RAF P-8A Patrol Aircraft – Foreign Military Sale Notification

Following the SDSR 2015 decision to purchase the Boeing P-8A Patrol Aircraft (Maritime Patrol or Multi Mission Aircraft) the Foreign Military Sale (FMS) notification has been published.

WASHINGTON, Mar. 25, 2016 – The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the United Kingdom for P-8A Aircraft and associated equipment, training, and support. The estimated cost is $3.2 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale on March 24, 2016. The Government of the United Kingdom (UK) has requested notification for the possible procurement of up to nine (9) P-8A Patrol Aircraft, associated major defense equipment, associated training, and support. The estimated cost is $3.2 billion

$3.2 billion is about £2.26 billion

Sorry, can’t avoid the temptation to divide that by nine (yes I know the support and training etc.) which comes in at about £250 million each. Now I know this is simplistic, I know there are all sorts of reasons why you can’t divide the programme cost by the quantity and come to a unit cost, but it is still a high level simple way of viewing it.

Torpedoes of sonobuoys I would expect will also be on the optional extras list!

All good stuff, a gaping capability gap will be filled and a road opened to a future where we might achieve some commonality with future replacements for Sentry, Airseeker and perhaps Sentinel.

However, let us not forget the £3.8 Billion sunk on Nimrod MRA4, adding that (somewhat uncharitably, granted) brings the total bill to just over £6 Billion, for the capability as represented by the nine new aircraft.

Just let that sink in for a moment.

Over £650 million each when you look at it like that.

I can hear the howls, and of course, they are not £650 million each, but we had Nimrod MR2, then we didn’t, we will have nine P-8A’s, and the total amount of taxpayers cash being spent is the total amount of taxpayers cash being spent.

People might not like it, they will complain how ridiculous that is and they will point out the difference between the two, but to coin a phrase, it is what it is.

Plus, there will be additional support and infrastructure costs on top of the weapon and consumables purchases, best get ready to dig deep going forward.

No doubt the MoD will follow up on this release shortly and the National Audit Office will provide the full picture in due course.

Not the MoD’s finest hour, Nimrod MRA4 cancellation and no competition to replace it, but still, putting the eye watering cost to one side, this is a very good news story for UK defence so perhaps we should just keep our mouths shut and let the RAF get on with it!

Read more…

http://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/mas/uk_16-26.pdf

 

H/T Mark

SDSR Leak Engine Revving Up

There have been relatively few pre-SDSR leaks this time around but as we get into the vinegar strokes, expect a few more. As the review work has nearly completed and various options presented to ministers the decision-making process gets into gear.

Decisions inevitably mean winners and losers, losers inevitably mean leaks to the Times and Telegraph, sadly.

The latest leak is regarding the Maritime Patrol Aircraft / Multi-Mission Aircraft  gap/requirement. The smart money had been on a purchase of Being P-8 Poseidon aircraft with a longer term plan for additional capability based on the same aircraft that might eventually replace the E3 Sentry and R1 Sentinel. Then Kawasaki came in with an option on the P1, cemented with an increasingly favourable UK/Japan defence trade relationship which muddied the waters.

 

Then Airbus, Alenia and Lockheed Martin/Marshall said, hang on a minute, what about a lower cost option using the C-295, C-27 or C-130 ‘Sea Hercules’ which would also include greater UK content, again, muddying the waters even more.

 

Ultra Electronics and General Atomics even suggested a manned/unmanned combination using the, now named Protector RPAS and pod mounted sonobouys.

 

All of a sudden, there were loads of options that allowed a capability-centric long term view to emerge, the obvious option is still a known obvious, but at least there were alternatives to consider.

Then, a British steel controversy, indirectly, a commentary on British jobs for British workers being financed by British taxpayers.

Finally, this morning, a story from the Sunday Times;

This suggested that the obvious answer, the Boeing P-8, was not so obvious anymore and the £2 Billion project for nine P-8 Poseidon’s was back into the long grass because it was ‘fiendishly expensive’

The story speculates that the favourite position is now an interim purchase of C-295 or SC-130 until rapidly maturing unmanned technologies can fill the gap.

