The MoD obtains equipment by one of two methods, CADMID or UOR/UCR.
CADMID stands for Concept, Assessment, Demonstration, Manufacture, In-Service and Disposal.
UOR stands for Urgent Operational Requirement, UCR, for urgent Capability Requirement.
The first is a gated and methodical process that is preceded with the R word, requirement. If there is no defined requirement, it doesn’t enter the CADMID process. UOR/UCR is a means by which equipment to meet an identified shortfall is obtained that short cuts CADMID. Sometimes this works, sometimes it does not, that is the risk one takes with short-cuts.
There has long been a desire for something in-between because CADMID can take a long time, and UOR, too risky. As an aside, it would seem that the SDSR 2015 proposed purchase of P-8 Poseidon falls somewhere between CADMID and UOR/UCR.
One of the SDSR 2015 statements was that 3 solid stores support vessels would be obtained to replace a number of older RFA vessels, there was no mention of plans to replace RFA Diligence or RFA Argus, both of which are looking at the end of their service lives.
RFA Argus
RFA Argus started live with the MoD during the 1982 Falkland Islands conflict as the MV Contender Bezant.
Contender Bezant was utilised as an aircraft transport, ferrying helicopters and harriers on deck.
Following purchase by the MoD in 1985 for £13million she was converted to an aviation training ship at the shipyard of Harland & Wolff, Belfast, with the addition of extended accommodation, a flight deck, aircraft lifts and naval radar and communications suites. She is now an aviation support ship operating aircraft from her former container deck with the RORO vehicle deck converted to an aircraft hangar. A Primary Casualty Receiving Facility was added before Argus was sent to participate in the 1991 Gulf War. Another role of RFA Argus is that of RORO vehicle transport with vehicles carried in the hangar and on the flight deck, a role she performed in support of United Nations operations in the former Yugoslavia. During the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Argus was again present in the Persian Gulf as an offshore hospital for coalition troops, earning the nickname “BUPA Baghdad”.
Besides a brief stint in the film World War Z, RFA Argus is now best known for her starting role in OPERATION GRITROCK, the effort to eradicate Ebola from Sierra Leone.
RFA Diligence
RFA Diligenceis also a 1982 veteran, originally an offshore support vessel named the MV Stena Inspector.
After a £28m conversion in 1984 she now serves as a forward repair ship.
More recently, HMS Protector was MV Polarbjørn, another offshore support vessel.
Commercial vessel conversions are demonstrably a proven method of providing non-combat vessels at reasonable cost.
Which bring me to the subject of this post.
Due to current economic conditions, there is a great deal of offshore support and container vessels sitting idle, waiting for either a) the market to pick up, or b) a buyer.
The Norwegian offshore fleet standing idle is reportedlynow at 100 and climbing, and according to latest market research, there are 238 container vessels of various sizes, with nothing to do, most of which are small to medium size.
It is a buyers market.
With our new found agility and efficiency in DE&S, can we adjust plans, timings and requirements to take advantage of a fleeting opportunity?
Out of the many FOI requests that are published there are sometimes ones that are very interesting. This one provides the number of times the ‘Point Class’ Strategic RORO ships are used on operations.
At £30m operating costs per year, for all of them, the usage data is detailed in this table.
Although it might not look like a lot, the service provides assured access to shipping at a relatively low cost.
As one of our very knowledgeable commenters points out, these figures would seem to exclude ‘non-operational’ tasks.
Obviously they are not the same type of ship with completely different roles, the Bay class LPD(R) cost about £10m each per year, by way of comparison,
Regardless, still a lot of capacity for a moderate cost.
It is not very often that I have an idea that I don’t think is a bit suspect, so these days, I tend to write about things and pose a question, but on this one, the more I think about it the more I like it so in time-honoured tradition of all defence bloggers, a modest suggestion…
What’s the Small Idea?
A demountable launcher for in-service and future rockets and missiles that can be carried by aircraft, ships and any in service or civilian truck.
In effect, a universal launcher.
Why bother?
