Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)

Whilst the S-300 and S-400 get most of the headlines the KBP Instrument Design Bureau manufactured Pantsir-S1 air defence system is equally effective.

It is a self-propelled short to medium range air defence system that combines guns and missiles on the same chassis to counter aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles and other precision stand-off weapons. The gun and missile combination allows the most appropriate weapon to be selected depending upon the target type and range.

One of its key roles is to protect friendly long range air defence systems, like the S-300, from precision stand-off weapons in a layered engagement zone.

Pantsir-S1 comprises three broad components; gun, missile and fire control system.

Twin 30mm cannons; between them they have a very high rate of fire (up to 5,000 rpm) and would normally expend between 150 and 200 rounds per target engagement. With an on-board ammunition supply of 1,400 rounds, the magazine is good for approximately 8 targets before before needing reloading.

Its 2A38M guns are used for targets between 200m and 4,000m range at altitudes between 0m and 3,000m.

In addition to the guns, Pantsir-S1 carries 12, ready to fire, two stage 57E6 missiles, 6 on either side. Each missile has a maximum range of 20km and 3,000m altitude, with short flight and high levels of maneuverability, a 20kg blast fragmentation warhead and launch weight of 75kg.

Finally, the fire control system can detect aircraft at 36km and track them from 28km, engaging two targets simultaneously, using radar and optical systems.

One of the best features of the Pantsir-S1 is its carrying vehicle diversity; it can use a heavy truck chassis or a tracked armoured vehicle and even a naval mount. It can fire whilst on the move or from static locations. Although they can operate in singles, the usual configuration is to cluster them in a 6 vehicle battery, supported by a mobile command post and replenishment vehicles. Each vehicle has a crew of three.

 

 

 

Customers include the Algeria, Iran, Oman, UAE, Jordan, Russia, and no doubt there are some on their way to Syria, or already there. Syria is an existing user of the Pantsir but it is thought a newer version has been sent recently. By placing such systems in Syria, Russia is placing a significant barrier to any NATO air attacks on Assad and because the new systems are likely to be manned by Russian ‘advisors’ the difficult position of an attack on Syria means an attack on Russia.

Brazil also has plans to purchase the system.

Pantsir-1 is actually a family of systems that have continually evolved over the years, going back to the mid-nineties.

 

The latest systems use phased array radars and modern computing and display systems. The Latest E variant of the missile has greater boost range and improved lethality. A follow on system is also in development, although details remain uncertain, and reportedly, there is also a version that extended the range of the missiles even further and is optimised for use in Arctic conditions.

The Pantsir-M has a slightly different configuration but uses many of the same components with the major exception of gun system, instead of two single barrel cannons it uses twin GSh-6-30K 6 barrel cannons as found on the Kashtan CIWS.

 

At DSEi this year there were many systems designed to counter small unmanned aircraft,. Whilst many of these use ECM to attack data links a gun system remains just as effective. For the British Army, and to some extent, the Royal Navy, a key question remains.

How will it counter small unmanned systems, LEAP, Land Ceptor and HVM may be part of the answer but the cost differential between target and missile could be hugely diferent.

Is it time the British Army looked at gun systems again for counter air generally, and counter small UAS specifically?

Read more;

http://www.kbptula.ru/en/productions/air-defense-weapon-systems/pantsir-s1

http://armamentresearch.com/russian-96k6-pantsir-s1-air-defence-system-in-ukraine/

http://www.army-technology.com/projects/pantsyr/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pantsir-S1

http://www.janes.com/article/52766/russia-to-launch-production-of-naval-pantsyr-m

http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-96K6-Pantsir-2K22-Tunguska.html

Manhunt in Syria – The Reaper Cometh

At what point does the legitimate self-defence become an extra-judicial murder?

That seems to be the question of the day, with predictably opposing views

 

 

 

The justification came in the simple form of they were planning to kill civilians in the UK and hence in the age old strategy of getting your digs in early, they were killed using the medium of an RAF Reaper. This is not dissimilar to Operation Flavius in 1988, Gibraltar, but obviously without the unmanned aircraft and Hellfire missile thing!