Now with all these stories, they must come with a health warning attached, it could be a simple fishing exercise, a well-timed story to scare Boeing into dropping their prices for example.

It could just be total nonsense.

Or, it could be true.

At the end of the day, having already spent the best part of £4 Billion pounds on MRA4, finding another £2 Billion was always going to be difficult, no matter how important or glaring a gap it left, because quite simply, it means £2 Billion not being spent on something else.

Meanwhile, somewhere near Coventry!

 

Maritime Patrol – Go Left, Right or Straight Ahead

If we look beyond the maritime patrol aircraft and into the future, it strikes me there are two roads to take, or maybe a third.

Option 1; concentrate on the multi-mission ISTAR space and look at either the P-8 or P-1 in terms of a future replacement for Sentinel, Sentry and Air Seeker.

Both provide a gateway to the future.

 

Sentinel is planned to go out of service before 2020 and Air Seeker and Sentry will eventually need replacing. Opting for a P-8 provides a ready-made pathway for the simple reason that this is the way the US is likely to go. A 737 based platform for SIGINT, Airborne Early Warning and Battlespace Management and Ground Surveillance seems eminently sensible.

Although the P-1 has a less obvious path in this regards, the aircraft would equally provide an ideal base to do so.

Cutting away all the arguments for and against either, to me, this seems the most compelling argument in favour.

Option 2; look across the air transport fleet to explore synergies there.

There seems little doubt that there is a gap between the A400M Atlas and Chinook with regards to payload and tactical air transport. There has been a great deal of discussion about the need for ‘something’ that fits in between the two. Suggestions include some future heavy lift rotary aircraft or an aircraft like the C27 or C-295 for example. Retaining existing C-130J’s, buying new, or looking at alternatives have been suggested and again, it is beyond the potential narrow requirement where synergies can be found.

 

If we purchase such a medium sized ramp equipped transport aircraft it could be used for many roles; air transport, Special Forces (including gunship), surveillance, VIP, parachute training, and of course, maritime patrol. There is potential to replace a number of in-service aircraft by going down this route. Likewise with an Alenia C-27J purchase. Both are mature aircraft with all manner of role fits and options available off the shelf.

By concentrating on the air transport area we would have to accept some compromise on the maritime patrol aspect. No one is suggesting that a C-295 or C-27J is comparable to a P-8 or P-1, and neither are people suggesting that a conversion to SC-130J or even A400M modular MPA fit comparable either.

But both are options that might be good enough if some compromise is accepted.

The degree of compromise is the crucial question to ask, if it is such that it renders the capability useless for the UK then it is no compromise at all, it is folly.

Option 3 is to look at teaming.

The capability that sets the P-8 and P-1 apart from the pack is their ability to hunt and destroy submarines, the ASW mission. Surface surveillance and other ISTAR type roles are likely to be the bread and butter activity with the ASW activity being used less. But it is this ASW capability that drives us towards the P-8 and P-1 type solution despite, it arguably, potentially being the least used.

Is there an option to use a modified business jet type aircraft for the bread and butter type work in order to keep purchase and in life costs down, and then team that with a smaller number of unmanned or transport aircraft to deliver the ordnance and expendables?

We know that transport aircraft are used for air despatch and we know that solutions exist and are in service for delivering munitions like cruise missiles (Taurus) and decoys (MALD/MALD-J) using ramp launch systems. Modified C-130 door launch systems for sonobuoys also exist.

None of this is science fiction.

Business jet derived platforms are relatively cheap to operate and tend to have excellent endurance. Payloads are lower and the lack of internal stores carriage could be a serious issue to resolve but we won’t know the scale of the issue until we know.

 

Now this is verging into fantasy fleets territory to some degree and there is certainly no guarantee that it would be a) effective or b) cheaper, but it must remain an option on the table, even if only to eliminate it.

Industrial Issues

Whether we like it or not, industrial issues are important.

The MoD’s budget comes from the UK economy, if the UK economy doesn’t generate wealth the MoD won’t have a budget. The defence aerospace industry contributes more to the UK economy than any other defence sector, land or maritime.

