Regular v Reserve Costs

Slipped out without a great deal of fanfare in March.

From the MoD;

The cost comparison analysis looked at 5 types of army regular and reserve sub-units. It identified the cost of ownership and use of these sub-units which enabled the different costs between the regulars and reserves to be better understood. The reports purpose was not to investigate their relative effectiveness on operations with regards to training standards and readiness states.

Click the image to read in full

 

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cost-comparison-analysis-of-army-regular-and-reserve-sub-unIts

An excellent read

All Change for the Army Reserve

The Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Nicholas Carter, recently gave a widely reported lecture at Chatham House. Many outlets concentrated on the 77th  Brigade aspects but I think one aspect that was under reported was his comments on the Army Reserve.

The full transcript and recording is here, but an extract on the Army Reserve, below;

I think the other thing we need to think hard about is reconstitution and regeneration. That seems to me entirely sensible, given the nature of the uncertain world in which we’re operating. I think it also plays to the importance of a word that I have not used for a long time: productivity. Given the nation’s circumstances, it’s important that we do deliver a productive outcome.

That’s why the Army Reserve is important to us.

We should be clear though about what it is there for. What we’ve done is to pair it with our regular force structure. We’ve done that because our regular force structure is slimmed down in certain parts of the Army and it will draw its resilience from the pairing relationship it has with the Army Reserve.

The point about the Army Reserve though is that the obligation if you join it is only for training, less some specialists. We are not going to use it regularly and routinely, as perhaps was suggested a couple of years ago. [emphasis added] Rather, it is there in the event of a national emergency. That means it’s much more straightforward, I think, for an individual to be a member of the Army Reserve. If you’re a reservist, what you have to do is to try and balance an equilateral triangle between the employer, your family and your own thoughts on life. If that becomes an isosceles, you won’t retain or recruit the reservist. So it’s important to keep that in balance, and that means that it is sensible to talk about the obligation being for training only, unless you can afford the time as an individual to deploy with your regular counterparts.

So it’s there for a national emergency.

The effect of us explaining it like that is beginning to have an impact out there in the countryside. The figures that were announced last week were positive in terms of the direction of travel.

But we do need to attend to the officer corps, and it is a fact that over the course of the last 15 years of campaigning, we’ve used the Army Reserve as a collection of individuals to back fill our regular gaps.

That has not been positive for the officer corps. A lot of work is going on at the moment to see how we can encourage reservist officers and how we can develop a career structure that is meaningful for them.

We have, importantly, reinvigorated the Army’s regular reserve. Many former soldiers in the audience will remember that they have a statutory liability when they leave regular service, for up to 10 years, to be available in the event of a national emergency. Of course again, coming back to the point about productivity, we put around 7,000 people back into society every year.

There’s a lot of skills in there which are important to keep a handle on.

I would encourage you to read the above again and then compare and contrast with the original Army 2020 publications, Future Reserves white paper from 2013 and SDSR 2010, then form your own opinion.

Despite General Carter saying as perhaps was suggested a couple of years ago, there was no ‘perhaps’ and it wasn’t a ‘suggestion’.

The Future Reserve paper was pretty clear in where the reserves would sit;

The Reserves will complement the Regulars, working together within an integrated force, providing military capability in a different way from the past to deliver the range and scale of military forces and skills required. We need the Reserves’ contribution to national security to expand. By 2020 they will provide a greater proportion of the overall Defence effort relative to Regular Forces and we will use them differently.

We will use our Reserve Forces to provide military capability as a matter of routine, mobilising them when appropriate. The wide range of possible activities may include enduring campaigns (such as Afghanistan), resilience operations in the UK, contributions to capacity-building overseas and to support activity at home. In some cases a level of specialist capabilities will be held only in the Reserve Forces.

It is as different as Mr Chalk and Mr Cheese.

The challenge for regulars is to recognise and value the contribution of their reservist colleagues

Clearly a change of policy, heart and direction is being signposted here, although a speech does not a policy make!