It is an interesting debate with many nuanced views in amongst the froth; what does Article 51 of the UN Charter say, what does international law say about anticipatory self defence, what is the definition of self-defence anyway and what amount of transparency is appropriate but at the end of the day, it comes down to a simple matter of right and wrong. They are not there to hand out food to the needy and they are not there to further their study in Quranic scripture, but they are there to fight with and for an organisation that sees no problems with beheading children, killing civilians with mustard gas, raping and enslaving women, throwing homosexuals off tall buildings, boiling prisoners alive and generally debasing what it means to be a human being. They were also plotting to carry out acts of terror in the UK. In that, they forfeit their right to leniency, they gave up their right to be treated with human decency, planted their flags firmly in the wrong camp and in a nutshell, got what was coming to them.

It was proportionate and necessary.

They want to play in a game that allows them to rape women and kill civilians, fine, but they have to understand the game they play has very harsh offside rules.

Where the government seem to be failing is in their efforts to provide legal cover for the people involved. I can see the decision to not publish the legal advice has logic and merit for the short term but longer term, the UK needs to have a clear and unambiguous interpretation of the legal landscape, if necessary, through specific provision in UK law, similar to the US ‘Authorisation of Military Force’ provisions made in the USA.

This provision should be confirmed by Parliament on a regular basis or lapse, but it needs clarity because one thing is certain, as an estimated 700 British nationals have joined Islamic terror groups in Syria, we can’t just bumble along on a case by case basis or saying the only ones we will target are the ones plotting VE day atrocities.

This places far too much emphasis on ‘intelligence’ with all the weight of Iraqi WMD ‘intelligence’ bearing down on each case.

Stripping them of citizenship so we can look the other way whilst America does our dirty work, as some have suggested, seems a rather underhand way of avoiding responsibility and facing up to the unpalatable facts.

So I think we should simply state that any British citizen fighting for ISIS is a clear threat to the UK and act accordingly.

Another question arises, should we exploit this capability?

By demonstrating that we can kill individuals we show that we have an effective intelligence machine backed up with the means to exploit that intelligence. We should be ruthlessly exploiting the psychological value of this capability with careful information operations designed to nurture the feelings of vulnerability. Let ISIS expend energy on trying to figure out how, let them worry about picking up the radio or sending a Tweet, let them understand that no matter where they are, they are being watched. Let’s see a YouTube video showing their last moments with the direct message that ‘it could be you’. Guile, cunning, Twitter and YouTube are powerful allies, especially when they have a big brother with wings. Making it known to other nationalities that hanging around with British members of ISIS might not be conducive to a long life might also have value.

This capability should also be used to incite those there to come home.

Now I know this might not be a popular sentiment and there is a very good argument for, without being shy about the word, killing them in Syria and Iraq rather than worrying about them back home; but, they will be a source of intelligence and maybe some of them can be used to educate and prevent others doing the same.

With a carefully designed and closely managed return and deradicalisation programme, driven by the threat of targetted execution and the pull of some return to normal life in the UK, aided and abetted by their families, some, but not all, of the British ISIS fighters can be peeled away put to work in this long war.

And make no mistake, this is a long war that is going to play out over decades and all of the Middle East and much of Africa.

So let’s be clear, we should make it a public policy position backed up with law; if you are a British member of ISIS, expect a door knock from Mr Reaper, but there are alternatives.

Carrot and Stick.

Finally, lost in all the hype is the fact that some very brave men and women will have been involved, maybe time to share a thought for them as well.

 

The Syrian Times They are a Changin’

Just as the MoD release an operational update which describes how many $500 pickup trucks it has destroyed with £100,000 Brimstone missiles our friend in Moscow displays yet more flair for upsetting the apple cart and catching the West totally off guard.

 

After several days of sightings and rumours, Vladimir Putin has confirmed the presence of Russian military forces in Syria, firmly on the side of the Assad regime. They are ostensibly there to advise, train and support;

To say we’re ready to do this today – so far it’s premature to talk about this. But we are already giving Syria quite serious help with equipment and training soldiers, with our weapons. We really want to create some kind of an international coalition to fight terrorism and extremism. To this end, we hold consultations with our American partners – I have personally spoken on the issue with US President Obama.

Images have emerged of vehicles, personnel, communications equipment and accommodation, a typical logistics advance party. These build on 40 odd years of Russian presence in Syria, in some regards, this is more of the same.