It is therefore of critical importance that sovereign skills and capacity retention is a decision-making factor.

What does the P-8 or P-1 option give, indeed, what would any of the other options provide?

It is an unknown factor at this stage but the issue cannot be wished away.

So What to Do?

The obvious answer is just buy the sodding P-8 and accept the advantages and disadvantages for what they are, maritime patrol is an important gap in our capabilities, one that is not getting any smaller and importantly, underpins the credibility of Trident.

If it were just maritime patrol I would be inclined to agree, but is far more complicated than that, there are implications beyond ASW.

Having just finished re-writing the sixty odd thousand word FRES article it might ssem to be a counter-intuitive thing to say, but I think we need to stand back, think very hard about the subject and not rush.

I don’t think it would be money wasted to invest in a handful of technology demonstrator contracts with Alenia, Airbus and Lockheed Martin; ramp/door launched torpedoes and expendables, palletised mission systems, podded sensors and external carriage of torpedoes spring immediately to mind. Answer the question of whether a transport aircraft like the C-130J could be viable without dismissing it based on limited information. Perhaps fund a business jet derivative representative trial contract to understand the pros and cons and look in depth at the bandwidth and airspace integration issues/costs of potential unmanned solutions.

This will certainly add overall cost and increase the time to a solution, which is never a good thing, but this is a large and complex strategic issue that is much more than a maritime patrol aircraft. It is a decision that needs to be based on a thorough understanding of the technology and costs for all potential solutions, not just the obvious ones.

The answer may still be Option 1, the obvious one.

But all that I am suggesting is…

Measure twice, cut once.

An Unfashionable Answer to the Nimrod Question

The fever pitch surrounding the UK’s yet to be announced maritime patrol, or perhaps more accurately, multi-mission, aircraft, is getting unbearable. The not very secret but terribly hush-hush trip aboard the Kawasaki P-1 by RAF officers, the rush of Russian submarine stories in the media and multi forum discussions about the relative advantages of business jets over unmanned types or even whether four engines are better than two or MAD is yesterday’s news, or not, continues unabated.

There is no doubt the P-8 is the real deal, it is capable, has a clear development path and is supportable.

Many think the UK and other users can effectively freeload off the back of the US Navy. After all, they will pay for all the future developments and clearances and then make sure Boeing let us have them at ‘mates rates’

mmm

I also think there is a great deal of wishful thinking about leveraging the 737 user base to drive down support costs, people assuming this will translate into supporting a military product, with the MAA and an integrated support contract in tow?

We will be purchasing a military product in small quantities with all that this entails, make no mistake.

There are also issues to resolve, lightweight torpedo for example, do we opt for the US Mk54 or integrate Stingray, or do we follow the Indian path and make sure the MAD boom is fitted, or stick with the medium to high altitude vision as defined by the US Navy.

That said, if we want to get a capable aircraft into service soon to fill Nimrods big shoes, an aircraft that above all else will be supportable and supported, one that has benefitted from UK experience and provides a return on our SEEDCORN investment, and we are thinking with our heads;

JUST BUY THE P8

I may well have said this once or twice but what makes this such an interesting subject is its implications beyond MPA/MMA. If we buy a P8 we are effectively giving Boeing a de-facto monopoly on NATO maritime patrol aircraft because P3’s and Atlantiques, however well they are upgraded, have a relatively short life. It also means that when the time comes to replace 707 based SIGINT and AEW&C aircraft, the only show in town will be from Boeing.

In a previous short post I also commented on the palpable desire from many quarters to consign Sentinel to the scrapheap as soon as possible to pave the way for a P8 purchase that could be turned into a Sentinel replacement by hanging a pod underneath it.

Another de-facto victory to Boeing (and a mistake I think)

I have no axe to grind against Boeing whatsoever but are we really sure we want to slide into giving a single US company a monopoly on a large and expanding sector of UK, European and NATO defence capability.

What about the P1?

The P1 might have some element of thinking with our hearts because clearly, it has been designed from scratch for the ASW role, right down to the big cockpit and observation windows.