The Army Reserve is now (according to this speech and save for a few specialists) national emergencies only

The old Regular Reserve seems to be back in fashion, although in what form this will take is not clear.

One cannot move for seeing an Army Reserve recruitment campaign, the Army is using pretty much every media channel to advertise the benefits of the Army Reserve to potential recruits but this About Turn seems to have slipped the attention of many.

Future Reserves 2020 – Planned v Current Manning

Before anyone gets over excited about the numbers it is important to remember that the planned column is for 2020, or more accurately April 2019.

The table was in response to an FOI request on regimental manning, instead of a regimental breakdown, the MoD provided it on Arm/Service. It shows the total trained Group A Army Reserve manning as at April 1st 2014 and includes Volunteer Reserves, Mobilised Reserves, High Readiness Reserves, Officer Training Corps support and training staff and Officers under training.

Numbers are rounded which means some of the percentages don’t appear to be correct but the figures in the table are exactly as provided by Defence Statistics. The only change I have made is correcting a spelling mistake in the Arm/Service column.

The exact wording on rounding from the release is

Please note the total strengths have been rounded to 10, numbers ending in “5” have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 20 to prevent systematic bias. Totals and sub totals have been rounded separately and so may not appear to be the sum of their parts

Statisticians eh!

I have sorted them on the percentage column, seems like we have plenty of Staff Officers and lawyers but a bit short of vets and PTI’s

Arm/Service Current Strength FR20 Requirement Strength as a % of Requirement
Staff Officers (Officers in the rank of full Colonel or above)                             110                                   68 156%
Adjutant General’s Corps (Army Legal Service)                               10                                   12 108%
Household Cavalry/Royal Armoured Corps                             980                             1,204 82%
Infantry                         4,750                             5,993 79%
Adjutant General’s Corps (Staff Personnel Support)                             500                                 685 74%
Royal Engineers                         1,910                             2,637 72%
Royal Signals                         1,460                             2,056 71%
Small Arms School Corps                               10                                   14 71%
Royal Army Chaplains Department                               50                                   75 68%
Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers                         1,370                             2,127 64%
Royal Artillery                         1,410                             2,286 62%
Adjutant General’s Corps (Provost)                             320                                 544 59%
Royal Logistic Corps                         3,460                             5,858 59%
Royal Army Medical Corps                         1,450                             2,596 56%
Queen Alexandria’s Royal Army Nursing Corps                             600                             1,122 53%
Intelligence Corps                             600                             1,403 43%
Royal Army Dental Corps                               30                                 108 28%
Army Air Corps                             120                                 572 21%
Adjutant General’s Corps (Education Training Service)                               40                                 233 18%
Royal Army Physical Training Corps                               10                                   66 12%
Royal Army Veterinary Corps                               10                                 342 3%
Adjutant General’s Corps (Unspecified)                               40                                    – 0%
Corps of Army Music                               50                                    – 0%
Other                             100                                    – 0%

 

The totals presented were, the Army Reserve is currently at 65% of the FR20 requirement

 

 

 

The Extra £1.8 Billion Budget for the Reserves

Whenever the MoD (or any Government department for that matter) wants to inflate the pitiful amount of money allocated to a project they call it a ten year plan and, obviously, multiply by that number.

The SDSR and subsequent Reserves White Paper confirmed that the reserve forces would benefit from £1.8 Billion additional funding over the ten next ten years.

With a planned trained Army Reserve of 30,000, 3,100 in the Royal Marines and Royal Navy Reserves and 1,800 in the Royal Auxillary Air Force the numbers make for some interesting long division.

I will save you from the sums but it works out at just over £5,000 per person per year.

40 days minimum commitment at roughly £50 per day for a Private plus a thousand Pounds Bounty payment comes to £3k alone, which leaves £2k for everything else; recruiting, non trained personnel, equipment, ammunition and consumables, training, travel and everything else, and these back of a fag packet calculations assumes everyone in the reserve is the rank (or equivalent) of a private and only ever qualifies for second year bounty.