The US and Europe have painted themselves into a corner with typical ineptitude, the mature long term thing to do would have been to work with Russia and Assad to at least attempt some kind of negotiated ceasefire that would isolate ISIS and allow concentration of resources on their destruction. By insisting Assad must go we create no incentive for Assad to rush to the same fate as Ghadaffi.

This has created a perfect opportunity for Russia to step in.

What the end state of Russian involvement will be is not certain but what is certain is that this intervention is at least something different in the never ending misery that is the Syrian civil war.

The reality on the ground is that if Russia does deploy a meaningful force, air or land, the West will have to cooperate, however difficult that will be.

Interesting  times ahead.

 

Cloud Cuckoo Land

One of the greatest problems with UK defence and security policy is the complete and utter disconnect between aspirations and reality.

Having successively cut the UK defence budget and failed to control the inexorable rise of defence equipment costs the actual capability we have may be perfectly formed with the very best of equipment, but it simply does not match the aspiration of politicians.

The current debate on ISIS You Know Who in Iraq and Syria shows this writ large for all to see.

This is from my new favourite newspaper, a quote from Julian Lewis, chair of the Defence Select Committee;

I think how I vote [on whether the UK should join US-led air strikes over Syria] will depend on whether the prime minister, instead of making this up on the hoof as has been the case I’m afraid up till now, presents parliament with an integrated strategy, approved jointly by the heads of the armed forces, as something that could produce a decisive result.

A decisive result.

Now that is the funniest thing I have heard all year.

With what?

Crispin Blunt, chair of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee also said;

The contribution of the Royal Air Force and the whole coalition operation flying about 5% of the missions now over both Iraq and Syria is not exactly the central contribution to defeating Islamic State

With the elderly Tornado looking likely to receive another service life extension and crews at the ragged edge, commitments to QRA taskings in the UK and the Falkland Islands, air policing in the Baltics and the task of managing the belated improvements in Typhoon capability, what is Mr Blunt expecting?

I don’t think there is anything wrong with carrying a medium sized stick and talking a medium sized fight, but our politicians seem to be intent on embarrassing themselves and placing unreasonable demands on service personnel by thinking they live in 1930’s.

If you want to talk softly and carry a large stick you have to pay for a stick, not a twig.

Whilst we are at it, let’s just remind ourselves, 2% is actually a reduction and considered to be the bare minimum, not something to crow about, no matter how you have cooked the books.

 

Learning to Agree with the Guardian

The big news today is that British pilots on exchange with the United States Navy (and possibly Canadian forces) have been conducting operations over Syria.

Now we all know personnel exchanges between allies are run of the mill, mundane business as usual, so let’s skewer that one from the off, but if anyone thinks a routine exchange for training and development purposes and conducting operations in a country that has not been approved by Parliament is the same thing, they should not be allowed sharp objects.

 

Personally, I have no issues whatsoever with the British armed forces conducting operations in or over Syria in the same manner as in Iraq, clearly, the distinction is nonsense. In any case, the RAF is conducting manned ISTAR operations over Syria, the only coalition nation to do so actually.

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jul/17/guardian-view-on-bombing-isis-in-syria-british-pilots

But as the Guardian says, the Government should have some respect and make its case in Parliament first.

Dropping bombs and taking photographs is not the same thing, at least in political terms but whilst we are where we are, the Guardian has a good point about Parliamentary approval. I don’t think anyone in Parliament would seek to preserve the distinction either so the whole thing becomes a bit of a farce.

Right, am off to give myself a good talking to 🙂

Stocking up on Paveway IV

The MoD has let another contract to Raytheon for more Paveway IV Precision Guided Bombs

The Secretary of State for Defence (the Authority) acting through the International Guns, Missiles and Rockets Project Team of Defence Equipment and Support proposes to award a 12 month contract, to Raytheon Systems Ltd for the manufacture of a number of Paveway IV bombs. The contract value is 40 000 000 GBP

Stock replenishment or getting ready?

