Ground and Sea Launched SPEAR 3

A few months ago I posted an update on the UK’s Selected Precision Effects At Range (SPEAR) Capability 3 requirement, without going too much into the detail (click here to read) one thing that struck me as an important advantage of the proposed MBDA solution over the Raytheon Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) II was the simple fact that it is powered. The two are very similar but obviously, the SDB II is at a much more advanced stage of development.

Because the MBDA solution has a small turbine engine it is reportedly capable of doubling the range of SDB II and being capable of much-increased manoeuver.

The difficult question for the UK is whether to accept the compromise and go for the US off the shelf solution or develop SPEAR.

The title of the post was Hard Sums Ahead, they will be, the decision will be a financial one of course.

I have a theory that one of the reasons CAMM is already an export success before it is in service and Brimstone is, pretty much, an export failure after many years of sterling service, is because of launch platform diversity.

CAMM can be used off a ship just as easily as a truck, and it is radar agnostic. We have failed to integrate Brimstone with anything but the Tornado, and now, Typhoon. If we had taken the decision early on with Dual Mode Brimstone to fund Apache, Wildcat and Reaper integration, gone the whole hog with the ‘Sea Spear’ concept and, as planned, deployed a ground-launched variant to replace the Swingfire ATGW, I think it would have seen more customers adopt it.

That aside, with SPEAR Cap 3, I think we need to think of ways to diversify its launch platforms and in a nutshell, do more with it. This means we should be thinking beyond F35 and Typhoon and onto other platforms. This will maximise flexibility and improve exportability.

Which brings me on to the subject of the post.

If we do opt for a development programme, and I think we should, launch platform diversity simply has to be a consideration.

In a maritime context, MBDA has shown an artist’s impression of SPEAR with a booster, quad packed into a CAMM launch cell. This means customers of the CAMM system will be able to easily deploy an all-weather land attack and anti-surface guided weapon, a weapon with a multi-mode seeker, tactical data link and range in excess of 100km and one that can hit moving targets. Smaller vessels will be able to pack a serious punch with very little positioning, top weight and efflux management issues.

 

Integration of SPEAR with a Mk 41 VLS opens up an even wider market.

Whether to use a small booster is used to clear the VLS with the onboard micro-turbine used for the rest of the flight or a longer ranged rocket booster used to increase range, is also another consideration. One could see some derivative of the CAMM rocket engine and control system used, of course, it is not as simple as just bolting SPEAR to the front of a CAMM missile, but some degree of commonality should surely be possible?

A standalone container could also be sited on almost any vessel of opportunity, from a frigate, to a RHIB.

In UK service, there may be some crossover between a sea-launched SPEAR and the new 5″ gun being fitted to the Type 26 Global Combat Ship

Overlapping capabilities are never a bad thing, and if we can perfect a soft launch VLS approach, like CAMM, other possibilities in the land domain become possible.

In the land environment, two concepts spring to mind…

The first is to use a ground-launched SPEAR missile as a replacement for the EXACTOR (Spike NLOS) missile. EXACTOR was purchased for a theatre-specific role but as Israel has shown with Spike NLOS, it is a very effective and flexible weapon that has been used in all spectrums of operation.

It takes me back to some of the original Netfires NLOS concepts and FOG-M.

 

NETFIRES was actually a brilliant concept, execution less so, but the concept was sound, apart from being a little over-complex.

i.e. platform independent, easily transported (12 on a NATO standard pallet), air-portable, over the horizon precision fire support, integrated with existing artillery and rocket command and control systems.

To completely replace EXACTOR, SPEAR would need an electro-optical guidance system but these are hardly at the cutting edge of technology, just another option at the front!

If SPEAR can be vertically launched, using the low-cost CAMM launch cells, one could easily imagine a host of launch platforms and configurations being used. A multiple round VLS type container could be air dropped to provide support for Special Forces or simply mounted on the back of trucks and other vehicles. With an ability to be distributed and fire from behind cover or from a reverse slope, it would provide an excellent overwatch system that complements direct fire (and faster to target) anti-tank guided weapons.

If the tactical data link had the range, or could be extended using airborne platforms, another use would be possible, one that is already being developed by Saab and Boeing.