The MoD is at pains to point out that the money is extra or additional ‘investment’ so these figures might not apply.

Don’t put too much against these figures, they really are wildly simplistic but when the MoD talks about £1.8 billion, remember, it isn’t actually a great deal, even if it is extra.

 

 

A new model TA

A guest post from Phil

In this article I aim to put across some of my ideas for how a new model TA might manage to bridge the risks inherent in its new role of providing even more of an even smaller regular army. It is an article to stimulate debate and I do not pretend that it is the whole answer or even if the model is a good one but  I think it provides opportunities to tackle the two main problems with the current TA: lack of confidence in it by regulars and relatively poor senior leadership.

In a nutshell what I propose is a multi-tiered Army Reserve with an emphasis on good Officer and Senior NCO leadership with resources focused not only in those two areas but in technical training also. How might it work? Well the model is one based on the Danish recruitment system which I wrote about some time ago now here on TD. What happens in the Danish model is that a large number of conscripts receive a basic training period of 4 months but at the end of these 4 months they can opt to sign onto a reserve contract which will see them undergo 8-9 months more training in their role and then be eligible for deployment. The advantage of this model is that it exposes a large number of people to the military who may not have realised they like it – in other words it broadens the recruitment base and attracts more souls.

Now I do not propose conscription into the Army Reserve but what I do propose is a tiered model whereby there are two levels of commitment – the bottom tier is essentially normal jogging and represents almost exactly what is done now with the exception that there would be a legal minimum training period of a 2 weeks a year in camp event and 4 weekends a year. Training could continue as now in 2 week modular courses and the commitment would be entirely open ended with no minimum terms. What I would envisage is that these flexible and open commitments would attract people of all ages (especially mature personnel) and ensure a wide recruitment pool for a higher commitment tier of the Army Reserve. It would essentially act as a hook but also provide soldiers that, as now, could be brought up to operational standards for an enduring operation – units need critical mass and warm bodies are very useful in themselves as they enhance retention and provide for better training events.

Now this basic recruitment and training model would be supplement by a higher commitment Army Reserve and act as one gateway to it. What I would envisage is a tier with higher level of compulsory training periods like the US National Guard and with a firm commitment in the same vein as a company might require a certain number of years of service after putting you through an MBA for example. This tier would be on an individual basis so a unit might have both lower and higher tier soldiers in it.

So in this higher tier soldiers would be eligible to do regular courses in exchange for a certain number of years’ service afterwards at the higher commitment level. The number of years’ service would depend on the type of course – I propose there could be 4 levels of courses: basic military courses (phase one and two training); advanced military courses (phase three training courses, promotional courses); long military courses (your long phase three military courses like Ammo Technician and so forth) and finally long trade courses (courses that have a direct civilian equivalent or use, such as artificer, environmental health etc). Now recruits might decide to join direct to the higher tier and do the basic military courses and thus give 3 years commitment; or after 18 months’ probation and training in the lower tier they might choose to do an advanced military course for 3-4 years commitment, or at some point in their career a long trade course for 7 years commitment (the longer time reflecting the more useful nature of the course and the extra expense involved in putting a reserve soldier through it).

What we would then have is a reserve with a large pool of flexible, casual soldiers able to be brought up to speed for an enduring operation buttressed by numbers of higher commitment soldiers who have stepped up or entered directly, requiring little more training than their regular counterparts for operations, having done exactly the same courses.

To accomplish this would require a change of primary legislation and the terms and conditions of the higher tier reservists. It would become necessary to offer them better pay (higher bounty, the full X-Factor, their trade pay etc), enhanced pension rights and also open up almost the full range of military benefits like access to med centres, dentists, rail cards, even married quarters perhaps but at a less subsidised rent – proper AT courses for example could also be offered. However it is done, there needs to be a real and palpable enhanced set of terms and conditions for the higher tier – there needs to be differentiation.