There are four reasons; availability, deception, flexibility and deployability.
Availability
Rockets and missiles are becoming increasingly costly, and as with many expensive ‘payloads’ they are often carried on relatively low-cost vehicles that are subject to maintenance and damage. To illustrate this, take the example of a land based anti-aircraft missile like the CAMM/Land Ceptor system.
The cost of the missiles is far in excess of the cost of the truck but the truck can be rendered unserviceable by a myriad of relatively minor issues, taking the missiles with it.
In peacetime, this could be as trivial as an indicator bulb but in war time, a broken driveshaft or engine fault would do just the same. The value of the truck is low, we have thousands of them. But the value of the missiles, both in cost and operational terms, is very high, we have far fewer missiles than trucks.
If part of our land based air defence capability was taken out of action by a single trucks engine problem, the potential consequences could be dire, far in excess of the perceived impact of an engine fault.
So, simply being able to move the missiles from one truck to another has enormous value.
Now with the example above, they are not wholly tied into the vehicle and can be demounted, but the principle remains. Other weapon systems are more tightly integrated with their carriage.
This is the first reason, demountable systems separate the valuable payload from the less valuable and likely less reliable means of transportation.
The availability of the expensive payload is therefore, maximised.
Deception
Deception was an art form that we used to be very good at, because it was a necessity.
Recent operations have been conducted in an environment where enemy observation and reconnaissance from the air has been practically non-existent.
So, it is a capability that we no longer practice.
However, with the ubiquity of aerial observation capabilities we must get used to operating in an environment where freedom from observation can no longer be assured.
Deception, therefore, should be fashionable again.
Yes, you guessed it, this means the exterior of the universal launcher must be constrained by the dimensions of either a 20ft, 30ft, 40ft or 45ft intermodal container. It must also have the appropriate corner fittings and look, pretty much, exactly like a container, possibly a reefer container.
Don’t groan!
There are millions of containers in use, their ubiquity allows the launcher to simply disappear into the civilian transport infrastructure background. This visual camouflage complicates enemy intelligence and targeting processes and in some circumstances, facilitate both tactical surprise and ambiguity of strategic intent.
This is nothing knew of course.
Making it look like a refrigerated container (reefer) would also provide cover for a thermal and audible signature of generators or batteries used for operation of the launchers on-board systems.
Flexibility
The objective is to provide launch platform flexibility, the same launcher could be used for land based anti-ship missiles, intermediate range cruise missiles, the GMLRS/ATACMS family of rockets, CAMM air aircraft missiles and future systems such as a GMLRS launched SPEAR/SDB.
This would allow a single launch system to be loaded with the required missiles or rockets, quickly.
Although it is unlikely to want to load the launcher with a CAMM pod and GMLRS pod, the ability to mix and match different calibre rockets would be very useful.
Platform diversity is never a bad thing and provides growth options for future systems.
We might also consider ensuring it can use enemy munitions.
With appropriate hooklift fittings, the launch container could be quickly loaded and unloading using DROPS/EPLS/Multilift type trucks. Conventional reloading using mobile cranes would be possible, but of rapid reloading is needed, simply swap containers.
Deployability
For rapid deployment, there are many scenarios and possibilities.
They could be already attached to a military donor vehicle, in this scenario, the containerised launch system offers no logistic advantages over a bespoke platform, in fact; it might potentially mean a slightly increased weight.
Other scenarios could see it deployed using the civilian container infrastructure and transported at the destination using vehicles already in that location.
In a major conflict, the availability of military trucks might be constrained, for this reason, the ability to use vehicles of opportunity is an obvious benefit of a demountable launch mechanism.
Another advantage is such a self-contained (see what I did there!) launcher could be quickly fitted to vessels of opportunity.
Whilst not a return to the post Falklands era of containerised Seawolf it could be on the same same lines. The crucial difference is that Sea Ceptor/CAMM does not need a radar director and therefore, much more self-contained. In a task force, the inbound missile or aircraft location, identification and tracking would be performed by a Type 45 Destroyer, or possibly a Type 26 Frigate, with launch instruction and initial target location transmitted to the container over a tactical data link.
