyond any territorial defence needs. It is also running out of real estate. How would we respond if China started expropriating territory in Africa or elsewhere, such as Taiwan? Thirdly, there is Iran, which only this week was reported to be adding long range anti-aircraft assets to defend its nuclear facilities. Although Iran insists that it has halted the development of nuclear weapons, this may not be the case. Iran’s deep-rooted dislike of the West and Israel means that it cannot be ignored.

In terms of asymmetric threats, Islamic extremist terrorism is perhaps the most existential danger we face, but our reluctance to deploy “boots on the ground” in countries where terrorist groups originate questions the level of commitment and the political resolve we would bring to bear if called upon to support military action in the Middle East or closer to home.

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, it is possible that we may need to deploy in a policing, peacekeeping and aid distribution role, on behalf of the United Nations. If the situation in Syria deteriorated further, this might also require some kind of military response.

When it comes to predicting future conflict scenarios, we have a perfect record: we haven’t gotten it right once. If we cannot successfully anticipate specific threats, we need to focus on the type and nature of deployments we must be resourced and equipped to undertake.

What combat roles do these imply?

Since the creation of the United Nations, the Commonwealth and the formation of NATO after World War 2, there have been four primary defence commitments that have defined UK policy. Although these have remained constant, in a climate of enduring budget austerity, the role of global policeman may have become unaffordable. This will require us to trim our aspirations so that we are resourced strictly to counter the most serious and likely threats.

The Four Pillars of UK Defence Policy

1. Self-defence of the United Kingdom. We need to protect ourselves from any direct action that might threaten our liberty, prosperity, democracy, indeed, our way of life. Situations might include a direct enemy attack against the UK mainland or our economy. Historically, this was seen as an invasion by sea or air. Today, it could be an infrastructure attack that prevented food, fuel and vital supplies from reaching UK citizens. A cyber attack or dirty bomb could damage or disrupt water supply and Our natural resources could be expropriated, e.g. oil and gas reserves or other essential assets could be seized to paralyse our economy. Terrorist attacks could be made by UK nationals or from external groups entering the UK illegally. Sustained attacks against passenger aircraft, for example, could force us to close our airports, creating a blockade. From a Land Power perspective, these scenarios imply domestic forces that could deploy rapidly within the UK, 

2. Protection of British and Commonwealth interests abroad. We need to be able to protect British people and assets in overseas countries, e.g. Oil company employees and depots in the Middle East. Commonwealth members, with whom we have mutually dependent trade agreements, might request our help to overcome a coup d’état or to expel an invader. Such scenarios imply an ability to for land forces to deploy over long distances and a capacity to sustain them in theatre for long periods.

3. The fulfilment of treaty obligations including NATO and the European Union. This is honouring the mutual commitment to our allies, where an attack against one nation is regarded as an attack against all. In one sense, this is the Doomsday scenario that might require an all-out deployment of regular forces before resorting to the use of nuclear weapons. From a land Power perspective, this scenario implies an ability to deploy substantial forces over long distances and sustain them in theatre indefinitely.

4. Support of the United Nations: the global police force / peacekeeper role. The UK has performed this role in Kosovo, Bosnia and, more recently, in Afghanistan. It may include the restoration of legitimate democratic government; helping nations build and manage their own police and national security capabilities; protecting the civil population in a political vacuum; and ensuring the effective distribution of aid after a natural disaster, especially when law and order have broken down. The role increasingly includes counter-insurgency operations against terrorist organisations, action against organised crime gangs and anti-piracy in international waters. It implies an ability to deploy moderate forces quickly, over long distances and often over long periods of time.

The Three Block War concept developed by US Marine Corps General, Charles Krulak, which envisaged a need for highly versatile forces able to switch easily between three core operational roles, has led to most NATO forces including the UK to divide deployment types into low, medium and high-intensity operations. Dividing our four principal defence commitments across the four primary pillars of commitment and by conflict intensity type gives us 12 basic threat scenarios. We can prioritise each one according to how probable the threat is and how serious it would be in terms of its political, military, and economic impact. The primary roles we must equip ourselves to perform can be grouped as follows:

 

The need to deploy forces domestically within the UK for Home Defence is not likely to be problematic with forces based domestically, not least because the local population is likely to support whatever missions were deemed necessary. UK based battalions should be easily able to deploy within the United Kingdom, using a wide variety of transport types.

Problems arise with a need to deploy troops thousands of miles from the UK in an expeditionary role. This is important because, traditionally, we have always deployed forces abroad to counter threats before they become too large and unmanageable on our doorstep. It is possible that we might be called upon to deploy within Europe, e.g. to deter or repulse an attack against the Baltic states. Similarly, we might need to deploy to Africa to protect against large-scale incursions by Boku Haraam, Al-Shabaab or other similar terrorist organisations that could threaten UK interests in Kenya, Nigeria and elsewhere. A Middle East situation might arise that required us to deploy within this region, e.g. Turkey, Iran or Syria if the situations were to deteriorate unexpectedly. For these reasons, an adaptable and autonomous long-range expeditionary capability is highly desirable.

What resources, including troop numbers, are needed to fulfil them?

My fundamental belief is that the UK needs two deployable divisions, plus an air mobile brigade, a commando brigade and a pool of reserves. We certainly have the manpower to staff an army of this size, even with total headcount restricted to 82,000.