The Ground Launched Small Diameter Bomb combines GMLRS and the Boeing SDB.

90km range of the GMLRS is then extended by the SDB’s 60km range.

With SPEAR 3, range is greater, so that would be 90km plus at least, another 100km. SPEAR Cap 3 is described as a 100km weapon but indications are that 140km is achievable.

200km minimum is only a third less than ATACMS, an interesting comparison.

This is not to say that SPEAR Cap 3 has the punch of ATACMS, because it doesn’t, but it would provide an extra dimension to the deep(ish) strike/interdiction repertoire.

With increasing costs of fast jet aircraft, they are inevitably becoming less numerous, providing land forces with a relatively cheap means of attacking rear area targets with precision would compensate for this, allowing the aircraft to attack higher priority targets more suited to their capabilities.

Again, the warhead on SPEARis smaller than GMLRS or Paveway IV, so not a complete one for one replacement.

If the UK is to invest in SPEAR, and not simply buy off some other nations shelf, we need to avoid stove-piped thinking and recognise that such a system has utility across the land, sea and air domains.

By building in this joint effects thinking, we also maximise commonality and export potential.

SPEAR need not be a solely air-launched weapon, and we should avoid thinking of it as such.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

F-15 2040C

Boeing has proposed a series if upgrades to the F-15C to supplement the small numbers of F-22’s and extend the production line once their order for Saudi Arabia is completed by the end of 2019.

 

Apart from all the systems improvements what is striking is the new pylons that allow it to carry 16 missiles.

In April this year Dr John Stillion from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments published a widely read report called Trends in Air Combat – Implications for Future Air Superiority

In this study, Dr. John Stillion conducts a historical analysis of air-to-air combat, drawing on a database of over 1,450 air-to-air victories from multiple conflicts from 1965 to the present. Using this data, Stillion assesses how advances in sensor, weapons, and communication technologies have changed air combat and the implications of these trends for future combat aircraft designs and operational concepts. Stillion concludes that these advances may have fundamentally transformed the nature of air combat. This transformation may be steadily reducing the utility of some attributes traditionally associated with fighter aircraft (e.g., extreme speed and maneuverability) while increasing the value of attributes not usually associated with fighter aircraft (e.g., sensor and weapon payload as well as range). As a result, an effective sixth-generation “fighter” may look similar to a future “bomber” and may even be a modified version of a bomber airframe or the same aircraft with its payload optimized for the air-to-air mission, Stillion argues. If this is correct, then the United States may be in a position to save tens of billions of dollars in nonrecurring development costs by combining Air Force and Navy future fighter development programs with each service’s long range ISR/strike programs.

Click here to read the report in full.

Whilst not the long range fighter-bomber he proposes, the increase in missile payload seems like at least a nod to the conclusions of the report, the need for a larger number of missiles than currently carried in order to combat increasingly advanced and likely numerically superior enemies.

Which brings me to this story from May, the Typhoon Common Weapons Launcher.

Although it seems to be mainly for ground-to-air weapons like Paveway IV and Brimstone 2, wonder if it could be used for carrying the extremely potent and long ranged Meteor?

 

With three on each pylon and four in the normal fuselage positions, a Typhoon could carry 22 missiles.

Do we have that many!

 

Stocking up on Paveway IV

The MoD has let another contract to Raytheon for more Paveway IV Precision Guided Bombs

The Secretary of State for Defence (the Authority) acting through the International Guns, Missiles and Rockets Project Team of Defence Equipment and Support proposes to award a 12 month contract, to Raytheon Systems Ltd for the manufacture of a number of Paveway IV bombs. The contract value is 40 000 000 GBP

Stock replenishment or getting ready?

 

 

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Paveway IV Tactical Penetrator Contract

The MoD has awarded a 3 and a half year £27 million contract to Rayhtheon for the;

Development, Qualification and Manufacture of a Tactical Penetrator Warhead.

This is the Paveway IV guided bomb in service since 2008, one of the RAF’s principle attack weapons, with Brimstone and Storm Shadow

This is an interesting development, a penetrating warhead has been one of those slow burn projects that has seemingly been around for ages as part of the Selected Precision Effects at Range (SPEAR) Capability 1 programme. Raytheon have worked with QinetiQ and Thales to develop and test initial versions of the penetrating warhead to reduce risk so this looks like moving the project to the next stage. Reports from last year indicated a discarding shroud would feature as part of the design, a design intended to penetrate hard and deep targets like bunkers and underground tunnels.