The ability to separate launch platform from the direction/control platform is one of the great strengths of the Sea Ceptor/CAMM system. Vessels with no organic air defence systems like auxiliaries or civilian vessels can now become part of the air defence bubble, in effect, they become missile trucks.
Against an inbound threat, the Type 45 does all the clever stuff and simply uses the best placed launch platform by remote control.
With GMLRS/ATACMS/GMLRS launched SDB/SPEAR Cap 3, there may also be some scenarios in which land attack precision fires could be delivered from a wider variety of military and civilian vessels.
A few thoughts on design
This isn’t a design as such, just a few ideas.
There are a few questions to ask, will it need a levelling mechanism, does the launcher need to be trainable, or will simple elevation be sufficient, how can efflux be managed and what about power and communication/interface requirements?
It is also clear that, despite looking like a standard container, it will not be one. This is not a proposal for a launch system that can be stuffed inside any container, instead, a launch system that looks like a standard container.
Because we know the dimensions of standard intermodal containers are the constraining factor, the number and types of missiles and rockets possible to be carried will be a product of these dimensions.
If we want more or larger, go up to the next standard container size.
Stabilisation and Demountability
Stabilisation and levelling legs will be required in addition to a hooklift and standard twistlock corner fittings. This is simple engineering and extremely common, European swap body containers, for example.
Hydraulic stabilisation, and levelling legs and pads are also commonplace, so nothing too challenging.
Power and Communication
An internal compartment would house appropriate communications, data link masts, power generation and conditioning equipment, cooling and battery systems. Each would also have external connectors for power, local diagnostics and data.
Power requirements would be relatively modest and potentially provided by a combination of lithium Ion battery packs, fuel cells or diesel generators, all widely available.
Whilst the norm would be for control via short to medium range in service secure tactical data links, emission free fibre optic cables can be used in excess of several thousand metres.
Efflux
Some missile systems use a soft launch mechanism, such as CAMM. Efflux management becomes less of an issue, therefore.
GMLRS on the other hand, has a significant efflux.
A traditional shipborne VLS uses an efflux chamber with the products of combustion vented vertically through an exhaust adjacent to missile hatches. When I was doing a spot of random googling on the subject I came across another article on a very similar subject, great minds and all that!
It talks about adding additional capacity for USN vessels using a containerised Mk41 VLS, but also describes a system for mounting GMLRS pods, image (stolen), below!
A similar arrangement could be used.
Alternatively, the efflux could be managed by simply directing it to the ground, perpendicular to the launch platform. This would require the launcher to be trainable so that the missiles/rockets were aligned in such a manner that the exhaust gases were directed to the side of the launcher. It would also cause problems for shipborne use, again, trade-offs.
Reading the linked article above, the suggestion to use a Mk41 VLS is interesting. They propose that the VLS is housed inside the container and raised prior to deployment. Nothing wrong with this but Mk41 is very expensive and it would result in a loss of flexibility for the most likely payloads. Mk41 also needs low-pressure air, fresh water, seawater, cooling, and three and single phase power., hardly conducive to the simplicity concept.
But it did get me thinking on the general subject and if you remember, Lockheed Martin have produced the Single Cell Launcher (SCL) and a standalone version of the ExLSlaunch system.
The standalone ExLS could be slotted into the launch mechanism and raised prior to launch.
Launch Mechanism
For unguided rockets, the mechanism must be able to position them in elevation and traverse. For guided missiles and rockets, the requirement for elevation AND traverse becomes reduced, if the launch vehicle itself can be used for positioning.
If the launch mechanism could only provide variation in elevation would be much less complex and compact, but for maximum flexibility it would be desirable to have both.
Something similar to the below, the Romanian LAROM system that can carry and fire legacy 122mm GRAD rockets or the newer 160m LAR 160mm rockets from IMI;
Payloads
With the HIMARS single pod GMLRS system, the thing that makes it wide is the self-loading rails. Accepting an external crane reload process means the Rocket Pod Container (RPC) can be loaded in pairs and still be fit inside a single container, the Korean RTK-2000 takes the same approach.