The current cap on manpower was based on having a readily deployable reserve of 30,000 soldiers that could be easily and quickly integrated into the regular army. In reality, this plan has not worked as well as anticipated. There is a shortfall in both regular and reserve troop numbers. We may be better off with a regular army of 100,000 and a reserve that can quickly grow into larger separate units in time of war. Historically, we’ve been able to afford a peacetime army of well-above 100,000 and this number may make sense again given the many non-core UK roles we still ask the Army to perform, including peacekeeping and humanitarian relief on behalf of the UN. No one is asking for a return to 150,000+ soldiers, simply a realistic total number of soldiers.

The revised Army 2020 structure is not yet finalised, but it appears that we will reduce the three heavy armour brigades of the Reaction Force structure previously proposed in 2010 to just two armoured brigades plus the two new medium weight strike brigades.

We need to maintain a heavy armoured division with a three-brigade structure envisaged by the original Army 2020 plan. Without it, we risk not having a division that is fully capable of taking-on peer or near-peer enemies or one that can fight in parallel with an allied formation.

The heavy armoured division would be equipped with MBTs, IFVs and self-propelled guns. It would also need anti-aircraft artillery, engineer, signals, logistics, and other supporting units. Large heavy armour units take time and resources to prepare and deploy. Typically, UK Armoured formations need a lead-time of about 6 weeks to deploy and this is usually by sea. In any future conflict, we are unlikely to have the luxury of waiting so long before committing combat-ready assets to the fight. Although we maintain an air mobile brigade at high readiness, this only has two battalions and no heavy support weapons.

A second deployable division that could be rapidly deployed in an expeditionary role would allow a more immediate high-impact response. A wheeled medium weight division could deploy by road over 1000 kilometres within 72 hours, based on US Stryker Brigade experience. Assuming it had sufficient offensive firepower to deliver a solid punch against an enemy, it would be a substantial force with significant reach and punch, as well as a formation that would give us time to prepare a more deliberate heavy armoured response.

Some observers may suggest that we can get round the need for a second deployable division if we stockpiled MBTs and IFVs in forward supply dumps. I do not believe we can afford to base units or equipment abroad because there is the inevitable risk of them being in the wrong place when we need them or being over-run or expropriated before we can access them.

In summary, the primary division should be a heavy armoured infantry division comprised of three brigades. Each brigade would have 1 x MBT regiment, 1 x Recce regiment and 3 x IFV battalions and be supported by 1 x artillery regiment. Each division would have dedicated engineer, signals, medical, UAV, and other supporting units attached to it.

I would prefer to have two tank regiments per brigade, instead of only 1 x MBT regiment plus 1 x Ajax Recce regiment. An ideal configuration could be achieved by reducing the total number of Ajax Recce variants and acquiring additional IFV versions of Ajax (ASCOD 2) to replace Warrior. This would ensure that all non-MBT regiments used the same platform.

The second deployable division should be a medium weight 8×8 wheeled mechanised infantry division. This would also be comprised of three brigades with each one having 1 x Cavalry regiment with an 8×8 fire support vehicle, 3 x mechanised infantry battalions in an 8×8 APC / IFV, plus 1 x artillery regiment with something like a 120 mm breech-loaded mortar.

Current manpower levels would allow an additional independent brigade with 4×4 light protected vehicles to be created while adding an additional battalion to the air mobile brigade.

In terms of weaponry, I would ensure that all UK MBTs had the L/55 120 mm smoothbore gun, which has become a de facto tank calibre across NATO, even if this meant acquiring Leopard 2A7 or Abrams M1A2 MBTs. I would junk the troublesome and unaffordable 40 mm CTAS cased-telescoped ammunition cannon used for Warrior and Ajax in favour of the 30 mm MK44 Bushmaster II cannon mounted in a remote turret, although at this stage of development, this would seem unlikely.

A new wheeled artillery system using a 155 mm gun should be purchased – something like Archer or Caesar 8×8.

There is an interesting debate on the relative merits of 120 mm breech-loaded mortars versus 105 mm guns; deployability, effects and cost.

To support the 50 x Apache attack helicopters and 50 x Chinook support helicopters we have already purchased, a purchase of 50-100 Blackhawk utility helicopters to replace Puma and older Lynx would provide a serious uplift in mobility and utility, perhaps arming Wildcat and/or Blackhawk, another uplift in firepower.

Perhaps even a purchase of 15-20 Reaper UAS for use by the Army to support land operations with UAVs directly allocated to each brigade to provide overwatch and fire support, although the issues with Watchkeeper and overall capacity may result in these being RAF operated.

All mechanised and armoured infantry vehicles would carry integrated externally-mounted Javelin launchers. I would also expedite the development of HVMs. A Mach 6 anti-tank missile with some kind of long-rod APFSDS penetrator that could reliably deliver kinetic effect beyond the range of any known tank’s own APFSDS rounds would be transformational.

Part of the rationale for retaining tank fleets is that heavily protected vehicles excel at line-of-sight engagements thanks to their survivability and the lethality of their direct fire weapons. However, if HVATGMs could be fired indirectly from a vehicle like MIV or MRV-P (as well as from strike aircraft, attack helicopters and UAVs) beyond the visual and actual range of the tank’s main armament, they would neutralise the fundamental advantages of heavy armour.

Anti-tank weapon development has always outpaced protective technology development. The APFSDS round fired by Rheinmetall’s L/55 120 mm smooth bore gun can defeat the frontal armour of any known tank at this time, including the Dorchester plates fitted our own Challenger 2, Leopard 2 and Abrams M1 tanks. The T-14 Armata may be better protected than these, which is why MBDA is developing new ATGMs and Rheinmetall a new 130 mm smooth bore gun.