Stiffening this would be a better reserve Officer and Senior leadership cadre. For Officer entry I would propose removing the Reserve entry option as it stands and making either the 12 months RMAS commissioning course a requirement and / or a new OTC model based loosely on the US ROTC model where a good chunk of the RMAS syllabus is delivered part time over the 3 years of University followed by the final term of RMAS full time: thereafter all Officers must do the regular Army courses and give several years commitment. For Senior NCOs I would propose that they have to conduct the regular Army promotional course for their Corps (an advanced military course) and thereafter give a minimum 3-4 year commitment at the higher level of commitment. This would mean that all Officers and Senior NCOs conduct identical training and are selected in an identical manner – the leadership core would thus become more professional. JNCOs in the lower tier could do a TA 2 week course as now, or they could opt to do the Regular course and move onto the higher tier.

Enhancing this further would be a far more permeable barrier between Reserve and Regular forces. Officers and ORs at the higher or lower commitments would be allowed to sign onto FTRS type contracts to serve with the Regular Army subject, at more Senior levels, to having completed the appropriate courses. Furthermore, Regular Senior NCOs and Officers, and certain Corporals would be allowed to take “sabbaticals” in the Reserves thus spreading Regular experience throughout the reserves by a mechanism other than the Permanent Staff. These things happen now but the objective would be to institutionalise this and promote it and normalise it so an Officer who takes three years out in the Reserves for example, to study, isn’t penalised. The objective is to have a very fluid movement between Regular and Reserve forces to spread experience, to spread leadership, to give reservist SNCOs and Officers command opportunities in the Regulars and to try and raise familiarity and trust.

Underpinning all this would be a selection process completely identical to the Regular forces with potential recruits held to the same mental and physical standards as regular recruits and undergoing the same selection process at Litchfield. Furthermore, all personnel will have the same scale of clothing and equipment and will (with few exceptions) be required to maintain the same levels of basic soldiering proficiency as regulars including basic fitness levels and marksmanship. In addition, partnering Reserve units with their Regular counterparts and encouraging cross posting using the new permeable boundaries will help operational effectiveness by allowing units to get to know one another better and to know strengths and weaknesses – the mere attendance of Squadron or Company personalities and OCs at a Regular Battalions CO Prayers cannot be underestimated, nor can running simple weekend joint MCCP type affairs where regular and reservist soldiers have their deployment documentation and vaccinations done together.

The main challenge to this would be creating an environment where regular counterparts trusted their reservist comrades to do their job at short notice to the same level as regulars are perceived to be able to do it. The system of higher commitment and doing regular courses and being able and encouraged to partake in FTRS contracts is designed to mitigate this risk and breed confidence. The other barrier is of course the money to pay for these extra courses and the higher number of MTDs needed at the higher commitment level and the enhanced conditions packages. And finally there would need to be legislative changes to give the higher commitment legal status and put the requisite reservists and Officers under military law 24/7 unlike their lower tier brethren. However, none of these are insurmountable obstacles. By embracing reserve units into their day to day lives regular units will become more familiar and if the senior leadership is better their impressions are more likely to tend toward ‘decent blokes’ rather than ‘cretins’.

An Alternative TA Model

A guest post from Phil…

This explores a possible model for the TA of the future.

It is based on the SDSR Army model of 2 light intervention groupings and 5 enduring operations groupings. Since this model is the current official one I think it would be more interesting to discuss how well this reservist model could complement the SDSR model rather than drift off into our own alternative SDSR models.

I am not into fantasy forces so this has been deliberately grounded in some sort of reality. Some of it is somewhat vague but that is because I have no idea of the ratio’s needed to achieve certain effects or how many people it would take to do it.

The organic Brigade reinforcement model (enduring operations) is simply a template, the Brigade commander could chose to organise this force as he sees fit depending on the mission, but these would be the building blocks.

The Brigade Groups would have their reservist units entirely integrated with them and be both OPCON and ADCON for them.

Apart from the higher commitment for Officers / SNCOs and in the final 18 months of the readiness cycle I have left the ToS as is for reasons of not stepping on cross policy toes.