The larger rocket in the image below is the 300km range ATACMS.
Looking at the various possibilities and container dimensions, 20ft, 30ft and 40ft, it is clear that even including the height penalty of a trainable launch mechanism capacity can still be reasonably good for a variety of rockets and missiles.
In a 20ft container with an internal length of 5.9m, 2.4m width and 2.4m height, ATACMS, GMLRS, Naval Strike Missile, LAR-160, CAMM and CAMM-ER all fit. LRASM and SCALP would need a 30ft container. Even accounting for a recent stockpile reduction, the UK has a relatively large stock of Storm Shadow air-launched cruise missiles. The similar MBDA TAURUS missile has a ground launch system concept so I wonder if we could adopt the same approach?
Rockets
Missiles
What is clear is there are many missiles and rockets that can be fired from such a ground launcher, make that a universal ground launcher than can be carried by standard trucks, and perhaps ships, and you have a very flexible system.
Some of those systems are in service, some not.
How would I pay for it, withdrawing the M/GMLRS launch vehicles would be a good start.
Summary
This is a bit of a hair brained idea that meets not a single defined military need or requirement, but still.
What could be in here?
A load of toilet rolls, or;
24 GMLRS,
8 Naval Strike Missiles,
4 ATACMS,
24 CAMM,
Or combinations of these and others.
I like it!
UPDATE
My friend Sven, over at Defense and Freedom just reminded me that he thought of it first 🙂
“Old delineations may disappear. A single multiple rocket launcher may be capable of launching area fires rockets, pinpoint accuracy rockets, scatterable AT mines, coastal defence anti-ship missiles, anti-air missiles, anti-radar missiles, heavy thermobaric short range rockets, rockets with sensor drones and bomb strike-replacing bridge and bunker buster missiles.”
In 2012 I wrote about the Generic Base Architecture and FOBEX, an open systems architecture for bases and a series of development trials designed to test some of the components.
So what happened to it?
Are fixed bases so last war, contingency operations are the future, and never again will we need to worry about water, food and poop?
Although this video is a few months old it has some interesting concepts, like all good concept videos (my favourites are from DCNS) it has littoral warfighting disaster relief!
The reason I posted it was to prompt further discussion on a coupel of ideas we have been looking at recently, SSK, whether the US LCS would be better replaced by something like Type 26, or more appropriately, something like the BMT Venator, and whether a fast landing craft is simply a nice to have, or vital.
Look at any of the marketing material for any new combat vessel these days and there is always a reference to the potable water generation capacity in relation to how it can support Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Response operations. Water supply is often a critical problem to be solved in the early phase of such a response and yet the means of getting potable water from the ship to the coast and inland seems to receive less attention.
Using water distribution points to fill plastic bottles and then transfer them to helicopters for transport inland is about as inefficient and expensive as it gets but in the absence of an alternative, better than nothing.
With the right combination of ships, equipment and personnel, a more efficient method will be to utilise water sources onshore, purify/treat, store and transport forward using tankers or standard trucks for bottled water.
For fuel, both the UK and US have capable systems for transferring fuel from afloat tankers to installations on the near shore from where it can be distributed. The UK’s system is called JOFS.
The video below shows JOFS in action in a ship to shore role, making use of Army Work Boats, RE Divers and Mexeflote’s to bring aviation fuel ashore, the system is called the Towed Flexible Barge Discharge System (TFBDS), supplied by DESMI and Trelleborg, 5 are in service. The barge or dracone has a capacity of 300,000 Litres, once it has been filled by connecting to an RFA (or civilian) tanker the barge is towed to within 200m of the shoreline and connected to a manifold raft. this raft is then connected via flexible pipelines to the onshore installation that uses 136,000 Litre flexible pillow tanks.
Using a flexible pipe for potable water transfer from a ship to the shore (like JOFS) has the potential to provide a much higher throughput than helicopters and would also allow the finite number of helicopters to be made available for other tasks.