 

 

READ MORE ABOUT UK COMPLEX WEAPONS

http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/uk-complex-weapons/

 

Slim Pickings in Iraq

Below is an extract from a recent MoD update on RAF operations over Iraq;

25 January: a Reaper was once again on patrol over northern Iraq on Sunday, providing top cover to the peshmerga as they consolidated their latest successful offensive against ISIL. One Hellfire was used to attack an armoured personnel carrier, then a further 2 missiles were used against 2 ISIL positions near by.

23 January: another Reaper flew on Friday morning to support the Iraqi army in the west of the country and observed ISIL fighters loading rockets into a truck. The vehicle was kept under close observation and then was successfully attacked with a Hellfire. A further attack was then conducted as the terrorists attempted to salvage equipment from the damaged truck.

22 January: an RAF Reaper, patrolling over northern Iraq, assisted Kurdish peshmerga who were under fire from a group of terrorists with a heavily armed pick-up truck. The vehicle was destroyed by a Hellfire missile.

21 January: early on Wednesday, a pair of Tornado GR4s flew in support of Kurdish troops, a Brimstone missile struck a heavily-armed ISIL truck and a Paveway IV guided bomb was used to target a terrorist observation post. Initial reports indicate both attacks were a success. On Wednesday evening, a Reaper provided further surveillance for the peshmerga, and in a series of engagements used Hellfires to attack a number terrorist vehicles and a fighting position.

20 January: RAF aircraft have been on hand to assist the latest Kurdish offensive operation; a Reaper was able to conduct a successful precision attack with a Hellfire missile on a terrorist group.

19 January: RAF Tornado GR4s were active in the early hours of Monday morning, flying armed reconnaissance in western Iraq, close to the Syrian border. An armoured personnel carrier was identified near Al Qaim and hit by a Brimstone missile. Continuing their patrol to the north east, the GR4s caught another group of ISIL vehicles attacked with a Paveway IV bomb. Meanwhile, British Army advisers continue to provide training and mentoring to the Iraqi security forces, particularly the Kurdish peshmerga in northern Iraq.

18 January: Reapers continued to provide support to the Iraqi army on Sunday – in the afternoon a Hellfire was used to strike a heavy machine-gun position that threatened Iraqi soldiers nearby, then during the night a further 3 missiles were used to target a large terrorist group as they began an attack on an Iraqi position.

16 January: Friday saw another Tornado patrol supporting the Iraqi army in its operations near Bayji. Three positions were identified and were struck simultaneously with Paveways. A fourth Paveway was used shortly afterwards against a further ISIL position near by. That evening, an RAF Reaper, operating elsewhere in Iraq, identified another group of terrorists who had just attacked an Iraqi unit and conducted 2 successful attacks with Hellfire missiles.

13 January: a pair of Tornado GR4s flew a reconnaissance mission ahead of Kurdish forces as they continued to strengthen security in the area east of Mount Sinjar, from which ISIL – or Da’ish as they are known to the Iraqi and Syrian people they abuse – was driven out in December. The aircraft spotted the terrorists constructing a fortified position; a Paveway IV precision guided bomb successfully destroyed the vehicle they were using.

9 January: late at night, 2 RAF Tornado GR4s, on an armed reconnaissance mission in northern Iraq, were summoned to assist the Kurdish peshmerga. Da’ish terrorists, who have lost a significant amount of territory to the peshmerga recently, were attempting to mount a local attack on a Kurdish unit. The GR4s delivered 4 precision strikes using Paveway IV guided bombs to disrupt the attack.

8 January: in the evening a Reaper remotely piloted air system (RPAS) worked in close conjunction with other coalition aircraft to provide air support to Iraqi troops in Anbar province, western Iraq. The RAF Reaper provided targeting assistance to the fast jets in strikes against ISIL positions, and conducted a successful attack using its own Hellfire missiles.

6 January: At the request of the Iraqi government, British forces took further action against ISIL terrorist targets.

5 January: Reaper and Tornado missions were also flown in the morning. Tornados again patrolled the Al Qaim area, where they destroyed an ISIL excavator vehicle, used to construct fortified positions, with a Brimstone, while a Reaper, scouting ahead of Iraqi troops, spotted an armoured vehicle being moved by ISIL on a heavy equipment transporter. A Hellfire missile scored a direct hit on the armoured vehicle, another Hellfire destroyed the transporter itself, and a third missile struck an ISIL position nearby.