The Japanese have some very advanced technology, an equally serious attitude to ASW, a commitment to producing many P1’s and a desire for more defence industrial engagement.

I think many people would quite like to see the P1 win any future UK competition but it is not quite as advanced programmatically as the P8, is an unknown in cost terms and represents a greater risk overall than the P8.

Using a business jet platform, perhaps in conjunction with unmanned systems is postulated by many to the ‘way of the future’ and the new F sized sonobuoys that follow the general trend of electronics miniaturisation mean using unmanned aircraft to place them becomes a realistic possibility, subject to confirmation of course.

Even the proposed Sea Hercules has some merit; it might not be a product anyone can touch yet but the technology components all exist, ease of integration of other complex systems onto the Hercules has been well proven. Pending structural assessment, the donor airframes exist and so does much of the support infrastructure. There is a lot to be said for developing a modular fit for Hercules or even Atlas in the medium term.

The smart money is clearly on the P8 with the P1 as a credible contender, although we should be very clear with Japan and not string them along because that would be damaging for the longer term and potentially fruitful defence relationship.

The general point here is a simple one, there are loads of options and all of them are good. It is unusual to have so many mature or maturing offerings to choose from.

But hang on a second.

When did we give up our ambition, when has our risk appetite sunk to such a monumentally low level that the default solution is buy from the USA?

Is the UK and Europe destined to be merely a customer of US products and a subcontractor to US defence organisations?

Have we learned nothing from the F35, a project designed specifically to create a US monopoly and eliminate Europe from any kind of ability to design and build complex combat aircraft, or the USAF tanker competition, or Brimstone, or efforts to stop Paveway IV being sold abroad.

I don’t blame the US defence industry for seeking market dominance and I don’t blame the US government for wanting to buy domestic products, but do we have to help them on their way?

No, we don’t.

We should also observe that the P8, and the P1 to the same extent, carry out their tasks in a pretty similar way to the Nimrod MR2 and P3 Orion that they replace. Of course they have moved the state of the art forward but they are both medium sized aircraft that carry sonobuoys and weapons. Both were started many years ago, critically, before the revolution in airborne, surface and sub-surface unmanned technology, autonomy, artificial intelligence and large scale data analytics.

But whoa I hear you say.

Have we equally learned nothing from Typhoon and A400M, European projects are a nightmare and we need an MPA right now, not in a decade plus time.

All good points, allow me to address them.

No doubt, Typhoon and Atlas have not been a showcase for how to manage multinational complex projects, both have taken longer to develop and cost more than anticipated but no more than any other development project of similar magnitude. Doing complex things is hard, takes time and costs serious money, especially when those complex things are at the cutting edge.

We should also be able to look at where those projects went wrong and avoid repetition.

We need a maritime patrol aircraft now for our struggle with that nice Mr Putin and with the increasing importance of ISR in our generational struggle with militant Islam (in all its various guises), a multi mission aircraft.

The counter to that is, well, we have done without a maritime patrol aircraft since 2011. Yes, we have operated at risk, yes we have had to rely on allies and yes, the risk environment has changed somewhat since 2011, but the world has not stopped turning.

Pretty much all of our European allies have opted to update their Orion’s or Atlantique’s so for the short to medium term, one could make a reasonable argument that the European MPA capability will be maintained in both quality and quantity.

So a question arises, could the UK continue to rely on our allies for the short to medium term for maritime patrol requirements by trading some of our capabilities, simply contributing to costs and formalising the ad hoc arrangements we have relied upon since 2011?

I am not sure if there would be enough to go around but if they have been covering our requirements since 2011 then logically, there is. Whether this level of capacity can be maintained for the next x number of years is an unknown.

Given that the sharing and pooling of resources is widely recognised to be an essential element of future collective defence, why not.

Seriously, why not?

For the multi mission requirement, what is the great big urgent gap that needs filling?

We have a range of excellent ISR capabilities, world beating in many cases, all of them have plenty of life left in them, and all of them have development options for the medium term.

The MPA requirement is therefore a great deal more urgent than the MMA requirement.