Once onshore, temporary pipelines might also be used in place of trucks, again, providing a step change in efficiency.
This video from TOHL shows the installation by helicopter of a 1,000m long, 25mm diameter HDPE pipeline in less than 10 minutes, impressive.
25mm might seem like a small pipe, and it is, but even accounting for pipe losses and other factors, the throughput would be around 3,000 Litres per hour. In a 24 hour period at the WHO recommended 15 Litres per day per person, that is just under 5,000 people. These are back of a fag packet calculations but still provide a god indicator.
Another way of viewing that is 3,600 jerrycans, or 70 pallet loads of bottled water.
Half the throughput and it is still a worthwhile transfer rate, especially in difficult terrain that might require trucks to navigate a tortuous route to get the destination.
A second prototype has been completed, the result of a successful Kickstarter Campaign.
Whether this is for the rapid ship to shore transfer of potable water to an onshore distribution point or an inland application with no ships in sight, small, light and rapidly installed pipelines are efficient and make use of scarce resources like helicopters.
We often have an image in our heads of the global supply chain being a model of efficiency and smooth running, like a Toyota Sewing Machine, and the military supply chain comprising practices that are stuck in the 18th century, but the reality is actually very far from it.
This video Maersk shows the paper trail of a single container shipment.
Do watch it all the way through, it is fascinating. It shows that there are 200 paper documents required to get a container from Africa to Europe and the number of delays, incompatible systems, dodgy workarounds and all round general inefficiency.
The assumption is that the physical system is fine but the information system is a bag of spanners. But even that assumption is not correct, as I described in the series on pallets, containers and boxes, the amount of dimensional incompatibility between road, rail, ships, pallets and containers is stagering. It is a wonder anything gets shipped at all.
This postfrom 2010 shows the scale of the issue with software and logistics in the MoD and this slide shows exactly the same shortcomings in 1991 as 2003.
Over a decade of learning, investment and development for zero improvement.
Poor asset tracking underpinned by poor communications and information systems inevitably leads to over ordering, hoarding and generally a lack of logistics performance, too much stuff or not enough stuff in the right places and the right times.
As we all know, you really need to know where your towel is!
Since then, the MoD has embarked on the a number of projects such as LogNEC/FLIS, the large contract with Boeing.
This is not a UK specific solution, the Swedish FMV for example, has just let a contractto Mil Def Systems and Track 24 for a container tracking system, read more here
As the British Army refocuses on contingency operations, integrating geographic asset tracking and visibility, further implementing FLIS, and doing more with considerably less but any notion of just copying civvy street needs to be examined very closely.
If one was in the market for a range of military equipment and wanting to indirectly support a potential ally to irritate and confound a potential enemy one might look at the defence market place in Ukraine.
A good starting point would be;
Nowadays, Ukroboronprom Ukrainian Defence Industry is the consolidation of a big number of multidisciplinary enterprises related to various fields of defense industry. The enterprises that conduct the economic activity in the area of development, manufacturing, sales, repair, upgrading and recycling of weaponry, military and special purpose equipment, ammunitions, and also participate in military and technical cooperation with foreign countries, have made the Ukrainian Defence Industry membership.
A few examples of things on the Ukraine shelf or development opportunities;
The Falarick 90 gun launched missile that is used by CMI with their various medium calibre turrets and gun combinations, also available in 105mm
Going up the scale is the Skif missile, imagine the endless hours of fun you could have saying you were going skiffing
Too obscure a reference, perhaps a more interesting option would be to look at Antonov.
The first aircraft that springs to mind is the brand new AN-178 currently looking for development partners in Europe. It does look increasingly like Poland will act as the bridge between East and West and Saudi Arabia also has an interest
The AN-178 could fill the gap between the RAF’s Chinook helicopter at 10 tonnes payload and the Atlas at 30 tonnes plus. It reminds me of a slightly larger BAE 146, in essence, it is an AN-158 with a ramp.
The AN-178 can carry 18 tonnes on a cargo deck that is sized to accommodate 463L pallets and ISO containers with what looks like an impressive short field and austere runway performance.