We are reaching a point in AFV evolution where protection levels are increasing the weight of tanks to unacceptable levels. I doubt that we will ever see 100-tonne MBTs – because the mobility limitations of 62-tonne tanks are already significant. Moreover, the unit cost of a next generation tank is likely to be €10-12 million while the unit cost of a wheeled medium weight vehicle fitted with ATGM is €3 million. The economic case unequivocally supports the latter platform.

Adding additional protection to tanks will be pointless if they can still be defeated, so we need an alternative approach. We need to reinvent the traditional iron triangle of firepower, protection and mobility. If it is reasonable to describe the Apache as a tank analogue, it prioritises mobility and speed above protection and firepower. An 8×8 MIV fitted with ATGMs would also prioritise mobility over protection and firepower, the difference between the two is cost. This is why wheeled vehicles with ATGMs have been such an equaliser.

With more than 104,000 tanks in use across the globally and only 20,000 of these belonging to NATO, countering enemy tanks is likely to remain an essential requirement. Since well-protected tanks with kinetic anti-tank rounds excel at defeating other tanks, it may be some time before we see the last of the MBT.

The CONEMP for MIV is likely to mandate the avoidance of direct confrontations with tanks in favour of indirect engagements. However, when MIV units can effectively neutralise tank formations of equivalent size through indirect ATGM fire, the tank may well have reached the limit of its development potential. Instead of direct confrontations with other AFVs, wheeled vehicles will be able to outmanoeuvre them or counter them using UAVs and other air assets.

All this assumes air superiority. One element of the mix that has also taken a serious “capability holiday” is anti-aircraft artillery (AAA). We need sufficient anti-aircraft missile systems to be integrated and deployable with both heavy and medium armour divisions.

We also need cannons with ammunition that is capable of shooting down helicopters and drones.

In addition to the two primary divisions, we have sufficient manpower to create a third independent brigade that would essentially be a pool of reserves. These troops would be mounted in light protected patrol vehicles, such as Jackal and Foxhound. I envisage five battalions plus a single cavalry regiment. If a fire support version of Jackal or Foxhound could be developed mounting something like the 30 mm M230LF chain gun, this would provide a worthwhile fire support element.

The above structure provides 23 infantry battalions with protected mobility. Indeed, the only battalions with protected vehicles would be the three air assault battalions and the five permanently committed forces battalions.

Finally, I would return 1 Para to the Air Assault Brigade and establish a separate Ranger Regiment as a dedicated Special Forces Support Group (SFSG).

How do we achieve a balanced allocation of resources between the three services?

We cannot extend the Army’s capabilities at the expense of the Royal Navy and RAF. Instead, the UK needs to recognise the need to increase defence spending in the short-term to plug the capability gaps created by austerity measures. We previously cut our forces to the bone in order for the economy to recover. Now that it has partly done so, we simply cannot afford to say: we survived without X or Y or Z, so we no longer need them. The 2010 Defence Review was a gamble. Just because we got away with it once doesn’t mean we should roll the dice again.

I should also mention that I am a firm believer in retaining the UK’s nuclear deterrent. However, bringing the cost of the Trident Successor into the main defence budget instead of keeping it as part of the treasury budget was a misleading tactic designed to disguise the true extent of the cuts imposed on all three forces, and especially the Army.

Summary

The most serious capability gap is the block obsolescence of the British Army’s AFV fleet. The piece-meal acquisition of different vehicles over time for individual deployments has resulted in an unsustainable variety of different platforms. Most were acquired hurriedly, at high cost and with little long-term utility beyond the missions they were required to fulfil. We need a carefully planned and implemented AFV strategy to underpin the Army’s ability to manoeuvre.

It is a reality of modern warfare that anti-vehicle mines (including IEDs) are here to stay. The concept of a Forward Edge of the Battlefield Area (FEBA) has become an anachronism. Consequently, we need protected mobility at every level.

We presently have Foxhound and Jackal as light protected 4×4 platforms. They are both excellent vehicles. We intend to acquire a third 4×4 platform, MRV-P, when we also already have Husky, Pinzgauer and Land-Rovers. I believe that all 4×4 vehicles should be based on a single common platform. That could easily be Foxhound or Jackal.

We need new MBTS and tracked IFVs. I favour Leopard 2 and ASCOD 2.

We need a multi-role medium weight wheeled 8×8 platform. I favour the Patria AMV.

We need new anti-tank missiles.

We need new artillery systems. Something like the Patria AMV with NEMO 120 mm mortar would be excellent.

We need new communications platforms. Morpheus is coming and it should be excellent.

We need to use UAVs more widely and to integrate them into brigade formations. We have already planned to buy more MQ-9 Reapers from General Atomics.

We need still need more helicopters if we want a credible air assault brigade. Puma is ancient. Wildcat is too small. NH-90 has problems. Blackhawk is proven, works well and is inexpensive.

The fact that we don’t have these resources today is because successive governments decided not to spend what is required to deliver them. Today, however, we go to war with what we have, not with what we would ideally want. If we don’t rebuild and reinvest in UK Land Power, we risk not being able to deploy at all or until after we have acquired what is needed to do the job – but that could be too late.

We have learned many times in the past that prevention is better than cure: deterrent is always preferable to having to use direct force. So let’s hope our politicians recognise the pressing need to re-equip our ground forces.

Policy paper: 2015 to 2020 government policy: Military Aid to the Civil Authorities for activities in the UK

The support of the armed forces to civil authorities in the UK is officially termed Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA). This paper shows the policy of the 2015 to 2020 Conservative government.

Find out about the current government’s policies.