Good news.

 

 

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Hard Sums Ahead for SPEAR Cap 3

THIS POST HAS BEEN REPLACED WITH

UK Complex Weapons – Reference

Selective Precision Effects at Range (SPEAR) Capability 3 is the name for a set of requirements for an air-launched stand-off weapon to be used against a wide range of stationary and moving targets in day or night with the ability to defeat countermeasures.

This description could be given to Brimstone but the key difference between Brimstone and SPEAR Cap 3 is the latter has a turbojet engine and not a rocket motor, thus, it can travel much further. The warhead is also designed to provide selectable effects.

Clever stuff.

Clearly, it is designed to work with the UK’s future F35B fleet for attacks against integrated air defences using its increased stand-off distance to enhance the launch aircraft survivability. In other air interdiction missions against lesser capability air defences it will be used to destroy the full gamut of likely targets on the ground.

All well and good, but the problem with SPEAR Capability 3 is whilst it offers a number of technical benefits over the competition it represents a significant investment at a time of constrained budgets.

A key decision point is approaching to hard sums lie ahead for the MoD.

As part of my extended (sorry about that) look at the UK Complex Weapons portfolio approach this is a summary of the current position regarding SPEAR Cap 3.

Background

SPEAR Capability 3 is part of a portfolio of air, land and sea-launched complex weapons.

Selective Precision Effects at Range, or SPEAR, is an RAF programme that is part of the 2010 Team Complex Weapons enabling contract that comprises a number of requirements and partners including Thales, MBDA and Roxel, QinetiQ and others.

The programme has evolved over time but the commonly accepted components are;

• Fire Shadow Loitering Munition for the Royal Artillery that looks increasingly like it is going nowhere; click here to read more.
• Future Anti-Surface Guided Weapon (Heavy), a joint programme with the French for Anti Navire Léger. FASGW (H)/ANL that will arm the Royal Navy’s AW159 Lynx Wildcat helicopter and the French Navy’s NH90 and Panther helicopters. This is now called Sea Venom and will be manufactured and bought into service by MBDA; click here to read more.
• Lightweight Multirole Missile (LMM) or Future Anti-Surface Guided Weapon (Light), being developed by Thales Air Defence to arm the Royal Navy’s AW159 Lynx Wildcat helicopter. Now called Martlet; click here to read more.
• Future Local Area Air Defence System/Common Anti-Air Modular Missile has been recently confirmed as a replacement for Sea Wolf for the Royal Navy Type 23 frigate and new Type 26 frigates. The same missile will also be used to replace the Rapier in the ground based air defence role. Now called Sea and Land Ceptor respectively, click here to read more.
• Storm Shadow Capability Enhancement Programme. A joint UK/French joint programme to enhance the Storm Shadow and SCALP cruise missiles (this is still on my to-do list)
• Selective Precision Effects At Range (SPEAR) is not a single weapon but a collection of requirements, 1 to 3. Capability 1 embodies a range of upgrades to the already impressive Raytheon Paveway IV precision guided bomb. Capability 2 is being met by Brimstone 2 and Capability 3 is commonly called SPEAR, confusingly.

Capabilities

SPEAR Capability 3 is a Category A project (>£400m) described as;

A new 100 kg class weapon being developed to be the primary air to ground armament for the Lightning II (Joint Strike Fighter) from 2021; and optimised for internal carriage. SPEAR Cap 3 will provide the capability to destroy/defeat a wide range of targets at range, including mobile and re locatable targets, in all weathers, day and night, in all environments under tight rules of engagement.

The conceptual requirement emerged some time ago but was been given particular impetus by the proliferation of advanced Russian and Chinese air defence systems, especially the SA-21 and related systems.

Its key features include;

• Internal turbojet with flush intakes and folding wings
• F35B internal or external carriage with 4 per bay on the F35
• External carriage on the Typhoon (although this does not seem to be in the current plan)
• 100km plus range (reportedly 120km)
• Two way datalink for re-tasking during flight
• GPS/INS, Millimetric Radar and Semi Active Laser (SAL) terminal guidance (final options to be confirmed)
• Multi fuzing and tuneable warhead

The turbojet propulsion is used to provide extended range, headwind resistance, survivability against air defence weapons and additional flexibility.