It is early days yes, the first flight only took place a few months ago, but it does look promising, investigate using a Rolls Royce BR700 series engine and it gets even more interesting.
These are kind of semi-serious suggestions but one that I think actually has some value is expanding and extending the Strategic Airlift Interim Service (SALIS). SALIS is a commercial arrangement managed by the Strategic Airlift Coordination Cell (SALCC) in the Royal Netherlands Air Force Base at Eindhoven.
The SALIS-Contract basically consists of two fundamental elements. Firstly, the assured access to strategic airlift capability for outsized cargo. Secondly the ownership and usage of Participants agreed quota of flying hours per annum. The assured access guarantees the assured availability of two (2) AN124-100 under part-time charter for any of the Participants national purpose, and the assured availability of up to six (6) AN124-100 aircraft on priority call for the rapid deployment of forces in support of NATO/EU operations. The SALIS Steering Board is the highest directing body for all SALIS matters.
SALIS has been recently extended to 2016 as the A400M project ramps up deliveries but even with a large European fleet of A400M’s in service there will still be a need for long range heavy strategic lift.
The SALIS participating nations are described below;
The consortium includes 12 NATO nations (Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, the United Kingdom) and two partner nations (Finland and Sweden).
The AN-124-100 Ruslan is a hugely impressive aircraft; 120 tonnes payload and 4,800km range for starters.
The first thing Europe/NATO should do is extend the SALIS contract beyond 2016 to at least 2022, this provides Ukraine with a stable source of income and in reality, would not cost a great deal when spread across the SALIS nations.
In parallel with this would be an effort to ‘de-Russia’ the agreement comprising two parts, commercial and technical.
Antonov has also been trying to develop the next generation Ruslan for a while, there have also been concepts to create a version with a taller cargo bay for tall industrial loads and a Chinook helicopter without disassembly.
The list of improvements in the AN124-100M-150 includes (from the Antonov website)
payload increased from 120 tons to 150 tons;
take-off weight increased from 392 tons to 402 tons;
flight range increased, including for cargo of 120 tons from 4650 km to 5400 km;
aircraft assigned service life is increased to 24,000 flight hours; works on its extension up to 50 000 flight hours/10 000 flights/45 years service life are being performed;
the new PO-500 schedule of maintenance has been introduced (maintenance every 500 flight hours);
onboard crane equipment providing loading-unloading operations of a single piece of cargo up to 40 tons weight;
fuselage structure had been strengthened to enable airlift of a single piece of cargo up to 150 tons weight;
Navigation System and radar have been updated;
digital anti-skid braking system allowing to reduce landing distance up to 30% have been installed;
crew reduced from 6 to 4 members, and the comfort level of the crew rest cabin has been improved;
military oxygen equipment has been exchanged for the civil one;
reinforced wheels and tires have been installed;
new devices for engine control have been installed;
modernized systems of reverse control and engine vibration state monitoring have been developed;
the SRPPZ-2000 ground proximity warning system installed;
A826 inertial navigation system upgraded;
Enhanced observation (EHS) has been applied;
Minimum Equipment List has been developed and is now being implemented
Added to this list should be an effort to remove any Russian sub-contractor or equipment components and replace with them home-grown or European manufactured items. The objective would be to move away from any reliance on Russian industry and upgrade the existing aircraft in the SALIS availability pool. This might also reveal opportunities for further development to improve performance or reduce in life costs, Rolls Royce Trent engines perhaps. They would still be civilian owned and managed with no military features.
Funding for this development would be on a loan or shared equity basis, binding Antonov into the European aerospace industry.
Once this non-Russian Ruslan design is available the SALIS partners should fund modifications to any existing aircraft and seriously consider increasing the airframe assured availability number from 6 to 12, or even 15.
This would be a smart move by Europe and/or NATO, a strategic investment in industrial cooperation with Ukraine that supports indirectly their security operations in the East and much less provocative than sending military aid.