Related information

• 2010 to 2015 government policy: armed forces support for activities in the UK

from Ministry of Defence – Activity on GOV.UK http://ift.tt/2aSRGAL

 

Speech: First Sea Lord’s defence and security lecture to the City of London

From the MoD…

Speech by First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Philip Jones.

My Lord Mayor,

It is a tremendous privilege to be the first service chief invited to deliver your annual Defence and Security Lecture, and to be joined by so many distinguished representatives from the City of London and beyond, including many of the Royal Navy’s long standing friends amongst the Livery Companies.

It’s also personal honour to be here tonight.

Thirty three years ago a previous Lord Mayor, Christopher Leaver, joined the PM Mrs Thatcher and the Chief of Defence Staff Admiral Lewin on the balcony of Mansion House to salute the men of the South Atlantic Task Force in a memorable commemorative parade.

Having been part of that Task Force, as a 22 year old acting Sub Lt, I was disappointed to be told I couldn’t be spared for the Parade, I was required to continue my training and instead spent the day in the altogether less jubilant environment of a lecture theatre in the Royal Navy’s School of Maritime Ops near Portsmouth.

So it is with some personal satisfaction that I have completed the loop as it were, and finally stand before you in Mansion House as First Sea Lord.

A huge amount has changed in the intervening period, for the navy and for the City. The year before the Falklands conflict, my own vessel, the amphibious flagship HMS Fearless, had been earmarked for scrapping as a result of the Nott Review. An unmistakable air of stagnation and decline hung over the fleet and, to an extent, the nation also, during that deep recession.

Yet the audacity of our victory 7,000 miles from home changed how the world viewed our nation and our armed forces. More importantly, it changed how we viewed ourselves.

As Mrs Thatcher told the guests at the lunch in the Guildhall given in honour of the Task Force:

“In those anxious months the spectacle of bold young Britons, fighting for great principles and a just cause, lifted the nation…doubts and hesitation were replaced by confidence and pride.”

Nowhere was that new found confidence more apparent than here in London, which has since then risen to become the world’s pre-eminent centre of global finance.

Here in the Square Mile, the spires of Wren and Hawksmoor have been joined by the glass cathedrals of Rogers and Foster.

On the skyline in Portsmouth, meanwhile, the iconic silhouette of HMS Victory will next year be joined by that of a 65,000 tonne aircraft carrier.

The City and the Navy are both defined by tradition and modernity in equal measure. Our shared strength reflects the UK’s international standing as determined by history and geography – but our success has the power to shape the UK’s continuing place in the world.

Last year, this lecture was delivered by the Director General of MI5, and the Home Secretary the year before, both of whom focused on the most immediate domestic security challenges we face today.

The Royal Navy shares that agenda.

We support the National Crime Agency to police our territorial waters, we have a range of forces at very high readiness for maritime counter terrorism and the Royal Marines make a significant contribution to our Special Forces.

It’s also worth noting that seven Royal Naval Reservists from HMS President here in London have been serving on UK Border Force cutters in recent times. They have civilian careers, perhaps in the City even, but, with the support of their employers, they’ve taken the decision to serve their country and gain new skills in the process.

I’d like to take this opportunity to thank the City of London Reserve Forces and Cadets Association for their work to promote reserve service among employers. Together, you’ve helped the Royal Naval Reserve and the Royal Marines Reserve grow in recent years, alongside those of our sister services, in accordance with government policy, and we are hugely grateful.

All these tasks are important, but the Royal Navy’s remit is as much global as it is domestic, and this is my focus tonight.

Last month, the people of the United Kingdom made a big decision in the EU Referendum. Charting a way forward is a matter for government and you will understand that I do not intend to speculate on any of that this evening.

But I do intend to describe what the Royal Navy is doing in the world today, together with the building blocks that are shaping our own future.

These were set in train before the Referendum and have not changed. They highlight Britain’s continuing, and indeed growing, position of global maritime leadership.

They also support the commitment expressed in last year’s Strategic Defence and Security Review for the work of the armed forces to more closely support the UK’s own prosperity.

Continued commitment

The full implications of last month’s vote will take time to become apparent, but for the Royal Navy the fundamentals remain the same.

Britain will always be an island nation, totally dependent on the sea for our security and prosperity; an understanding I know I share with this audience.

We remain in a position of global leadership, which includes the Royal Navy’s permanent command of NATO’s maritime forces.

Among the nations of Europe we continue to lead by example through our investment in credible hard power.

The Royal Navy has delivered the nation’s Strategic Nuclear Deterrent for almost 50 years. Now, through the regeneration of Carrier Strike, we will also deliver the nation’s principal conventional deterrent.

Both these projects continue irrespective of last month’s Referendum. On Monday, Parliament voted to build a new generation of Trident submarines. The 2 carriers are both structurally complete, and the first begins sea trials next year. In both cases, the government has made clear its intent. The nation expects, the world is watching and the Royal Navy will deliver.

Despite the inevitable internal focus over the last month, our international security challenges have not diminished. The security of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean is no less concerning today than it was before the Referendum. Russia and Daesh have not changed their character. The seas and oceans of the world will continue to be cluttered and contested.

So it’s business as usual for our sailors and marines, and for the UK armed forces as a whole.

Even before the Referendum, the Royal Navy was making our largest contribution to NATO in over a decade.

Across Europe’s southern flank, we continue to contribute to the EU and NATO led response to the migrant crisis.

The survey ship HMS Enterprise has now been on station in that role for a year, in which time she has rescued over 5,600 people.

Even since the Referendum, the government has announced the additional deployment of RFA Mounts Bay to the EU force in the Central Mediterranean and HMS Mersey to the NATO force in the Aegean.