There have been a number of feed in research programmes including the Sensor to Effector Phase 2 and Time Sensitive Target Test Bed that have developed the control and communication systems between the weapon and other platforms.

MBDA have also suggested that with a suitable booster, SPEAR Cap 3 could be quad packed in a Mk41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) silo to provide a 70km plus anti-surface weapon.

Status and Issues

The SPEAR Capability 3 Assessment Phase also included Capability 2 block 2 and Sea Ceptor so when the National Audit Office report, the individual component costs are not clear.

The real issue with SPEAR Capability 3 is that the MBDA version is not the only game in town. Raytheon has their Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) Increment II or GBU-53. There is no doubt SDB-II has less capability, it is a glide only weapon and thus has a lower time to target (which enables the launch aircraft the get the f**k out of dodge sooner) and longer range (greater stand-off distance).

The SDB-II has a tri-mode seeker (SAL, IR and MMW) and a larger warhead than SPEAR Cap 3.

What it does have though, is a production contract.

Raytheon are on the public relations offensive and have hinted that a UK SDB-II could be made at their UK manufacturing facility.

The MoD is keeping tight-lipped but what has been released indicates that both MBDA and Raytheon are providing data that will enable an informed decision point to be reached, possibly this year, with a final decision coming in 2017-2018.

The UK will have to fund development of the MBDA weapon and integration with any aircraft the MoD want to launch it from, at least the F35 and potentially, the Typhoon and any future unmanned aircraft in the FCAS vision. If the SDB-II were selected at least the F35B integration costs could be eliminated. This might sound trivial but as we know, integration of complex weapons onto complex aircraft is a very expensive hobby, Storm Shadow on Typhoon is costing £150m for example.

Apart from Saudi Arabia, the air-launched weapons (Brimstone and Paveway IV) have not done well in export market and prospects for Sea Venom and Martlet remain unclear beyond the launch customers of France and the UK, although to be fair, they have yet to enter service. By contrast, Sea Ceptor has secured export orders even before it comes into service, a promising sign for longer term success.

Where does this leave the export potential for Cap 3?

Difficult to say, after all, who can predict the future, but will potential buyers be interested given the likely cost differential between it and SDB-II or will the F35 partner nations simply go for the cheaper option and accept the performance compromise, assuming SDB-II is in fact, cheaper.

The F35B is not scheduled to carry the SDB-II until 2022 as part of Block 4a software and recent news indicates some minor modifications (hydraulic line and bracket) to the bomb way will be required in order to allow the carriage of 4 per bay, these are planned to be incorporated into the production aircraft from 2019 onwards.

Whether these plans come to fruition within the proposed timescale is open for discussion.

Another interesting aspect of the Boeing SDB-I offering is its potential for carriage on a GMLRS rocket.

This has nothing to do with the SDB-II from Raytheon but it is still an interesting concept and one which is likely to be explored further for the SDB-II.

A Few Thoughts

There is no doubt the MBDA SPEAR Cap 3 weapons could be as a significant a step forward as Meteor is over AMRAAM but the ever present question remains. In shooting for the moon will the UK fall short and end up with an overly expensive, exquisite spec, UK only weapon, ordered in tiny quantities that cannot take advantage of economies of scale, and one that is rapidly overtaken?

The SDB-II is likely to be produced in thousands, current plans indicate approximately 17,000 for the US forces alone. It is this scale that allows it to develop and improve at a reasonable cost.

Could Raytheon simply add a turbojet, however much a redesign that would take, and would this cut the MBDA missile off at the legs, Raytheon are reportedly open to the idea?

If SPEAR 3 is the only UK weapon that has some possibility of export sales into the future F35 market then it should be a no brainer but only if it offers a compelling technical and financial proposition to that market.

As usual with these decisions they are not taken in isolation, issues such as sovereign design and manufacturing capability need to be considered and if the USA do not take Brimstone (as they clearly should) why should we take SDB-II?