Outcomes

  • Able to generate infantry battalion as part of force generation cycle
  • Able to generate other CS manning increments as part of force generation cycle
  • Able to generate CSS formed units and increments as part of force generation cycle
  • Able to generate a third Theatre Support Group
  • Able to generate a third divisional level Support Group
  • Able to generate a Force Support Hospital on an enduring basis and provide surge capability of a 100 bed Field Hospital
  • Able to generate specialist units as needed
  • Able to support and maintain specialist pools of trades
  • Able to provide UK wide resilient communication network
  • Provide the framework for utilising regular reservist volunteers

 

Problems

  • Lack of training time
  • Unbalanced commitment
  • Poor ratio of effectives to ration strength
  • Perceived risk in SNCO and Officer abilities
  • Perceived risk in deploying formed combat units
  • Perceived as ‘second line’
  • Poor career development opportunities
  • Lack of diffusion between TA and regular
  • Poor use of regular reservists

 

Force Generation Model

  • Third Theatre Support Group and third Divisional Support Group at present state of readiness since it will be comprised of CSS units and will only be deployed at considerable notice.
  • Specialist individuals, pools and Force Support Hospitals will rotate through the same readiness level as their assigned Brigade Group: the surge hospitals will maintain a standard readiness baseline which would be elevated as their need became more imminent.
  • The UK resilience communication networks would make use of sponsored reservists and would be at a high state of readiness for local communication assurance and varying readiness levels for regional and national communication needs.
  • The units assigned to each Brigade Group would cycle through the parent Brigades readiness cycle, each brigade would have 2x reserve units so that the readiness cycle was 1 deployment every approx 6 years. For example, 1 reserve infantry battalion will generate to highest readiness over 24 months, supported by the second reserve battalion, switching on the brigades next cycle.

 

Brigade Group Readiness Cycle

  • Training commitment would build to an enhanced training commitment in the final year of the readiness cycle with an additional two week camp on a Brigade FTX and a MOBEX at the end of the generation cycle and a DEMOBEX at the end of the deployment phase.
  • The battalion would be reinforced by those regular reservists who leave their parent unit in the 12 months prior to the culmination of the readiness cycle and by volunteers from the second reserve unit and by additional regular reservist volunteers and shadow volunteers.
  • Each unit would in the 12 months before the culmination of the readiness cycle receive a manning increment from the regulars which would include additional permanent staff, shadow officers and reinforcement to the HQ elements that would enable the battalion to conduct operations independently.
  • Every SNCO and Officer in the reserves found to be wanting in any capacity will be replaced via the regulars or via the regular reserve of officers in the 12 month build up phase.

 

Maximum Level of Brigade reinforcement (enduring operation)

  • 1 infantry battalion, mounted as appropriate
  • 1 tank regiment of 2 squadrons
  • 1 FR regiment of 2 squadrons
  • 1 artillery regiment of 2 batteries
  • 1 Engineer squadron
  • 1 REME company
  • 1 Logistics company
  • 1 RMP platoon
  • 1 Medical squadron
  • Specialists as needed for the operation
  • Regular reservist and other reserve IR volunteers

 

Maximum Level of organic Brigade reinforcement (surge and in addition to above)

  • 1 infantry company
  • 1 tank squadron
  • 1 FR squadron
  • 1 artillery battery
  • 1 Engineer element
  • 1 REME element
  • 1 Logistics element
  • 1 Medical increment
  • Additional specialists
  • Additional regular reservist and reserve IR volunteers

 

Additional non organic surge capability

  • Reserve units from other brigades can be trawled for IR and BCRs and the regular reserve will trawled also. These IRs would reinforce regular and reserve units in a surge operation.