4 January: an RAF Reaper, working in support of Iraqi army units, identified an ISIL vehicle and engaged it with a Hellfire missile. Shortly afterwards, the Reaper discovered an ISIL position close by, and attacked this with another Hellfire.

2 January: in the early hours a RAF Tornado GR4 armed reconnaissance patrol located an ISIL armoured personnel carrier to the east of Al Qaim, and conducted a successful strike with a Brimstone missile. Later in the day, a coalition surveillance aircraft observed ISIL positions concealed within woods north-west of Ramadi and another Tornado mounted an attack with 2 Paveway IV precision guided bombs.

Just shy of a months worth of operations and the RAF has expended;

• Hellfire; 20, from Reaper
• Brimstone; 5, from Tornado
• Paveway IV; 12, from Tornado

The target descriptions are equally interesting, a truck, a heavy machine gun position, an armoured personnel carrier and excavator. These targets fall definitely into the ‘tactical’ column rather than attacking ‘strategic’ targets.

What conclusions can we draw (if any) from the number of targets, types of target, launch platform and weapons expended?

• Reaper is doing just as much of the heavy lifting as Tornado without the massive logistic effort involved with refuelling Tornado?
• Paveway IV seems to be the referred option for those sorties flown by Tornado?
• How many Reapers can we buy for a single F35?
• The effect delivered (destroying an excavator or trucks in singles) are insignificant compared to the cost?
• Air power used in this manner satisfies the ‘something must be done’ brigade but not much else?
• Any others, none, the opposite of the above?

 

Are Coalition Ground Troops Needed in Iraq and Syria?

From a new contributor, Josh Hughes

Members of the US-led coalition fighting Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria, political and defence commentators, and retired military figures have been talking about ‘boots on the ground’, and whether coalition members should begin a large-scale ground offensive against IS, in addition to the ongoing air-strikes. Some, including NATO’s former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, Admiral James Stravidis are advocating a significant role for coalition ground troops, in conjunction with the Kurdish Peshmerga and the Iraqi Army. The idea of a ground intervention results from the failure of the Iraqi army to stop the summer advance of IS in Iraq, and the inability of the western-backed rebel groups in Syria to contain IS and Jahbat Al-Nusra, the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, whilst fighting the Assad regime.

IS has managed to take and hold ground in Syria because there is no rebel opposition as effective as itself, and the Syrian Army are not aggressively targeting IS. The presence of IS means the west has targets other than the Assad regime, increasing the likelihood of regime survival.

Therefore, President Assad can play a long game, and remain in power. In Iraq, the IS rapid advance was accelerated by the Iraqi army and police fleeing in June, resulting in little resistance. Thus, the State forces one would initially hope to fight IS were not doing so, through acquiescence, or inability.

Thus, until local forces are in a position to fight IS effectively, there is an issue of how to continue fighting IS on the ground. Peshmerga backed by coalition airstrikes, weapons and training have so far been able to push back IS a limited distance, and contain their advances in Iraq, but not strike any decisive blows. Without rolling them back, IS territory could become what the Jordanian Foreign Minister describes as ‘Extremist-stan’.

There are fears that their territory could become, a terrorist safe haven and training ground, as with Afghanistan in the 1990’s and Somalia since the civil war.

Therefore an additional factor may be needed to swing the fight definitively against IS. However, the political will does not exist in coalition countries, due to war weariness, and fears of retaliation by IS for an intervention with ground troops, thus more creative options could be explored. Admiral Stravidis advocates a multi-force attack on IS, with Peshmerga engaging IS in the North, the Iraqi army engaging IS in central Iraq, and Coalition ground troops engaging IS in Syria, not the Syrian rebels which are currently being trained. Such an intervention is unlikely to occur, however. Intervention in Syria will inevitably lead to being sucked into their civil war, which political leaders are opposed to. It is this reason which also removes the possibility for States intervening to create ‘buffer-zones’, which some have advocated.

This would involve armies taking small areas in IS and Assad-controlled territory for civilians to escape conflict within, not only would this risk mission creep, but it also reminiscent of the failed safe-zones of Srebrenica. Alternatively, Afzal Ashraf of the Royal United Services Institute suggests using ‘boots with wings’, attacking IS with coalition paratroopers to push IS back, with Iraqi forces and Peshmerga holding the ground and fighting any IS insurgency remaining in towns.