The MoD has a finite budget, and certainly a finite budget for complex weapons. There are many competing draws on the defence Pound and it has to ask a very simple question.

Is the MBDA SPEAR Cap 3 worth the extra cost?

Make no mistake, every Pound spent on developing the weapon will be a Pound not spent on something else so it is not a simple question of specification.

Rather than spreading our jam too thinly, could the UK double down on Brimstone and the other complex weapons to get a greater capability return?

There is certainly much potential in Brimstone to keep the UK parts of MBDA in design and production work.

Change the rocket motor and add a TV imager and data link for a Spike NLOS replacement, integrate it on Predator and Apache to remove Hellfire from the inventory, investigate drop launch, push on with Sea Spear, get it onto Wildcat and the F35B, develop a tripod launched version for SF and coastal defence and even replace the gapped Swingfire capability as armoured recce overwatch.

I like every single one these concepts, they allow us to maximise our not inconsiderable investment in the Brimstone missile, open up further export opportunities and provide a range of capability enhancements for use in our most likely operating scenarios.

There are also other systems in the complex weapons pipeline that need investment.

A UK F35B with Paveway IV, ASRAAM and SDB-II compared to a UK F35B with Paveway IV, ASRAAM and SPEAR Cap 3 (MBDA) doesn’t seem all that different.

However, if that difference is the difference between being inside or outside the IAD danger bubble then actually, it is a big difference, potentially the difference between exiting the bubble or not.

The S-400 has a range in excess of 250km, far outranging either weapon in any event but against medium-range missile systems like the SA-11 (BUK), and those projected to be in service in the next decade or so, the difference between the SDB-II and SPEAR Cap 3 may be more significant.

The other question is that of operational likelihoods, how often will the additional capability actually be needed?. Personally I find it unlikely we will be duking it out with Russia anytime soon and see playing whack-a-mole in the Middle East and Africa as the more likely operational template. How many times are we likely to go up against a sophisticated air defence system, alone, or will the UK more likely be in a coalition with the US. I know many of you think this is simply subscribing to the doctrine of ‘someone else will do it’ i.e. the US, but matching the US on a capability basis across the board leads to only one thing, not enough of everything.

All of this will no doubt form part of the detailed assessment.

Without seeing the detailed information, I must admit to being sceptical that the MBDA SPEAR Cap 3 represents good value for money for the UK’s stretched defence budget. It is easy to say we should develop our own or go for the 100% solution but in doing so, somewhere in the MoD, another capability will suffer.

Words are easy.

Maybe a better option would be to consolidate and expand on what we already have and invest in what comes after SDB and Brimstone, interestingly, at the Paris Air Show MBDA floated their CVW102 Flexis concept, one missile to rule them all, or perhaps more accurately, one kits of parts to rule them all.

Janes have a good article on Flexis, here

Hard sums and tough decisions ahead.

Typhoon Common Weapon Launcher

Getting ready for Tornado out of service and continued evolution of the aircraft with Brimstone, Storm Shadow, Paveway IV, Meteor and E-Scan radar, the Typhoon continues to grow, at a glacial pace perhaps but slow and steady is not always a bad thing.

 

The MoD has let a £1.7m contract to BAE to research a common weapon launcher for Typhoon that can be used to carry multiple weapons on a single hardpoint, much like the existing Brimstone launcher but also to include other weapons, principally, Meteor Paveway IV and a future SPEAR Cap 3.

 

 

In the delicate balancing act between Typhoon and F35B (and beyond) I have started to think for a while we need to get behind Typhoon and reconsider our Tranche 3 commitment.

 

 

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A Ground Based ARTISAN

The BAE/ROKE ARTISAN (Advanced Radar Target Indication Situational Awareness and Navigation) Radar is now in service with the Royal Navy, designated the Type 997.

 

It is an advanced medium range 3D radar with a high level of resistance to jamming, providing air surveillance, target identification and air traffic management services.

The Saab GIRAFFE Agile Multi Beam Radar is now in service with the British Army as part of the Land Environment Air Picture Provision (LEAPP) system being developed by Lockheed Martin in a £100m contract awarded in 2008.

 

It is an advanced medium range 3D radar with a high level of resistance to jamming, providing air surveillance, target identification and air traffic management services.