 

Required organic Brigade reserve units

  • 2 infantry battalions + regular reservist cell
  • 2 tank regiments with 2 squadrons ea + RR cell
  • 2 FR regiments with 2 squadrons ea + RR cell
  • 2 artillery regiments with 2 batteries ea + RR cell
  • 1 engineer regiment with 2 squadrons + RR cell
  • 1 logistics regiments with 2 squadrons + RR cell
  • 1 RMP company with 2 platoons + RR cell
  • 1 medical regiment with 2 squadrons + RR cell

These will have their HQs aligned with regular unit locations to ensure equipment can be pooled and shared and to ensure shared expertise and familiarity. The readiness reserve unit will be included in all regular unit training and planning preparations and meetings. There will be a regular liaison officer from the regular unit liaising directly with the reserve unit. The 2 tank regiments etc could be formed into one larger unit with 4 squadrons, 2 separate units are listed for ease of administration.

 

The Manpower

  • Officer training requires more routes. Current TA route should be supplemented with the option of doing the full Sandhurst course or an abridged Sandhurst course as part of a new UOTC stream. Reserve Officers should have access to the entire range of regular training courses. Regular and reserve Officers should be able to move freely (needs of the service permitting) between reserve and regular posts via all Officer posts being made “One Army”. This would be actively managed by the Army to ensure relevant ability and experience is kept in the regular forces (ie perhaps having limits on movements per year, or having service points etc). Reserve Officers in the pre-deployment phase would be mentored by temporary shadow regular or regular reserve Officers. Officers would all have a higher training commitment and perhaps should serve for 6 months if not on operations in the readiness cycle, amongst a regular unit on an FTRS type contract.
  • SNCOs, most of the above would apply. Higher training commitment and possibly spending 6 months every 6 years either on operations or serving in the regular army.
  • Other Ranks would continue much as now but with the higher training commitment when the unit comes to the last 18 months of the force generation cycle. They would be able to move freely between regular and reserve units and would have the option of conducting regular basic training and promotions courses and trade courses if they wished. They could also have the option of a 6 month FTRS type contract if not on ops but this would be voluntary. OR would receive reservist career postings and reserve professional development.
  • There would be a training establishment above and beyond the core strength establishment.
  • All personnel would get regular scales of personal equipment and receive a retainer during the 6 months of the culmination of the readiness period if not on operations to compensate for the higher level of readiness they would be expected to have.

 

Problems thus solved:

  • Lack of training time
    • increased funding and extra commitment
    • regular course posting and training opportunities
  • Unbalanced commitment
    • Higher compulsory commitment in the final 18 months of cycle
    • Higher quality SNCO and Officers produce better incentives and traininig
  • Poor ratio of effectives to ration strength
    • Better Officers more able to remove dead wood
  • Perceived risk in SNCO and Officer abilities
    • More integration, training and exposure to regular army
  • Perceived risk in deploying formed combat units
    • Build up
    • Regular increment
    • Shadow Officers
    • Joint training
  • Perceived as ‘second line’
    • Officer and SNCO posts become One Army posts
    • Kit becomes uniform and pooled
  • Poor career development opportunities
    • Better Officers and SNCOs better able to handle development
    • Regular army opportunities
  • Lack of diffusion between TA and regular
    • One Army posts and movement opportunities
  • Poor use of regular reservists
    • Regular reservist role enhanced and integrated

 

Regular Reserves

Better use of regular reserves needs to be made.

Every reserve unit will have a regular reservist cell which will liaise and work with regular reservists who volunteer to be at a higher state of readiness than normal regular reservists but lower than the TA commitment and liable for deployment – for specialist personnel mainly (essentially like the Danish contract soldiers).

They would be known as Section A regular reservists. Section B regular reservists would be those that have been released from the Colours but have to spend a period of time on the TA commitment level and will be liable for deployment; and also those regular reservists who wish to do this also for periods of time.

Section C regular reservists would be all others still liable to recall and their regular units would be responsible for these. Section C reservists could volunteer for Section A level of commitment or B levels of commitment depending on their trade and skill.

This model would be underpinned by “intelligent selection” whereby as far as is possible Section B reservists only deploy voluntarily. The regular reserve of officers would have a mirror organisation but with a Section D for Staff Officers and a General Officer list.