In all three options, massive amounts of (currently non-existent) political will would be required, along with determination to intervene against public opinion, and are therefore they are unlikely to happen without a significant change of circumstance.

Most importantly, however, coalition ground troops are not wanted to fight in either Iraq or Syria. The Iraqi Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, stated at the beginning of October that defeating IS in Iraq could be performed by the Iraqi’s themselves with collation airpower. In Syria it is more complicated, but foreign troops are not wanted by commanders of the Free Syrian Army, unless they are committed to removing Assad as well as IS. Thus Stravidis’ idea must find another local force to take the place of coalition ground troops.

Kurdish fighters in both Syria and Iraq are well-motivated and have been pushing back the IS advance, with help from coalition airstrikes. However this has widely been acknowledged as not enough to defeat IS. Whilst there may be a large number of Iraqi-Peshmerga fighters, the Regional Kurdistan Government are unwilling to commit to advances outside of Kurdistan. Whereas Syrian-Peshmerga fighters are willing to take the fight to IS, but do not have the numbers, or equipment to deal decisive blows. Indeed, in the currently under-siege city of Kobane, the Kurdish fighters are unable to halt the IS advance through lack of heavy weaponry to defeat IS tanks and artillery, stolen from the Syrian and Iraqi armies.

However, Iraqi-Peshmerga and now being allowed by Turkey to reinforce and rearm the Syrian-Peshmerga in Kobane. This may stem the IS advance into Kobane, but does not take the fight to IS in their territories of central Iraq and Northern Syria.

In terms of ‘moderate’ rebel groups in Syria, they are being taken out of Syria to be trained in Turkey, after initial reports that training was to be carried out in Saudi Arabia. Rebels have also been trained in Jordan by the CIA, and are reportedly re-entering the Syrian battlefields. Thus, whilst the West can hope these rebel groups will both push back IS, and topple the Assad regime, they are an unknown quantity until they return to the battlefield, and therefore cannot yet be brought into an anti-IS strategy.

During the Islamist insurgency phase of the Iraq war, with many attacks performed by the group which preceded IS, al-Qaeda in Iraq, lots of Islamist and Shia militia fighters were pushed out of Iraq by tribal militias and the Iraqi army. In terms repeating the ‘Sunni Awakening’ of 2005, where Sunni tribes fought against al-Qaeda to liberate their towns, the opposite has been happening, to the benefit of IS. The IS rapid advance was accelerated by having little to no resistance from Sunni tribes, some of whom are supportive of IS.

This is because, the Shia-dominated Malaki government, security and intelligence services disenfranchised Sunni parts of Iraqi society by focussing on Shia issues, and reneging on promises to employ parts of the Sunni tribal militias and absorb them into State organs. This grievance of the Sunni minority resulted in at least tacit support for IS by many Sunnis, with IS being a mostly Sunni group, and many would rather risk rule under IS than accept a poor deal from the Malaki government. Attempts in the last weeks of the Maliki government to arm Sunni tribes to fight IS failed. However, more recently, several tribes have been cooperating against IS, after witnessing their brutal rule.

The El Bayaa tribe have been fighting with Kurdish forces in the North, and several tribes have been cooperating with Government forces. The Jaghaifa and Albo Nimr tribes in Anbar have been cooperating, along with groups such as Albu Alwan, Albu Fayad, Albu Esa, Albu Shaban and Albu Khalifa. If these tribes continue to cooperate, it is possible that their militia fighters could act as the ground troops to expel IS from central Iraq with coalition air support.

Despite initially failing to fight IS adequately in the summer, the Iraqi army could have a place in removing IS. Following their disintegration, the Iraqi army has been staging a significant turn-around. The 17th division has pushed IS from Baghdad, and beyond some suburbs. The army is being re-organised with Saddam-era officers brought in to replace the inexperienced young officers who fled the IS advance. Whilst this may not be an ideal situation, it is expected to go some way towards producing a well-functioning Iraqi army capable of taking the fight to IS. Thus, whilst Peshmerga fighters concentrate on removing IS from the North of Iraq, Sunni militia fighters, in conjunction with the re-constituted Iraqi army can expel them from central Iraq. Thus at the moment coalition ground troops are not needed in Iraq, and will not be needed if the mix of Peshmerga, Sunni militia and Iraqi army can defeat IS in Iraq.