So our commitment to working with our continental partners has not waivered, nor will it.

Supporting global maritime trade

Our shared interests and values, not to mention our geography, will always bind our defence to that of the continent.

Yet as an island nation and a trading power, the UK’s security and prosperity is indivisible from that of the wider world.

Our historic relationship with the City of London is testament to this.

Three hundred and fifty years ago, the City’s wealthiest citizens raised £16,000, not an insignificant sum back then, to fund the construction of a new warship. The King, so taken with this display of patriotism, named her Loyal London.

But those 17th Century Londoners weren’t motivated by loyalty or patriotism alone. They were merchants and traders, they knew that prosperity and security were intertwined; and that a strong, credible Royal Navy was necessary to protect and advance their own commercial interests.

From the earliest days of exploration to the height of Empire and beyond, the Royal Navy has always been the guardian of maritime trade. Long before Trafalgar, the teenage Horatio Nelson was protecting the ships of the British East India Company. It was naval power that opened China and Japan to Western markets. It was strength and security at sea that enabled Britain to become both the workshop of the world and the mother of Parliaments. Twice in the last century, the Royal Navy protected the convoys that formed Britain’s wartime lifeline.

Now, as the government looks to extend the UK’s economic partnerships, as signified by the creation of a new Department for International Trade in the last 2 weeks, the Royal Navy’s role in supporting prosperity rises to the fore once more.

Nowhere is this more apparent today than in the Gulf, where we are working with our partners to promote stability and prevent the arteries of world from hardening.

We’ve been there not just for the wars but for the peace too: a 40 year strategic commitment to the UK’s long term interests and one that shows no sign of lessening.

The Royal Navy holds a significant position of leadership in the region through the deputy commander role in Combined Maritime Forces, a US Navy led coalition of 31 nations, from Australia and Canada to Thailand and South Korea, drawn together by a shared commitment to maritime security throughout the Middle East.

The opening of our new naval base in Bahrain in the next few years will, quite literally, cement the Royal Navy’s commitment to the Gulf.

It will also enable us to reach further East. Every major financial centre in Asia-Pacific is on or near the coast. Every rising power in the region is investing in maritime power. And as the economic pull of Asia-Pacific continues to grow, so too does our commitment to security in that region.

Earlier this year the Royal Navy was for the first time granted observer status at the Western Pacific Naval Symposium. Piracy in the Straits of Malacca and cooperation in the South China Sea matter to us because the UK’s own economic wellbeing, like that of the international system, is reliant on the rule of law at sea.

But the Royal Navy’s contribution to prosperity is more than just the physical protection of maritime trade, important though that is.

At the weekend, the new Foreign Secretary wrote of his desire for “a truly global Britain using our unique voice, humane, compassionate, principled, to do good around the world and to exploit growth in markets to the full”.

Three years ago, the Royal Navy provided disaster relief to the Philippines in the wake of Typhoon Haiyan, as did the RAF. The fact that we responded with greater speed and effect than even some neighbouring countries did not go unnoticed, particularly among the leading regional powers.

Wherever we are and whatever we’re doing, be it countering narcotics in the Caribbean or searching for missing aircraft in the Indian Ocean, the world is watching.

So the hard punch of military power is often delivered inside the kid glove of humanitarian relief or the mailed fist of maritime security. But the Royal Navy also delivers the soft touch of engagement: that reassuring and persistent UK presence in the world that underpins the friendship and commitment upon which so many economic partnerships rest.

This influence runs deeper than mere physical presence.

Our young sailors and marines are some of the best ambassadors for Britain you could wish for.

Many of our closest diplomatic and military ties today were forged on the parade ground 30 or 40 years ago. Britannia Royal Naval College has trained the current heads of 2 dozen navies.

Over the past 10 years, the Royal Navy’s Flag Officer Sea Training and his staff have trained 105 of the world’s navies and coastguards, 58 of them in 2015.

Across the board, the message from our friends in NATO, the Commonwealth, the Gulf and beyond is clear: they want more of the Royal Navy.

Carrier Strike

The introduction of the first of 2 new aircraft carriers into the Royal Navy next year is a huge opportunity for the UK to signal its continuing ambition in the world.

At the moment, the United States is the first and only country in the world with both a Continuous At Sea Nuclear Deterrent and a continuously available Carrier Strike capability.

Within the next few years, the UK will join them in wielding both these totemic capabilities: ahead of China, ahead of India, ahead of Russia.

The F35B Joint Strike Fighter made its first appearance in the UK earlier this month. It’s an extraordinarily capable aircraft. The Royal Navy and Royal Air Force will operate it together in partnership, from the sea and the land. By 2023 up to 24 will be available to fly from the carriers.

The combination of 2 operational carriers and a credible numbers of jets is crucial to shaping Britain’s military power in the world

It will offer the largest dedicated air group of fifth generation fighters at sea, and the most potent Carrier Strike capability outside the United States.

It will endow the UK with the means to take our place alongside our closest allies, chiefly the United States and France, but others too, in providing maritime air power in defence of shared interests around the world.

And it will form the centrepiece not only of the Royal Navy, but to many of our international alliances too, reinforcing our position of leadership within NATO, reaffirming our commitment to continental Europe, and projecting our influence far beyond.

Because while they are first and foremost fighting ships, these carriers will embody the Government’s full spectrum approach. They will support exports for UKTI and the Department for International Trade, diplomacy for the Foreign Office, security for the National Security Secretariat in the Cabinet Office and they will deliver aid for DFID.