By pooling our allies MPA and sharing our ISR assets, a breathing space into which a replacement for European P3/Atlantique/Nimrod can be developed.

This does not need to be an A319/320 MPA either, I asked whether the ASW role needs to be delivered by a P8/P1 looky likey.

The answer is maybe, maybe not.

Textron have shown clearly that with a careful approach, a realistic set of performance objectives and selective use of bespoke and off the shelf components, aircraft can be developed in relatively short order. This isn’t a pitch for the Scorpion by the way, just a point about how fast aircraft can be developed.

The European aerospace industry has an enormous well of system components from which to draw. Mission systems, flight control software, undercarriage, sensors, weapons and crew toilets are all available off the shelf.

As mentioned above, unmanned and autonomous air, surface and sub-surface could form part of the solution. Business jet sized aircraft could also feature. An aircraft would also be designed to provide a range of ISR capabilities, a common aircraft for SIGINT, AEW&C, SAR/GMTI and even a weapons carrier. Not in the same aircraft at the same time, but a common base platform designed from the ground up using a range of common components already available and in production.

So to summarise, let’s not rush in, work with our allies on practical pooling and sharing and develop a European replacement for Atlantique, Orion and Nimrod that takes advantage of the revolution in unmanned systems, autonomy and sensors.

Failing that, if we all OK with just buying off Uncle Sam, let’s just get on with buying the P8 because the constant hype is getting boring now!

 

JSTARS and the P8 Poseidon

Just as the USAF may be accepting that their JSTARS replacement might look a lot like the RAF’s Sentinel, the mood music seems to be indicating that the Sentinel can be sacrificed on the altar of getting the JSTAR’s size P8 in service.

OK, so I am taking some rather large liberties here but Raytheon, Lockheed Martin and Bombardier are offering this;

jstars-proposal-740x528

 

Which to my untrained eye looks very similar to this;

 

Sentinel R1

Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, Gulfstream, and L-3 are also partnering, obviously with a Gulfstream business jet platform.

Boeing, the third competitor, will be offering a 737-700 Boeing Business Jet (BBJ) derivative, not a version of the larger 737-800 based Poseidon.

There seems to be an almost casual assumption in a great deal of online chatter that the capabilities of the Sentinel can be replaced as part of a possible P-8 Poseidon purchase, either taking a Boing JSTAR’s recap win (artist impression below), or by adding an external sensor pod to the P-8 and using the same aircraft for both.

 

The external sensor pod in question is called the AN/APS-154 Advanced Airborne Sensor (AAS), a US Navy programme that is a derivative of the Littoral Surveillance Radar System (LSRS). It is currently on track for Increment 2 of the P-8A Poseidon programme.

Naval Air Systems Command describes the AAS as;

The APS-154 radar represents the next generation of maritime patrol and reconnaissance radars which will provide military commanders highly accurate battle-space situational awareness as an integrated Maritime Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Targeting (ISR&T) asset.

In January this year Boeing were awarded a $60.7 million contract for AAS integration kits for Low Rate Initial Production Lot IV (13 aircraft) and Full Rate Production Lot I (16 aircraft). The AAS is said to be a very advanced system, superior to the E8 JSTARS but the million dollar question is, is it as good as the ASTOR, especially given ASTOR and AAS ar Raytheon products and ASTOR is being modified to incorporate maritime and littoral surveillance capabilities.

The sensor is only one part of the equation, the platform is just as important. One of the key selling points of the Bombardier Global Express platform used for Sentinel is its high service ceiling and long endurance. Both are reduced by the weight and drag imposed by the mission equipment but they are still impressive. Altitude is important, the higher you go the further you can see although someone much cleverer than I once explained it was all to to do with graze angles. Long endurance also has obvious benefits, as does its high speed. The P8 is a bit lardy in comparison, much shorter range than the Sentinel. The Sentinel cruises at the top speed of a P-8A and can fly about five or six thousand feet higher. Unless an RAF P-8 is modified with a refuelling probe or Voyagers fitted with a boom, range may be ‘a bit of a problem’

It is also not clear whether the Boeing proposal for the JSTARS recap utilises the AAS or some other system. Interestingly, Boeing are not offering a P8 plus pod for the JSTARS programme and reading between the lines there is more than a fair share of inter-service shenanigans between the USAF and USN.