Syria is more complicated, as any intervention would probably drag participating States into the Syrian civil war, is unlikely to happen.

Therefore, Syria-Peshmerga are likely to be helped by the West to fight IS in the North. With Iraqi-Peshmerga reinforcements aiding their Syrian cousins in Kobane, it could be facilitated for both Peshmerga to move further into Syria to fight IS, should they be successful in liberating Kobane and pushing IS back. As the ‘moderate’ rebel groups will continue to return from training in other countries, they will hopefully enable a larger response to IS in Syria, though this will likely be mitigated by rebels also fighting the regime.

Thus, whilst there is a feasible opposition in Iraq to IS, there is not in Syria. If we assume that a politically risky intervention by foreign powers will not happen, only the Peshmerga and rebel groups are willing to fight IS. The Syria army are unwilling to fight IS, because if they crush IS, every rebel group who was fighting IS will turn their fire on the regime, creating a lower likelihood that the Assad regime will survive.

Therefore, whilst it is possible that a multi-force offensive on IS in Iraq could be successful, there is less likelihood of success in Syria as there are simply less forces to fight it. Ergo, IS could feasibly continue to exist in Syria for some time, unless the Syrian-Peshmerga and rebel groups can defeat them, or the Iraqi multi-force offensive continues into Syria to remove IS completely.

In addition, although there was criticism of their employment during the Iraq war, Private Military Contractors (PMCs) could be employed in limited humanitarian roles where anti-IS forces cannot act, as suggested by former-Blackwater CEO Erik Prince. PMCs could be tasked with specific goals, such as evacuating civilians for endangered towns, aid convoys, or defence of strategic positions where there are gaps in anti-IS lines or capabilities.

As PMCs work for those with the largest cheque book, they would not necessarily have to work for a government in their action, they could be funded by rich Syrians, Iraqis and Kurds, or even charities. In 2005, Sam Bells’ ‘Genocide Intervention Network’ of college students and volunteers came very close to hiring a PMC to monitor the situation in Darfur. The leap from a charity attempting to monitor a conflict through a PMC, to a group protecting civilians through a PMC is not great.

Whilst some will feel the employment of PMCs into the campaign against IS is morally and ethically wrong, there is a role which they could play, and could relieve civilian suffering if played well. However, this would require a significant change in the process of warfare, with wealthy individuals and groups engaging directly in conflicts. As there have been no indications of such action so far in this conflict, it is unlikely, but not impossible, that such a private intervention could happen.

In conclusion, there is currently not a need for coalition ground troops in Iraq. Kurdish Peshmerga in the North, and Sunni militias cooperating with the Iraqi army in the centre of Iraq could potentially push back IS with assistance from coalition air power.

However, in Syria, the defeat of IS requires Syrian-Peshmerga and coalition-trained rebel groups to take on both IS and the Assad regime simultaneously, thus there is a lower likelihood of success.

This could create a need for extra anti-IS troops, which are unlikely to be Western, as the West wishes to avoid being dragged into the Syrian civil war, thus the anti-IS force in Iraq could feasible advance into Syria to remove IS, and then withdraw.

Additionally, there may be a role for PMCs to play in the fight against IS, but to avoid the controversies of the Iraq war, they should be limited to specific humanitarian goals, or temporarily filling in holes in the anti-IS forces. Thus, as the situation stands at the moment, there is no need for coalition ground troops to be deployed into either Iraq or Syria to fight IS, but dealing with IS in Syria may require more force than can be amassed by Syrian-Peshmerga and moderate rebels.

A Failure of Intelligence?

Comments yesterday from General Sir Peter Wall on the ISIL/ISIS took me rather by surprise.

Isil has committed grotesque acts of terrorism, but I am not [sure] what kind of understanding we have of their strength and capabilities. We have to be very careful that we do not get sucked into an international conflict without having a proper understanding of the situation on the ground… we were found wanting in these respects in Iraq and Afghanistan and it took some time to get things right.

Is anyone else troubled by the admission that we are so bereft of information on what has been characterised by the Government as a direct threat to the people of the United Kingdom.