So like the Royal Navy itself, these ships, and their aircraft, offer something unique and invaluabl, hard and soft power bound together.

National shipbuilding Strategy

Far from detracting from the needs of the wider Fleet, as some commentators have suggested, these ships are a catalyst for investment across each of the Royal Navy’s fighting arms.

The third new Astute-class attack submarine has now entered service, and 4 further boats are in various stages of build. New tankers are under construction for the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and new stores ships will follow. Every type of helicopter in the Fleet Air Arm is being upgraded and replaced and our Royal Marines remain the UK’s go-to contingency force.

Meanwhile our current Type 23 frigates, the backbone of the Fleet, will be replaced with 8 Type 26 anti-submarine warfare frigates and “at least” 5 lighter Type 31 General Purpose frigates.

The build programme for the Type 31, and subsequent classes of ship, will be determined by the National Shipbuilding Strategy which is being developed by Sir John Parker and is expected to report later in the year.

Within this Strategy is the opportunity to both strengthen our security overseas and also invest in Britain’s prosperity at home.

Type 26 is a case in point. The hull may be built on the Clyde, but the benefits are shared across the country. It includes gearboxes from Huddersfield, stabilisers from Dunfermline and countermeasures from Bridgend: high-tech systems that demand high-skilled jobs and create new apprenticeships.

The Type 31 offers the same prospect; but with an additional potential for export orders for the UK from the international market.

The National Shipbuilding Strategy therefore represents a historic opportunity to reverse the decades old decline in surface ship numbers, and to re-establish a sustainable and prosperous long term shipbuilding capability that sits above short term economic and political tides.

There will be challenging trade-offs to achieve in order to keep the price down, and the timescale is tight. But if we get this right, and I am determined that we will, then there is a real chance to grow the size of the Royal Navy’s fleet for the first time in decades.

This could enable a more frequent, or even a permanent, presence in parts of the world where we have admittedly been spread thin in recent decades.

Together with the aforementioned naval base in Bahrain, the Royal Navy has also been working with the government of Oman to explore berthing options in the new commercial port of Duqm. Situated outside the Strait of Hormuz it provides immediate access to the Indian Ocean and capacity for aircraft carriers and nuclear powered submarines. Under the Five Powers Defence Agreement, the Royal Navy also retains berthing space in Singapore.

All of these facilities provide the government and defence with the option, should we wish, to project power and influence beyond the Atlantic.

Given our long standing defence relationships in the Middle East, it is certain that a Royal Navy task group, centred on a Queen Elizabeth-class carrier, will regularly deploy East of Suez.

And it will be perfectly possible, should we wish, for Type 31 frigates to permanently operate from the Gulf region or from Asia-Pacific in the decades ahead.

These are examples of what we could do and not yet policy, and I am never complacent about the challenges we continue to face in recruiting and retaining the very best men and women in a competitive employment market.

But navies are strategic in nature and the genesis of these opportunities is found in the present.

The success of both Carrier Strike and the National Shipbuilding Strategy in the near time has the potential to help match the UK’s defence capabilities to our national economic ambitions in the longer term: however, and wherever, they may develop.

A new era of maritime ambition

I’m looking forward to taking your questions, so I shall draw to a close.

For 500 years the Royal Navy has been the most consistent and visible expression of the mercantile character of our island nation.

Today we are ready once again to be melded and aligned for best effect with the UK’s political, economic, diplomatic and trade ambitions.

The opportunities are coming thick and fast.

2017 will truly be the ‘Year of the Carrier’, as HMS Queen Elizabeth leaves her builders, commences sea trials and arrives in Portsmouth for the first time. Before the end of the year she will hoist the White Ensign for the first time, and her sister ship will be officially named in Rosyth.

Throughout this time, the spotlight will be on the United Kingdom.

These ships, and our continued national investment in maritime power, send an unmistakable message about our place in the world:

Far from being a diminished nation, withdrawing from the world, the United Kingdom has both the intent and the means to protect our interests, shoulder our responsibilities and support our prosperity across the globe.

And as the most senior serving veteran of the Falklands conflict, I know better than most that whatever our current preoccupations may be, ‘events’ will always have the power to surprise.

So rest assured, the Royal Navy is here whatever the future holds for our maritime trading nation and its great global City.

from Ministry of Defence – Activity on GOV.UK http://ift.tt/29ZNmtG

How to Fix UK Land Power

This is a guest post from long time defence blogger Sven, from Defense and Freedom, a German milblog.

Sven describes his blog as;

This blog is about the defence against external threats and about the defence of civil liberties. Most topics are about the art of war, military history or military technology

It is always good to get an outside perspective on things.

So on to the subject, fixing UK Land Power…

The security situation in Europe has changed from the rather pleasant state at the turn of the millennium.

At first, the warning shot of the South Ossetia War left little impression on most who bothered to pay attention to military affairs in Europe. Few dared to be derided as Cold War dinosaurs and began to point at collective deterrence and defence as the raison d’être of NATO, calling for attention on deterring Russia for the sake of the vulnerable Baltic members of NATO. At least NATO finally and belatedly began to plan for their defence in 2010.

Yet the official stance was still that Russia was a partner, not a great power to be deterred.

This bubble of illusion did burst with the Ukrainian Civil War – a war that was waged between pro-Western and pro-Russian elements in the political arena, albeit the actual forces siding with Russia were Russia’s own army operating without proper national insignia, adventurers from outside the Ukraine and relatively few actual ethnic Russians from Ukraine.

Whatever the political and military events looked and look like in Ukraine – that war seemed to have convinced a majority of those who paid attention in NATO that Russia is more of an aggressor – a threat – than a “partner for peace”.