This poses a few interesting dilemmas for the UK.

Sentinel currently has a reprieve until 2018 but no funding beyond that, the final decision coming out of SDSR 2015 and the ISTAR Optimisation Study completed by the RAF.

We cannot know the performance differences between ASTOR and AAS but we can reasonably estimate the flight performance differences between the P8 and a Sentinel, and not forgetting the range figures given for a P8 are without the hefty podded sensor attached.

Costs are equally an unknown but the problem for using an RAF P-8 in the Sentinel role is as much about politics as anything else, if we can have British Poseidons off doing the Sentinel mission then obviously the glaring gaps and massive risks used to justify a P-8 suddenly look a bit hollow. Go for a larger fleet of P-8’s to cover both missions and you are lugging around all that maritime patrol kit (and having to support more than you would for a pure MPA role) so the overall costs rise.

As ever, trade-offs to the fore, but personally, I see using Sentinel replacement as part of the business case for P-8 as rather weak.

We also don’t know whether the US Navy would let us have the AAS and at what cost it would be.

I would rather see us expanding the role of the Sentinel by the use of a range of software and sensor upgrades such as adding an electro-optical turret or the DB-110 sensor from RAPTOR pods as GR.4 goes out of service. With advances in computing technology some of the weight of the ASTOR systems may be possible to be reduced. Certainly, as its role has evolved and connectivity improved, the field deployable ground station component would seem to be of less value so some cost savings, particularly in squadron manning, may be found there.

Any purchase of the P-8 would then be right sized for the maritime patrol mission, optimised for such and personnel dedicated to this very important mission.

So, a developed Sentinel plus a minimum sized fleet of P-8’s (or equvialent, including combinations of unmanned aircraft) instead of an overiszed P-8 fleet trying to do everything.

The flip side is to go with the 737-700 based Boeing JSTARS and use the same aircraft platform for a future AWACS replacement, thus having very high levels of commonality across the three large missions.

Thoughts?

 

A French Bomber

Does this mean the Marine Nationale now has a long-range bomber and the RAF doesn’t?

Ouch!

From Navy Recognition;

The French Navy (Marine Nationale) announced that on 18 June 2015, two Atlantique 2 (ATL2) maritime patrol crews were qualified to GBU-12 Paveway II laser guided bomb shooting procedures with self-designation. This flight marked the end of a training course which confronted crews to modern technologies used in air-to-ground support missions thanks to the Wescam MX-20D electro-optical turret fitted on ATL2 Standard V.

What makes this interesting is that this was the first time they have self designated, the ATL has been used previously in the ground attack role over Mali but only with offboard designation.

 

Next step is the smaller GB-58

This continues to demonstrate the value of teaming up large aircraft and precision weapons.

Maritime Patrol – Choices Choices Choices

Since we last looked at maritime patrol and number of options have emerged that make the P8 Shoe In not so obvious.

Only a few months ago the obvious runners and riders were the Boeing P8 Poseidon as the natural Nimrod MRA4 replacement or the Airbus C295 as the low cost options. There were other options from Saab or Alenia or the less likely combinations of refurbished P3, new build business derivatives, those based on transport aircraft and even unmanned aircraft but at the time they looked, for any number of reasons, less likely.

What a difference a few months make.

First was the situation with UK Japan defence cooperation which although has been bubbling along for a while took an interesting turn with comments from Kawasaki officials that they see the P1 as a contender for a forthcoming UK decision on maritime patrol. The P1 has a lot going for it, first, the Japanese take ASW seriously, second, the manifestation of that seriousness is a design built from scratch for the mission.

A Japanese defence official was quoted by the Telegraph

If the UK gives it serious consideration, then the P-1 will garner attention internationally

I still think this is an outside option but Chris over at Defence with a C wrote a nice post on the benefits of defence cooperation with Japan and RUSI covered the P1 in a bit more detail, here

Although not in any way approaching an official position from Airbus a number of commenters saw the announcement of a potential A321 Neo with its extended range and being an almost perfect base platform for a European replacement for the Atalantique’s and P3’s in service with various European nations.