Both will be used to provide target information for the Common Anti Air Missile (Sea and Land Ceptor) as part of the Future Local Area Air Defence System (FLAADS) land and naval flavours.

The ARTISAN antenna weighs in at about 700kg and was developed at a cost of over £100m, the UK has a lot invested in ARTISAN and just looking at the headline brochure stats looks much more capable.

Saab has a naval version of the lower Giraffe AMB but BAE do not seem to be marketing a land version of ARTISAN.

We have a common missile, gone will be Sea Wolf and Rapier to be replaced with CAMM but different primary search and target sensors.

My question, why no commonality between the land and maritime environments to eliminate duplication and drive down support costs?

If we really want to drive down defence costs, commonality and the elimination of duplication is one of the most fruitful avenues. If there is no good reason for maintaining two systems that do the same thing is there an ‘invest to save’ argument to withdraw the handful of Giraffe radars in service and replace them with the much more numerous and higher performance ARTISAN?

Maximising our considerable investment in ARTISAN and lowering overall support costs, best pack that kind of radical nonsense in right now.

 

Slim Pickings in Iraq

Below is an extract from a recent MoD update on RAF operations over Iraq;

25 January: a Reaper was once again on patrol over northern Iraq on Sunday, providing top cover to the peshmerga as they consolidated their latest successful offensive against ISIL. One Hellfire was used to attack an armoured personnel carrier, then a further 2 missiles were used against 2 ISIL positions near by.

23 January: another Reaper flew on Friday morning to support the Iraqi army in the west of the country and observed ISIL fighters loading rockets into a truck. The vehicle was kept under close observation and then was successfully attacked with a Hellfire. A further attack was then conducted as the terrorists attempted to salvage equipment from the damaged truck.

22 January: an RAF Reaper, patrolling over northern Iraq, assisted Kurdish peshmerga who were under fire from a group of terrorists with a heavily armed pick-up truck. The vehicle was destroyed by a Hellfire missile.

21 January: early on Wednesday, a pair of Tornado GR4s flew in support of Kurdish troops, a Brimstone missile struck a heavily-armed ISIL truck and a Paveway IV guided bomb was used to target a terrorist observation post. Initial reports indicate both attacks were a success. On Wednesday evening, a Reaper provided further surveillance for the peshmerga, and in a series of engagements used Hellfires to attack a number terrorist vehicles and a fighting position.

20 January: RAF aircraft have been on hand to assist the latest Kurdish offensive operation; a Reaper was able to conduct a successful precision attack with a Hellfire missile on a terrorist group.

19 January: RAF Tornado GR4s were active in the early hours of Monday morning, flying armed reconnaissance in western Iraq, close to the Syrian border. An armoured personnel carrier was identified near Al Qaim and hit by a Brimstone missile. Continuing their patrol to the north east, the GR4s caught another group of ISIL vehicles attacked with a Paveway IV bomb. Meanwhile, British Army advisers continue to provide training and mentoring to the Iraqi security forces, particularly the Kurdish peshmerga in northern Iraq.

18 January: Reapers continued to provide support to the Iraqi army on Sunday – in the afternoon a Hellfire was used to strike a heavy machine-gun position that threatened Iraqi soldiers nearby, then during the night a further 3 missiles were used to target a large terrorist group as they began an attack on an Iraqi position.

16 January: Friday saw another Tornado patrol supporting the Iraqi army in its operations near Bayji. Three positions were identified and were struck simultaneously with Paveways. A fourth Paveway was used shortly afterwards against a further ISIL position near by. That evening, an RAF Reaper, operating elsewhere in Iraq, identified another group of terrorists who had just attacked an Iraqi unit and conducted 2 successful attacks with Hellfire missiles.

13 January: a pair of Tornado GR4s flew a reconnaissance mission ahead of Kurdish forces as they continued to strengthen security in the area east of Mount Sinjar, from which ISIL – or Da’ish as they are known to the Iraqi and Syrian people they abuse – was driven out in December. The aircraft spotted the terrorists constructing a fortified position; a Paveway IV precision guided bomb successfully destroyed the vehicle they were using.