Meanwhile, all those great power games on distant continents ended in a mess – one after another.

• Iraq is still a mess,
• Afghanistan is a mess’
• Yemen is a mess,
• Somalia has made a mess its natural state of existence,
• Pakistan may turn into a mess with nukes any day.

None of the great power gaming with military forces has achieved much more than body counts. Additional oil has been poured into the fire. The belief in military force as capable of solving problems on distant continents was mostly shattered in the West. It wasn’t quite a majority opinion in Europe anyway. Most of those politicians who get to play great power games – with the world as their sandbox and the armed forces as their plastic toy soldiers – have lost this naive faith as well.

Many of those who pay attention to military affairs at all are somewhat surprised by the new threat Russia, and in their primitiveness many of them conclude that we need to spend additional resources to meet such a threat.

I have yet to see anyone who publicly does the rational thing: Look at the real threat situation, look at the budget sizes (less pensions), look at what efficiency of military spending can be achieved and then determine the required level of spending.

Instead, the easiest route is being preferred. Let’s throw some more resources at the problem, this is how to solve problems, right?

Didn’t this serve us well in the great power games before?

I have recently looked at both the brigades of the U.S. Army and the German Heer on my blog, trying to determine what minimum changes should be done to make them fit for collective deterrence and defence against the only somewhat realistic threat, Russia. I mustered the self-discipline and moderated the ambition, trying to point at but a very few pivotal points instead of creating some fantasy army from a blank sheet of paper.

It’s an interesting thought experiment to do the same to about the army of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Said army is still recovering from being used as a pool of ‘toy soldiers’ for great power games in Iraq and Afghanistan.

It’s also withdrawing from its WW2 legacy bases in Germany. Its equipment for conventional warfare such as main battle tanks or air defences suffers from very small production runs and inventories, and the wisdom of additional national design solutions is highly questionable. Development and procurement of equipment in the past decades hasn’t exactly gained the bureaucracy a reputation for outstanding competence. Its post-Cold War track record in developing combat platforms for the army has been as dismal as in the United States.

British Aerospace has become a binational corporation (US/UK), and the English people stand out in Europe as feeling much more close to North America than continental Europe does, and attitude that can at the very least be traced back to the Thatcher era. Both these factors almost predetermine that the British Army’s equipment will become ever more similar to the U.S Army’s. In my opinion any advice or proposal to choose another path is bound to be unrealistic.

Likewise, it’s unrealistic to expect the UK to feel as a land power first and foremost anytime soon. Ever since the 16th century the English in particular have looked to the seas first, with land power being an afterthought during peacetime at least. An all-out orientation of their army at NATO’s Eastern frontier as can be asked of the Germans is thus unrealistic.

What conclusions could be drawn for adjustments to the British land forces (including the Royal Marines) then?

The land forces can sensibly be expected to have several tasks:

1. to provide a contribution to NATO’s Eastern deterrence and defence
2. to provide a contribution to NATO’s Northern deterrence and defence
3. to protect the UK territory at least against feeble invasion attempts
4. to provide a pool of great power game toy soldiers*

[box type=”note” bg=”#” color=”#” border=”#” radius=”0″ fontsize=”15″]TD NOTE; Have discussed this last point point with Sven and for the avoidance of doubt, he has used this term in the context of his opinion that contemporary politicians see the Army as plastic toy soldiers on a board as part of their ‘power games’. No slight or insult is intended so please do not climb aboard the outrage bus.[/box]

I do not claim to fully understand or even like British army traditions, regimental system et cetera. A main battle tank battalion that gets called “Hussars” is an insult to my military history sense, for example.

Still, I do feel that there are sensible paths for change that do not require substantial extra budgeting or unrealistic changes of national attitudes. So much I dare to pretend to know and understand.

Concerning the four principal missions:

ONE

A combination of Royal Marines, “Para” and “Commando” forces could meet the Norway defence requirements. Norway is too large and its geography too complex for a complete defence, but the persistence of forces even in face of an invading force could neutralise Norway as a base for opposing forces’ air and sea power. This in turn would keep the UK far from any opposing forces’ base and thus safe. It is reasonable to expect the Americans or preferably Canadians to do the same regarding Iceland.

The equipment of forces meant in part for employment in Norway needs to be air-deployable, suitable for very cold weather, suitable for mountainous terrain and efficient in supply demands (both mass and volume).

 

Effective, denying attacks on airbases and harbours needs to be possible with some pieces of this equipment even in face of strong security efforts on the opposing forces. Obviously, this goes well beyond what 81 mm mortars can do.

The organisation of these forces will likely remain a hodgepodge of one-of-its-kind units with traditional designations. Any effort at organisation standardisation would likely be a wasted effort. The organisation should meet two requirements, though: It should both allow for guerilla-like persisting operation of highly elusive small units and units that keep threatening bases AND concerted synchronised assaults to defeat invading forces when this seems to be possible.

This way a mere share of the UK’s land power could in concert with Norwegian forces provide the deterrence required to make Norway a most undesirable target for invasion, and thus safe. This is in the long term and grand scheme of things the price to be paid for being -and staying- at a safe distance from the net potential aggressor.