The candid admission from the outgoing Chief of the General Staff is in stark contrast to the move to increased involvement being encouraged by the Government.

Interesting contrast.

 

 

ISIS and the UK’s Defence Response

An analysis of what ISIS really means for the defence of the United Kingdom and what our response should be

A quote to start

There’s no problem we can’t ignore if we really put our mind to it
(King Ralph)

Has the world really shifted to any degree that affects the UK?

I will set out my store here and say I can see no obvious way that it has.

We have in the UK, for whatever reason a small number of young Muslim men who feel that the society in which they have been raised, and in many case born, has nothing to offer them: – and needs to be overthrown and replaced by the medievalist creed of Wahhabi Islam.

That overthrow is best accomplished by terror.

There are a somewhat larger number of young men from that background who believe that the secular democratic, or Christian west, is intent on controlling or in some way doing Muslims and Muslim nations down. As a result, it is the duty of all Muslims to take up arms in those states that are so threatened; in order to ‘protect’ them form the influence of the west and it’s (in their eyes) treacherous Muslim allies who have turned from the true faith.

The Syria/ Iraq situation does not change that. These two groups existed before the first shots were fired in Syria, and will exist after the ISIS flood has gone the way of all ‘supper-hot ideological flaming revolutions; and broken down into recrimination and compromise. (Although it may re draw the map in the process)

Any members of the two groups who wanted to get their religious fervour stoked could do so in any number of safe havens – Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, for example.

Accompanied with obligatory AK 47 based tuition.

The existence of an Islamic republic trans Syrian and Iraqi borders does not IMHO change that.

Does this increase the ‘internal’ threat to the UK?

Not sure it does.

We know that in all of the countries where there is significant Muslim fundamentalist struggle, there are (or at least are rumours of) UK citizens involved.

Are Jihadis from the UK more likely to return to the UK from a Caliphate and transfer from the 2nd of the above groups to the 1st than if they come home from Afghanistan or Somalia?

As to how to fix them, any student of early modern history can see the parallels with the rise of militant Protestantism in the 1500’s; and the key to beating the Muslim fundamentalists is the same sort of restrictive policies about preaching etc that were adopted at the time. But that is not a defence issue it is a law and order and social policy one.

What are the defence issues?

Not sure I see any, so what if the map of the middle-east is re drawn and Iraq fragments into 3 parts, so what if northern Syria melts into one of those 3 parts to form a caliphate.

Where is our interest?

What strategic issues arise for us from that?

Just what we can our conventional forces do about it anyway?

As far as I can see the square route of bugger all.

The Navy?

Just about as far from the sea as you can get. Real non-starter.

Army?

Outside of some special-forces activities tied into the next point nothing much.

We trained and helped equip The Large, Well Trained, Well led, Well motivated Iraqi Army (TLWTWLWMIA) for short. That’s the army that we left behind, and we were assured by previous and currently serving Snr officers and officials, before we withdrew having accomplished our mission of leaving a stable Iraq behind; could well handle the job.

That is TLWTWLWMIA that in effect melted away, or ran off so fast there was a small supersonic pop as its vehicles flew past at the first sign of a pick-up truck with a beardy bloke in it.

I doubt us or the US will repeat the tactic.

Any real numbers of UK troops in the ground?

Amazon will be urgently despatching ice skates to :-

Mr B,E Lzbub
1 Inferno Terrace
Damnation Town
Hell

Before that happens.

The Air force?

Well there is scope for targeted UAV and even Tornado strikes if basing can be agreed. (And ok on the ‘me too!’ scale I am sure that a sub somewhere will get to fire some Tomahawks to make it feel better). But Bombing Iraq has not really accomplished much since WW1.

But it is the most likely option of any.

Of course all this can and will be accomplished by the US without us but for the sake of standing next to our allies we might get to blow some shit up somewhere.

So in reality, as often these days, the nature of the threat we face is not going to be ‘dealable’ with by FRES, QEC, T26, or F35.

Nor will ‘force structures’ etc affect it much.

In effect ‘chillax’ chaps it will all sort itself out and if it does not well that’s the local’s problem.

Apart that is from our home grown ‘Fundi Jundies who we will have to deal with by other means, and I do not see that as a defence issue.