9 January: late at night, 2 RAF Tornado GR4s, on an armed reconnaissance mission in northern Iraq, were summoned to assist the Kurdish peshmerga. Da’ish terrorists, who have lost a significant amount of territory to the peshmerga recently, were attempting to mount a local attack on a Kurdish unit. The GR4s delivered 4 precision strikes using Paveway IV guided bombs to disrupt the attack.

8 January: in the evening a Reaper remotely piloted air system (RPAS) worked in close conjunction with other coalition aircraft to provide air support to Iraqi troops in Anbar province, western Iraq. The RAF Reaper provided targeting assistance to the fast jets in strikes against ISIL positions, and conducted a successful attack using its own Hellfire missiles.

6 January: At the request of the Iraqi government, British forces took further action against ISIL terrorist targets.

5 January: Reaper and Tornado missions were also flown in the morning. Tornados again patrolled the Al Qaim area, where they destroyed an ISIL excavator vehicle, used to construct fortified positions, with a Brimstone, while a Reaper, scouting ahead of Iraqi troops, spotted an armoured vehicle being moved by ISIL on a heavy equipment transporter. A Hellfire missile scored a direct hit on the armoured vehicle, another Hellfire destroyed the transporter itself, and a third missile struck an ISIL position nearby.

4 January: an RAF Reaper, working in support of Iraqi army units, identified an ISIL vehicle and engaged it with a Hellfire missile. Shortly afterwards, the Reaper discovered an ISIL position close by, and attacked this with another Hellfire.

2 January: in the early hours a RAF Tornado GR4 armed reconnaissance patrol located an ISIL armoured personnel carrier to the east of Al Qaim, and conducted a successful strike with a Brimstone missile. Later in the day, a coalition surveillance aircraft observed ISIL positions concealed within woods north-west of Ramadi and another Tornado mounted an attack with 2 Paveway IV precision guided bombs.

Just shy of a months worth of operations and the RAF has expended;

• Hellfire; 20, from Reaper
• Brimstone; 5, from Tornado
• Paveway IV; 12, from Tornado

The target descriptions are equally interesting, a truck, a heavy machine gun position, an armoured personnel carrier and excavator. These targets fall definitely into the ‘tactical’ column rather than attacking ‘strategic’ targets.

What conclusions can we draw (if any) from the number of targets, types of target, launch platform and weapons expended?

• Reaper is doing just as much of the heavy lifting as Tornado without the massive logistic effort involved with refuelling Tornado?
• Paveway IV seems to be the referred option for those sorties flown by Tornado?
• How many Reapers can we buy for a single F35?
• The effect delivered (destroying an excavator or trucks in singles) are insignificant compared to the cost?
• Air power used in this manner satisfies the ‘something must be done’ brigade but not much else?
• Any others, none, the opposite of the above?

 

Typhoon and Paveway IV

From the MoD this morning, news about Paveway IV and Typhoon

A Typhoon of 1 (Fighter) Squadron prepares to drop a Paveway IV precision guided bomb at the Cape Wrath training area.

UK Royal Air Force Typhoon capability has taken another step forward with a live weapon testing sortie carried out by Britain’s oldest frontline squadron. Two Paveway IV precision guided bombs were dropped sucessfully, with two direct hits.

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Spearfish Torpedo Upgrade

In service with the Royal Navy since 1994, the heavyweight BAE Spearfish torpedo is being upgraded.

Naval Technology describes Spearfish as;

The Spearfish advanced heavy weight torpedo from BAE Systems is effective against submarine and surface threats in oceanic and coastal waters. The 1.85t torpedo is in service with the submarine fleet of the UK Royal Navy. The Spearfish carries Aluminised PBX explosive warhead of 300kg and is directed towards the target by high-capacity guide wire system and passive and active sonar. Its power plant is composed of a gas turbine engine using Otto Fuel as a liquid monopropellant, and Hydroxyl Ammonium Perchlorate (HAP) as oxidant. The propulsion system allows the Spearfish to engage targets within 48km at low speed.

This additional £270 million contract is specifically for the manufacture phase of activity that started several years ago as part of the 2009-2019 £369.5 million Torpedo Support Contract.

 

The upgrade will address improvements across a broad range of subsystems so that the torpedo remains effective and useful for use in the Royal Navy submarine fleet

BAE Spearfish product page

The Spearfish Engine