TWO

Forces for employment in Eastern Europe would first and foremost need to be able to deploy there in time. There’s still no road connection, and the Eurotunnel appears to be a fairly easy target for disruption efforts. A deployment by rail from the UK into Poland is thus too unreliable an approach to be trusted. Any deployment by sea on the other hand would only reach to Hamburg. Hamburg is the closest to Poland and the Baltics among all reasonably safe harbours. A road march of hundreds of kilometres after disembarkment would thus be inevitable unless at least the equipment was prepositioned. There’s little reason to expect much forward positioning of equipment or even complete brigades given the political situation (especially fiscal policy) and attitudes. Air transport assets would be overburdened by the Royal Air Force’s needs (in support of Typhoons) and the deployment of forces into Norway. To add much additional airlift capacity is unrealistic considering the high prices of Western military transport aircraft.

I do not wish to insult the UK’s land forces, but to me they seem to be limited to a slow deployment reinforcements role regarding NATO’s Eastern security. A battalion or so may be in the region as symbolic tripwire force as part of some rotation scheme, but the bulk of land power would arrive so late that they would have no say in whether the Russians overrun and occupy the Baltics or not.

The consequence of this is simply that the land power would need to be suitable for liberation of the Baltics, a capability which may add to the alliance’s deterrence. This also means that these forces would be pointless and thus their budgets wasted if Russia’s leaders were convinced that such a liberation could be deterred with the threat of tactical nuclear strikes or if NATO allies such as Poland and Germany convince the same Russian leaders that Lithuania would not be overrun in the first place, and Estonia/Latvia only be overrun at the price or losing the Kaliningrad Oblast.

Still, what should such forces look like?

Air defence needs to be more serious, which CAMM may provide – but MICA VL is available military off the shelf already and ESSM Block II may spawn a land-based system before CAMM becomes available. Anti-tank defences should be bolstered as well, and this goes beyond the question mark about Challenger 2’s 120 mm munitions.

Javelin has been understood by the Russians since 1989. They are almost guaranteed to have worked out a counter to Javelin, and thus also to EuroSpike. This may be a warning sensor and a liberal employment of multispectral smoke if nothing else. My proposal is thus the same as for the German and American land forces; add redundancy and thus reliability by adding an anti-tank munition with very few if any systemic (shared) risks: A Mach 6 missile with a kinetic energy penetrator similar to the long rod of APFSDS fired from 120 mm tank guns. Multiple American projects appear to be the closest to introduction into service; LOSAT, CKEM and HATM. They share a weakness at short ranges since the missile first needs to accelerate, but this happens within the effective range of NLAW and at those ranges where Javelin cannot exploit its top attack mode yet.

 

British artillery shares about the same problems as the American artillery; its self-propelled gun is an old style 155 mm L/39 ordnance, not L/45 of the 80’s or L/52 of the 90’s. Really long ranges can only be achieved with exotic (gliding) rounds that aren’t in the inventory. The AS 90 either needs to be upgraded, or artillery needs to focus on multiple rocket launchers or alternative 155 mm L/52 systems need to be introduced. A substantial range disadvantage compared to 2S19, 2S35 and possibly even the old 2S5 should not be tolerated.

MLRS should be reverted from a GMLRS-only role; the system lends itself well to large thermobaric munitions which would be uniquely suitable for destruction of identified and occupied positions, akin to TOS-1A.

Organisation-wise, I think terrain and mission would favour a mechanised brigade format, essentially well-rounded little divisions with organic air defence, anti-tank unit, tank, armoured infantry, artillery, infantry, engineer and logistics components. This could yield up to three battalion battlegroups, either identical or with different weighting of infantry and armour.

Rocket artillery on the other hand should stay out of the manoeuvre brigades; unguided rocket munitions are terribly bulky and thus poorly suited for mobile warfare while guided rocket munitions can support from far ‘behind’.

THREE

The Army Reserve (territorial forces) faces the challenge of being relevant for deterrence while spending as little as possible. A great dependence on reservist and possibly part-time personnel is thus the way to go, and let’s be frank: The most sensible course of action would be to hand them mostly second hand equipment that’s been succeeded in the deployable army already. The move from a militia-like territorial force towards a pool for additional, cheaper, soldiers was ill-advised.

By now it’s obvious that this yields no benefit whatsoever.

Deployment on the continent in the event of collective defence in Europe would hardly be a benefit, for it would expose the UK to event he flimsiest airborne invasions if the Typhoons fail (or are absent). The Army Reserve would furthermore arrive even later than the regular army, and would no doubt be rated much lower in quality by Russian army planners. To change this would turn the Army Reserve into regular army forces, with the resulting fiscal disadvantage.

The Army Reserve should in equipment and organisation be focused on defeating the VDV and on disaster relief in my opinion.

FOUR

Finally, the pool for those ‘board game toy soldiers’ should probably follow the Légion étrangère format, exploiting recruiting in Commonwealth countries and especially among Gurkhas. The equipment could be dominated by armoured air-deployable cars, while the Commando/Para ‘Norway reinforcements’ could add the infantry strength needed in places like Belize.

– – – – –

I paid much attention to laying out the reasoning, as well as why, where and how the path dependency should be broken to increase the fitness of British land power for missions that really matter. The exact choice of equipment types and formation designs is not so much of importance as is clarity about what land power is good for now, in the near future, and why.

Only this utility may justify the fiscal expenses as well as the spending of time, sweat and often even health by British soldiers.

 

links:

“began to plan for their defence in 2010” : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Eagle_Guardian

HATM: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/hatm.htm

LOSAT: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MGM-166_LOSAT

CKEM: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compact_Kinetic_Energy_Missile

VDV: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Airborne_Troops

TOS-1A: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TOS-1

MICA VL: http://www.mbda-systems.com/ground-based-air-defence/vl-mica/

“withdrawing from its WW2 legacy bases in Germany”: http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-33142613