The obvious spin-off is a significant improvement in the ability of the SALIS nations to project power and respond to humanitarian disaster relief operations, regardless of the A400M’s fine qualities.
None of this would be ‘easy’ but some obvious joined up thinking between overseas development assistance departments and shared funding models would reduce the overall impact on European defence budgets even further.
12 of the 150M version would be able to move a maximum 900 tonnes in a single lift cycle (assuming the receiving airport has the capacity), or put another way, more than double the entire lift capacity of the RAF’s C17 entire fleet.
Let’s not get too ambitious, but who knows, it might even make the original medium weight FRES concept viable and trade is always better than aid!
I have been rather remiss in not writing anything about Dunkirk but with so much great material out there it is hard to produce anything that is interesting.
On Twitter earlier someone highlighted an aspect of the Dunkirk landings I had never heard of.
Three were built, one at Bray Dunes and two at la Panne, using trucks and any expedient materials they could find.
From the BBC’s Peoples War website;
A makeshift pier
After the first day or so we began to receive motorised units in La Panne, after which a new evacuation stratagem was devised. At low tide, the highest vehicles were to be driven out to a given point, and a pier formed by driving out and parking up more trucks alongside. From these, the troops would be able to clamber into the boats that were now able to come alongside.
The hard part was the organisation of the assembly of the pier between bouts of shelling, low-level bombing and machine gunning from enemy aircraft. Once it was done, though, this procedure was a most welcome break for us. It made filling the boats so much easier. There was no more brute force required to push out the boats and get wet through in the process.
Using enormous physical and mental resources
I know that none of the RN personnel realised just how much energy was required for the sleepless hours and days that the evacuation entailed. By the time the army had reached the beach, it was virtually drained. We of the RN landing party had arrived fresh, so the frequent 24 hours we spent servicing boats did nothing to diminish our enthusiasm for the job. Enthusiasm, however, did not entirely compensate for exhaustion.
We were thankful, therefore, for the labour-saving piers that we helped to build. So improved was the evacuation by this, that troops were now able to embark with fewer directives from us, sometimes just under the orders of a senior army officer.
‘Anymore for the Skylark?’
We could now spend more time with our own group and discuss the future. HQ staff at La Panne, plus General Gort (Lord Gort), would at some time soon have to be evacuated. We had also to make provision for our own escape.
It was at one of these get-togethers, involving a foray into the Bofors-gun crew’s rations, that a direct hit was made on one of our piers by a German bomber. Reading about such an occurrence is one thing, but experiencing the frustration that it caused is something else. The lads waiting on the pier, next in line to be taken off for their journey home, had been so close. We no longer joked, ‘Anymore for the Skylark?’, and the gap in our pier was never filled.
The piers were built by various Royal Engineer units including 246 Field Company RE, 59 Field Company, 38 Field Company and divisional elements from 1 and 4 Division, read more here. I have also read that members of the Corps of Military Police took part, especially in driving the lorries onto the beach at low tide.
I suppose the reality of the situation was that anyone and everyone was involved to some degree although there are conflicting reports of whose idea it was, the balance of evidence seems to point to a Royal Navy Sub Lieutenant requesting a pier be built be who came up with the idea of using 3 ton trucks, I guess that is lost to history.
The piers enabled several thousand personnel to escape to fight another day.
The mess tin and hexamine stove will be familiar to millions.
But technology marches on, is there a replacement that saves weight, has lower toxicity and doesn’t mean you have to spend 8 hours a day scrubbing two inches of carbon off the back?
Of course there is!
Fire Dragon from BCB International is a new(ish) fuel that has a number of advantages over hexamine; lightweight, non-toxic, high heat output, easy to light, long lasting, it is an all-round better solution.
Yes they are robust, yes they used to fit neatly in 58 pattern webbing wrapped in your green towel (showing my age there) and yes they can be polished to a high shine, but what about progress?
Sea to Summit have a rather nifty collapsible silicon cooking pot that allows you to shave a few grams off the total weight, save a few cubic centimetres and above all, look like you are at the cutting edge?
Think Defence 