Again though, still an outside possibility.

Finally, what is arguably a more credible option, a Bombardier Global Express proposal from IAI.

Both Janes and Shepard reported an announcement from IAI of their proposal for a EL/I-3360 MPA based on the Bombardier Global 5000   

There are obvious commonality benefits with the RAF’s Sentinel and the aircraft has longer legs that either the P8 or P1, certainly much longer range that any of the turboprop alternatives. As we have discussed, carriage of torpedoes on an unprotected pylon might be an issue to resolve but what these options do is open the field up a little.

As the the Reaper is becoming the de-facto European Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) Remotely Piloted Air System (RPAS) and the joint user group focuses on operability in non segregated airspace and integration on European payloads there may be a companion role for a maritime patrol variant of the Reaper. Using a combination of manned and unmanned types might offer additional capabilities.

The IAI proposal includes a sophisticated EW/ELINT/ESM which would also provide multi mission capabilities, i.e. the desired direction of travel.

One of the lesser discussed issues with the P8 is that it effectively ties all AWACS operating nations into the 737 platform, a Bombardier Global based AWACS does not seem so outlandish either, Israel and Singapore seem to be OK with business jet based AEW aircaft.

Interesting times.

Marco Ramius Pops Home for a Battered Mars Bar

The news broke earlier today that it seems the UK has joined Sweden in a game of hide and seek.

Read the initial report here;

http://aviationweek.com/defense/canadians-french-us-hunt-submarine-scotland

A bit of speculation here and some fun on Twitter there 🙂

It’s getting beyond a joke now isn’t it?

 

Maritime Patrol – Are there any alternatives to a Maritime Patrol Aircraft

Following up from yesterdays post on the Defence Select Committee evidence session in which ACM Pulford was at pains to draw a distinction between a maritime patrol requirement and a maritime patrol aircraft I thought a useful question to ask is whether there is a practical difference or is it just playing with words.

Whenever the words maritime patrol requirement comes up the default answer is actually a maritime patrol aircraft but you do have to wonder if things have moved on since the Nimrod MRA4 was designed, does the P8 offer much by the way of change or just newer way of doing older things?

Since then we have seen rapid advances in surface, sub surface and airborne unmanned systems, massive leaps in target recognition software, sensor technology, long endurance power supplies, positional accuracy, communications and autonomous control systems.

The attraction of getting a working system like the P8 into service as soon as possible to close the capability gap is obvious, phrases like ‘proven’, ‘low risk’ and ‘off the shelf’ seem to be the weapons of choice in the verbal battle between proponents of one solution or the other.

In the UK’s extensive ASW armoury there is actually very little off the shelf so why this should apply to a maritime patrol capability and not Merlin, Sonar 2087, Stingray, Astute or Type 26 is somewhat of a mystery but that aside, the simple fact is, the UK remains at the very top of the ASW credibility stakes by any objective measure, with or without the P8.

This leads on the question of the nature of this maritime patrol gap, especially in the demanding business of anti submarine warfare AND ESPECIALLY in the context of UK only requirements.

I know we keep coming back to defence planning assumptions and strategic objectives but if the gap is so critical as to render the massive UK investment in ASW worthless and the nuclear deterrent under threat then we have to think seriously about prioritising it over future expeditionary aspirations.

If the lack of a P8 really does put at risk the UK only mission of protection of the Vanguard and successor submarines as they enter and leave UK waters then to be be blunt, we need to chop a handful of infantry brigades, frigates or fast jest to pay for it.

If it is a little less clear cut then that (and I accept these things are never clear cut) then we have to understand that spending money on it will mean not spending money on something else (welcome to the world of defence politics)

Which brings me on the original question.

Does technology developed since MRA4 and P8 was designed offer us the opportunity to do things differently, cheaper and more effectively?

Is there really an alternative to a Maritime Patrol Aircraft for a Maritime Patrol Requirement?

 

PS

And I don’t mean calling an MPA an MMA, which they have always actually been.